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Perspective: The history of weather forecasting 
For the interested reader, this chapter provides supplementary information regarding the 
historical development of weather forecasting and communication of the forecasts. This 
background may help place the work described in this PhD study within a wider context. 
Information on future weather conditions has historically been important to people in 
industries such as farming, fishing, and sailing. Because of their dependence of the weather, 
people have always attempted to predict the weather (Smits, 2009a). Different approaches, 
based on various ideas, concepts and models have been implemented with varying success. 
Meteorologists were not available to issue weather forecasts in previous centuries, but 
experience accumulated over generations was used to predict the weather for millennia. For 
example, weather sayings date to Assyria and Babylonia, and runic calendars were employed 
for centuries (Smits, 2009a). Information was communicated orally and by symbols carved 
into wood or stone. Predictions provided few details and were highly uncertain. 
The use of almanacs as early as the 3rd century was a primitive attempt to incorporate science 
into weather forecasting (Smits, 2009b). The idea was that weather was closely associated 
with star and moon phases and would repeat when these phenomena repeated. Daily weather 
predictions were made based on previous weather observations, for example, for one year in 
the future (Smits, 2009b). Words and symbols printed on paper replaced carvings in wood and 
stone in one-way communication between scientists and laypeople. The scientific approach 
should have represented an improvement over traditional knowledge. However, it was not 
until the middle of the 19th century that weather predictions were simplified and presented as 
climate information in the Norwegian almanac. As Carl Fearnley, professor in astronomy, 
said in 1865: “The predictions were not just useless, they were misleading” (Smits, 2009b, p. 
12). Scientists now understood the conceptualization used for the predictions was flawed.  
The Crimean War (1853-1856) is recognized as the beginning of modern weather forecasting, 
as scientists began to realize that weather systems moved from one location to another. The 
novel concept was that if you could observe weather in different places and send the 
observations by (recently invented) telegraphy, people could be warned of future weather 
events. Several countries established meteorological institutes and began to “hint” about the 
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weather for the following day. Although it was incomplete, this method of conceptualization 
was no longer flawed and enabled more certain predictions than before. Forecasts were now 
communicated using various approaches. For example, texts were placed in central locations. 
In Norway, symbols were attached to trains traveling from Christiania (Oslo). The institute 
informed people that the forecasts were incorrect 2 out of 10 times and that the accuracy of 
the forecasts decreased for locations far from Christiania (Smits, 2009c). Some early 
predictions of weather (19th century) were called probabilities and indications rather than 
forecasts (National Research Council, 2006).  
In 1919, Vilhelm Bjerknes and the Bergen School of Meteorology invented the Polar Front 
Model. This model was based on similar concepts but enabled a more complete 
conceptualization. The interpretation of meteorological observations enabled weather 
forecasts with greater accuracy. As meteorology evolved during the 20th century, the 
uncertainties in the forecasts were by some viewed as a weakness (National Research 
Council, 2006). The more precise predictions became deterministic and were providing a 
single value for parameters, without statements of uncertainty (National Research Council, 
2006). However, presenting uncertain information as certain may be misleading (May, 2001).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, computer-based weather forecasts (numerical weather predictions) 
became more prevalent in operational forecasting (Lynch, 2008). Computer power has 
continued to increase, which enables more complete conceptualizations, improvements in 
models and predictions that are made hours, days, and weeks in advance. The improvements 
in models should reduce uncertainty in the predictions. Although most forecast information 
still is deterministic, there is a movement toward again including more uncertainty 
information (National Research Council, 2006; Joslyn & Savelli, 2010).  
Weather forecasts are continuously communicated through new media such as radio, 
television, and the Internet. Written and spoken words as well as symbols and other graphics 
are employed. The popularity of online weather reports has increased, and multimodal 
forecast information dominates communication, which (in a historic perspective) primarily 
consists of one-way communication from experts to laypeople. This study intends to 
encourage meteorology to keep up with the new trend of more two-way communication 
between experts and laypeople. Such a dialog can help create and provide useful information 




Different people in different occupations depend on weather forecasts to plan their 
work and recreational schedules. People with no expertise in meteorology frequently 
interpret weather forecasts and uncertainty information. These non-experts apply their 
prior knowledge and experiences in a variety of fields and their abilities to synthesize 
different types of information to interpret forecasts. Initial studies of communication 
and the interpretation of forecasts and uncertainty information focused on separate 
pieces of information rather than the situations of ordinary users. In this study, 
situations of typical users are simulated to increase the ecological validity when 
examining how different user groups interpret, integrate, and use information from 
online weather reports in their everyday decision-making. First, qualitative interviews 
of twenty-one Norwegians from five different user groups (farmers, exterior painters, 
tour guides, and upper secondary school teachers and students) were conducted. 
Second, sixteen upper secondary school students participated in an eye-tracking study. 
Immediately after this study, the participants were asked to verbalize their thoughts 
(think out loud) when viewing the gaze data. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted to ensure the collection of rich data. In this study, the participants were 
given weather forecasts from one selected online weather report (www.Yr.no), which 
served as a basis for both data collections. The verbal data were analyzed by assigning 
codes and categories to the transcribed statements. 
The main findings of the study are as follows: a) For each representation, such as 
tables, diagrams, numbers and symbols, a set of strengths and functions (affordances) 
was ascribed and exploited by the participants. b) Only part of the representations that 
provided forecast and uncertainty information at the website was used by each 
participant. c) Nuances such as color and the number of drops were important in the 
interpretations of the weather symbols and forecast uncertainty, which were sometimes 
interpreted differently than intended by the forecast provider. d) Prior knowledge 
affected the participants’ interpretations and even superseded the given information in 
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apparent conflicts. e) The interpretations were also affected by the integration of 
information from different representations, which was performed to create a dynamic 
picture of the weather and to control and compare information. f) The decision-making 
process influenced the construction of different reading paths and the selections of 
representations in different situations. g) The participants used a varying amount of 
information in their decision-making; their selection was dependent on the importance 
of the envisaged activity and the weather conditions for the day. h) Additionally, in 
situations in which the participants had a lack of experiences, this lack provides a 
possible explanation for why part of the information was occasionally not understood 
and used. i) Evaluations of weather dynamics and the degree of certainty in the 
forecast were disregarded when quick decisions were made.  
Some implications of the findings for communication and future research are as 
follows: a) Providers of online weather reports should take care in the details of the 
information they present because such nuances may be interpreted as substantial 
information. b) Uncertainty information should be easy to understand and use, and the 
benefits of this information should be clear to enable users to interpret the degree of 
certainty as intended. c) Information communicated in online weather reports should 
enable the use of different decision-processes. d) A comprehensive use of multimodal 
information in communication appears to be an advantage when information is used by 
different users in different situations. e) However, some users should be guided and 
supported to facilitate the interpretation, integration, and use of information from 
multiple representations in situations where they lack experiences and/or aim for an 
elaborate decision process. f) One possibility to support persons that lack experiences 
and have low situation awareness might be to provide consequences and impacts of 
forecast weather. g) Notably, forecast providers should take into account the needs of 
the forecast users. h) To achieve this goal, users’ needs should be addressed in a co-
production process. i) Future studies should investigate the situations of typical users 
and different decision-making processes. 
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Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1: In addition to motivations for the study, background information on 
multimodal reading and meaning-making, human decision-making, risk and 
uncertainty, and communication between experts and laypeople is provided. 
Chapter 2: Certain methodological considerations are presented. An explanation of the 
interviews and eye-tracking and a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
interviews and eye-tracking as methods are provided. Finally, there are two short 
discussions of generalization of findings and study ethics. 
Chapter 3: The three papers of the study are introduced. 
Chapter 4: A summary of the lessons learned from the study is provided, before I 
discuss research-based weather communication, communication and learning of terms, 
and decision-making and accidents. 
Chapter 5: A brief concluding summary and suggestions for future studies are 
provided. 
Aims of the thesis 
The overarching aim of this study was to identify different interpretations, integrations, and 
uses of the weather forecasts and uncertainty information on the website www.Yr.no 
(hereafter: Yr.no). Selected user groups were included in the study to identify a variety of 
forecast interpretations and to determine whether their interpretations were as intended by the 
forecast provider when making decisions for everyday weather-dependent activities. 
Moreover, the study aimed to identify the representations (e.g., tables, symbols, and verbal 
text) that were used, and the reasons for integrating and using various representations.  
This study is motivated by and provides insight into the communication process between 
forecast providers and the end-users and discusses the implications of the findings for the 




To fulfill the aim of this study, the following question was articulated:  
How is information in online weather reports interpreted, integrated, and used by laypeople 
when making everyday decisions for weather-dependent activities? 
To address this question, three research questions are presented and answered. Answers to the 
first question, which is addressed in the first paper, provide insight into how information on 
the website was interpreted and integrated by laypeople. Evaluating how previous knowledge 
and experience were employed in the interpretations enabled the formulation of suggestions 
regarding how to design the communication of the forecasts. The second question, which is 
addressed in the second paper, provides insight into how forecast information is used by 
laypeople in different everyday situations when making decisions regarding weather-
dependent activities. Answers to the third question, which is addressed in the third paper, is a 
more theoretical contribution to how non-experts access and use multimodal weather 
information. This study provides a deeper understanding of how laypeople make meaning in 
online weather information by exploring their reasons for using different pieces of 
information in a decision-making context. 
The research questions (RQ) of the study are as follows: 
1) How is information in an online weather report interpreted and integrated by 
laypeople with respect to the degree of certainty, and how is previous knowledge 
employed in the interpretations? 
 
2) What factors influence the amount of information used by laypeople in (hypothetical) 
everyday situations involving the use of online weather forecasts, and how is complex 
and uncertain information from Yr.no handled when making decisions for weather-
dependent activities? 
 
3) What reasons do laypeople give for: a) reading the various representations on a 





1. Setting the scene 
1.1 Introduction 
First my personal and professional motivations for this study are presented in Section 
1.2. The first and third research questions concern the reading of multimodal 
information and meaning-making, and Section 1.3 is giving an overview of theory on 
these topics, including interpretation and integration of information. The second 
research question addresses decision-making. Literature from three areas, decision 
theory, risk communication, and science communication, is also highlighted by von 
Winterfeldt (2013) as relevant to bridging science and decision-making. For this 
reason, Section 1.4 discusses theory on information processing and human decision-
making, and rationality. In Section 1.5, background on risk and uncertainty is 
presented. Finally, all research questions relate to public communication. Therefore, 
Section 1.6 provides an overview of models that describe communication between 
experts and laypeople.  
1.2 Motivations for this study 
1.2.1 My motivations 
After finishing my master’s degree in meteorology, I began working as a weather 
forecaster at the Norwegian Meteorological Institute (MET Norway) in 2006. One of 
the things I loved about this job was the daily contact with end-users and the amount 
of feedback they provided. Most people did not indicate that they were satisfied with a 
forecast; rather, they described problems that were attributed to an inaccurate 
(perception of the) forecast. Their feedback is useful because we (the meteorological 
society) make attempts to improve the quality of our forecast. Over time, my interest 
in the communication aspect of the forecasting process increased, especially regarding 
the words and sentences used to write a text forecast or when talking to newspaper or 
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radio journalists. In 2007, MET Norway and the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation 
(NRK) began to provide forecasts on the new web service Yr.no, which involved a 
shift to a greater use of graphics (e.g., symbols) to express the forecasts. My interest in 
communication also shifted toward graphical forecasts. To learn more about 
communication, I began taking part-time teacher education in 2009. When working as 
a forecaster, I experienced the feeling of having a clear impression of weather 
developments and of communicating a clear message to the public from time to time. 
However, I also received feedback from users who were unsatisfied with the forecast 
on such occasions. Thus, it seemed that some users interpreted the forecast differently 
from what I had intended. Other forecasters described similar experiences. I spent 
some time in the library and online to research the field of forecast communication. 
Unfortunately, I could not find as much information as I could like, and was not 
satisfied. After completing my teacher education in spring 2011, I was confident that 
improvements in the communication of weather forecasts were possible. I was ready to 
pursue a PhD to investigate the communication of weather forecasts to the public. My 
goal was to learn how laypeople interpret, integrate, and use information in online 
weather reports when making decisions, and I hoped the results could be used to 
improve communication.  
I find some limitations concerning the extent of the study worth mentioning. The 
Norwegian Meteorological Institute communicates their forecasts in several media. 
For example, weather services to governmental agencies are communicated at the 
web-service halo.met.no, and forecasts for military purposes and civil aviation have 
other channels. Weather forecasts to the public are communicated at the web-service 
Yr.no, in addition to on radio and at television. Extreme weather events are 
communicated in all channels, but in separate forecasts. To limit the scope of my PhD-
thesis, I aimed to study non-experts` use and interpretation of weather forecasts 
communicated at the web-service Yr.no for everyday decision-making about weather 
dependent activities. For this reason weather forecasts and decision-making involving 
extreme weather events and huge decision stakes were not included.  
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1.2.2 Professional motivations 
Information from weather forecasts can help people take appropriate actions to protect 
their lives, property (Schultz et al., 2010) and well-being, that is, to make informed 
decisions. Informed decision-making leads to desirable outcomes and prevents 
unnecessary costs to society (Pielke & Carbone, 2002). The study of how people make 
decisions based on information from weather forecasts is important to improving the 
communication of forecasts. Improved communication can contribute to increased 
forecast value for users (Stuart et al., 2006) and help them make informed decisions. 
However, there is limited understanding of how information from weather forecasts is 
applied in decision-making (Morss et al., 2010). Previous studies are primarily 
concerned with interpretations of independent forecast information and do not address 
the situations of typical users. Thus, how laypeople make decisions in the context of a 
full weather report should be explored (Morss et al., 2010). As of May 07, 2016, the 
top five (in terms of daily visitors and page views) weather websites in the world are 
Weather.com, Accuweather.com, Wunderground.com, Weather.gov, and Yr.no 
(Alexa, 2016). All five sites include multimodal information, that is, they feature 
different forms of representation, such as tables, symbols, maps, diagrams, and verbal 
text forecasts. The integration of information from different representations may affect 
decision-making and is interesting to study in more detail. 
The atmosphere is chaotic; it is “sensitive dependent on initial conditions” (Fjelland, 
2002, p. 160). Because the initial conditions (meteorological observations) are not 
precisely known, it is impossible to provide a prediction of the future conditions of the 
atmosphere with certainty, i.e., the forecast is more or less uncertain, although models 
are continuously improving and there are an increasing number of observations. The 
trend is to include more uncertainty information in weather reports (Joslyn & Savelli, 
2010); the top five weather sites provide uncertainty information in addition to single-
valued forecasts. When considering the hourly presentations of weather forecasts for a 
given area, it can be easy to forget that weather forecasts remain predictions and, 
therefore, are uncertain. The communication of forecast uncertainty has considerable 
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potential value to society and users of such forecasts and could enable more informed 
decision-making (National Research Council, 2006; Stuart et al., 2006; Hirschberg et 
al., 2011). However, the methods by which laypeople evaluate the degree of certainty 
in a weather report are not well understood. How different types of uncertainty 
information are interpreted and how single-valued forecasts are interpreted in the 
context of uncertainty should be explored (National Research Council, 2006; Morss et 
al., 2008).  
 
Figure 1: The article published on www.nytimes.com (left), October 22, 2012, tells the story 
of the seven Italian earthquake experts who were sentenced to prison for not predicting a 
deadly earthquake (Povoledo & Fountain, 2012). The article published on 
www.telegraph.co.uk (right), July 09, 2012, indicates that Belgian tourism officials plan to 
sue the weather service due to its long-term weather predictions (Banks, 2012). 
 
It is important to communicate uncertainty and to avoid appearing more certain than 
you are for several reasons. In 2012, seven earthquake experts in Italy were sentenced 
to six years in prison for murder because they did not warn people about the risk of an 
earthquake (Figure 1). (Six of the experts were exonerated in November 2014, and the 
sentence of the seventh was reduced.) Could something similar happen to a 
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meteorologist for not forecasting an extreme weather event? Some media reports 
indicate the possibility of legal action against weather services (Figure 1). Perhaps 
both forecast providers and the public can benefit from improved communication (of 
uncertainty). At the same time, it is important not to be too afraid of errors and not to 
expect forecasts that are never wrong. Meteorologists should communicate what they 
know and how certain they are about what they know. Improved communication of 
weather forecasts is expected to be of greater importance than improved model 
development in the future (Stuart et al., 2006). The present study seeks to contribute 
new knowledge concerning forecast communication to end-users by examining the 
communication of information (including uncertainty) in online weather reports.  
The topic in this study is highly multidisciplinary. Meteorology, social semiotics, 
reading and literacy, science education, science and risk communication, decision-
making and psychology are all among the potential fields of study to be considered. 
Writing the thesis was thus a challenging task due to tough choices in selecting 
literature to include and explore in light of the constraints limiting this work. In other 




1.3 Multimodal reading and meaning-making 
“People need a diverse set of cognitive, social, and emotional skills in order to 
understand the information that they receive and to interpret its relevance for their 
lives... They can acquire those skills through formal education, self-study, and 
personal experience” (Morgan et al., 2002, p. 2).  
When a user receives a weather report, she must listen to it or read it to make meaning 
and utilize the information. Visual information (graphical representations such as 
tables, symbols, maps, graphs, diagrams, and photographs) dominate all of the world’s 
top five weather sites (see above). In addition, all five sites provide verbal information. 
Thus, online weather reports, composed of multiple representations, are well suited for 
the examination of multimodal reading - that is, how the information is interpreted and 
integrated to make meaning of it. Moreover, all weather forecasts are uncertain, and 
users must assess the truth value of the information. Studying how people interpret and 
use information to make meaning in a weather report is valuable for understanding, 
and subsequently improving, communication and usability. In turn, improved 
communication can lead to improved decision-making. 
In the following subsections, I summarize the following literature relevant to this work 
(RQ1 and RQ3 in particular): Multiple representations and multimodality (subsection 
1.3.1); interpretation (subsection 1.3.2) and integration (subsection 1.3.3) of 
information related to multimodal reading; and, finally, truth value (subsection 1.3.4). 
1.3.1 Multiple representations and multimodality 
In recent years, graphical representations have been used more frequently and with 
greater variety for communicating information (McTigue & Flowers, 2011), for 
example in weather reports. Both paper and digital media texts are increasingly 
multimodal (Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). Graphics are assumed to help readers to 
focus on the reading material by guiding their attention (particularly to the illustrated 
parts) and to develop interest and motivation toward the reading material (Hannus and 
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Hyönä, 1999). The students in McTigue and Flowers (2011) believed that the purpose 
of diagrams was to represent visually what was in the text. Although this purpose is 
common, other not-considered purposes exist. For instance, graphics can convey 
unique information or serve as an orientational tool (McTigue & Flowers, 2011). If the 
reader does not know possible functions, the graphics might be undervalued (McTigue 
& Flowers, 2011). In the present study, the reading of a multimodal weather report is 
examined in more detail. 
I introduce below two related concepts used in this study that provide an important 
background for multimodal reading and meaning-making: multiple representations 
and multimodality. 
Writing from a science education perspective, Tang et al. (2014, p. 306) states that 
“representations are artifacts that symbolize an idea or concept and can take the form 
of for instance verbal texts, diagrams, graphs, and simulations”. Representations are 
meaningful for the designer; however, to others, they are only a collection of writings 
and drawings initially devoid of any meaning (Tang et al., 2014). From Vygotsky’s 
(1986) sociocognitive theory, representations are understood as tools that mediate 
social learning and human cognition (Tang et al., 2014). In other words, a 
representation is viewed as an intermediate agent, between the sender and the receiver 
of a message, contributing to the meaning-making process. In principle, this process 
also includes written words because these are also signs. The term multiple 
representations denotes the practice of representing the same concept or type of 
information through different representational forms (Tang et al., 2014). This situation 
exists for many weather reports, such as Yr.no, in which, for example, precipitation is 
represented by the use of verbal text, as symbols in a table, or as spatial information in 
a map or animation. 
Modes are different culturally and socially produced physical resources for 
representing different aspects of a phenomenon (Kress, 2005). Thus, different 
representations of a phenomenon are expressed using different modes. There are many 
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different modes, for instance sound, gesture, gaze, and layout (Jewitt & Kress, 2010). 
In the present study, the modes of words and graphics are examined. Lemke (2005) 
claims that different semiotic modalities are essentially incommensurable; in other 
words, for example, a verbal text cannot convey the same meaning as an arrow or a 
number. Moreover, Kress (2003) claims that different modes will typically have 
different affordances (explained more in detail below) (Bezemer & Kress, 2008). For 
example, in the verbal mode, a forecaster can report local rain showers without being 
more specific about their distribution. In the visual mode, however, a map must show 
the spatial distribution of the showers. In other words, a verbal and visual depiction of 
the same thing can be thought of as two different representations of the same 
phenomenon (Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). In scientific communication, meanings are 
typically made by the joint co-deployment of two or more semiotic modalities (Lemke, 
2005); that is, the communication is multimodal. Sometimes, the information is 
presented almost simultaneously in the two modes, for instance a TV weather forecast 
in which the verbal and visual information is presented at the same time. At other 
times, the information is first read in one mode and presented later in another (Lemke, 
2005), for example, due to the spatial organization of a website. In multimodal 
communication, concepts and information are not defined by the common 
denominator of their representations but by the union of meanings implied by all of 
these representations (Lemke, 2005). The meanings being constructed are joint 
meanings produced in the intersection of different modes, thus multiplying the set of 
possible meanings that can be made (Lemke, 2005).  
Interestingly, all texts can be considered multimodal, but some texts are more 
multimodal than others are (Baldry & Thibault, 2010). For example, a verbal text 
creates meaning via the words but is also dependent upon a combination of for 
example font, color, and spatial (layout) resources (Baldry & Thibault, 2010). The use 
of headings, boldface and font size signals emphasis or significance (Lemke, 2005) 
and tells the reader how he should orient and where he should focus his attention.  
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The present study focuses on online weather reports, which typically are distinct 
multimodal texts that combine words and graphics. Thus, in the following, I specify 
whether I am referring to a text consisting of only words by referring it as verbal text. 
Otherwise, I use the term text when talking about distinct multimodal texts combining 
words and graphics. 
Many multimodal studies are based on Halliday’s (1978) theory of social semiotics 
(i.e., the study of sign systems and their use in meaning-making as a function of a 
social process (Tang et al., 2014)). Similar to multimodal studies, it is common in 
studies of multiple representations to consider the modality of representations 
(Ainsworth, 2006). Hence, many studies of multiple representations are also rooted in 
semiotics, an area Andersen et al. (2015) refer to as human meaning-making. In 
addition to this similarity between the two research traditions, Tang et al. (2014) note 
the use of different units of analysis as a difference between them. Grain size refers to 
such a unit of analysis, ranging from elements (fine grain size) such as words and 
paragraphs or lines and symbols to a representation as a whole (large grain size) (e.g., 
verbal text or a diagram) (Tang et al. 2014). Research on multiple representations is 
typically of large grain size and focuses on the relative effectiveness of single 
representations or combinations of these (Ainsworth, 2006; Tang et al. 2014). 
Research on multimodality is usually of fine grain size, and tends to consider how 
people integrate various modalities to produce meaning, and can help determine why a 
given configuration or type of representation is more effective than another is (Tang et 
al., 2014). For instance, although a multiple representation analysis can show that two 
different representations lead to different explanations, a multimodal analysis can 
reveal how and why the representations support different explanations (Tang et al., 
2014). Conversely, a multimodal analysis alone would miss important contextual 
information from the multimodal representation analysis (Tang et al., 2014). In other 
words, it is important to consider both research traditions to understand readers’ 
meaning-making and learning through representations, because each analysis plays a 
mutually complementary role in these processes. Thus, Tang et al. (2014) attempt to 
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integrate research on multiple representations and multimodality by considering and 
integrating both analytical levels. 
The present study attempts to expand on previous research by examining how (RQ1) 
and why (RQ3) different modes and representations in a weather report are interpreted 
and integrated by selected user groups of laypeople. Making meaning from multimodal 
texts, that is, multimodal reading, relies on comprehending not only verbal text 
(words) but also the graphics (Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; McTigue & Flowers, 2011). 
Thus, to master multimodal reading, readers must interpret and integrate information 
from several modes and representations found in the text (Solheim & Uppstad, 2011). 
In the following subsections, I review literature describing these two key processes, 
interpretation (1.3.2) and integration (1.3.3) of information. 
1.3.2 Multimodal reading: Interpretation of information  
From a behavioristic view of reading, meaning resides in the text itself, and the goal of 
the reader is to reproduce that meaning (Dole et al., 1991; Pearson & Cervetti (2015). 
This view of reading was dominant prior to the mid-1960s (Pearson & Cervetti, 2015). 
Thereafter, research on reading comprehension has resulted in a new understanding 
and a different view of reading. Now, reading is typically viewed as a more complex 
process (Dole et al., 1991) in which the text, the reader, the social and cultural context, 
and the task all are important variables in the meaning-making process (Pearson & 
Cervetti, 2015). In contrast to the behavioristic view, cognitively based views of 
reading emphasize that all readers use their existing knowledge and cues from the text 
and situational context in which the reading occurs to construct meaning from the text 
(Dole et al., 1991; Pearson & Cervetti, 2015). Interpretation is a key process for 
making meaning when reading (Dole et al., 1991). The reader must interpret elements 
of a representation (fine grain size) and interpret the representation as a whole (large 
grain size) to make meaning of the information. Building on Halliday’s systemic 
functional linguistic (1985), Lemke (2005) argues that all such meaning-making is 
organized around three generalized semiotic functions. The process of how this 
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meaning-making occurs is described below in the context of Lemke’s (2005) 
presentational, orientational, and organizational functions.  
When making meaning of a text, the reader identifies the elements she recognizes and 
constructs a presentation of what elements are being shown (Lemke, 2005). 
Interpretations of what we see are not fixed; words and graphics are relatively empty 
entities, to be filled with meaning (Kress, 2005). For example, when viewing a 
weather report, a line with a pointed head can be recognized as an arrow.  
The reader orients to this presentation and orients it to others, establishing the tone 
between the reader and the text/sender (Lemke, 2005). The interpretation of elements 
in a representation depends upon the person, task and situation in addition to historical 
and cultural conventions (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; de Vries et al., 2009). For 
example consider an arrow in a weather report. A girl daydreaming of her boyfriend 
whom she is head over heels in love with might interpret this arrow as a sign of love 
(refers to Cupid’s arrows in classical mythology). The same, or another, girl reading 
the weather report and planning for windsurfing might interpret an arrow as a sign to 
illustrate the speed and direction of the wind. In other words, interpretations are not 
made in a void. The reader orients to what she sees and who the sender is 
(orientational function) and assesses the information as good or bad and as necessary 
or irrelevant. She also evaluates its certainty (Lemke, 2005, Knain, 2015). The 
orientation is done in the context of larger social relationships between the reader and 
the sender and against the background of other information known in the particular 
community and available to the reader (Lemke, 2005). Meaning made with one 
representation depends upon prior meanings made with preceding representations 
across space and time (Tang et al., 2014). When the situation is familiar, little effort in 
interpretation is required (Knain, 2015). Then, the reader has experiences from similar 
situations and expectations of what appropriate interpretations are (Knain, 2015). For 
example, a weather report is a specific text genre, and a person knowing this genre is 
more likely to interpret an arrow as a sign of wind and not as a sign of love because of 
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expectations related to this genre and experiences from similar situations. Moreover, 
the meaning of a representation is constantly transformed by its users; the more it is 
used in a community, the more fully and finely articulated its meaning becomes 
(Jewitt, 2008). Thus, meaning is made through use in the social life of a particular 
community, differs among societies (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Jewitt 2008), and 
more than one relevant interpretation is possible (Pearson & Cervetti, 2015). In other 
words, readers can interpret information in a weather report differently. For example, 
in this study, local knowledge is found to be important when interpreting a weather 
report. A person can have different experience with westerly winds where he lives 
(e.g., it typically rains) and where he is on holiday (e.g., it is sunny). Hence, when 
reading a weather report indicating westerly winds, he has two possible interpretations 
- either rain or fair weather. When interpreting the information, he must consider the 
local context (where he stays) to select the more consistent interpretation. Notably, one 
representation can hold several elements, and it is possible to make meaning of one 
element and not another. For example, when reading a table on Yr.no, it is possible to 
make meaning of the precipitation information without understanding the wind 
information. How selected users interpreted multimodal information on Yr.no and how 
they called upon prior knowledge in their interpretations is examined in the present 
study (RQ1). The reasons provided by the participants for reading the different 
elements in the weather report are also examined (RQ3).  
When making meaning of a text, the reader also creates an organized structure of 
related elements (Lemke, 2005). Grammar involves how elements are combined into a 
meaningful whole (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). In linguistics, the following two 
theories have been employed most often: Chomsky’s Universal Grammar (UG) and 
Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Bavali & Sadighi, 2008; 
Almurashi, 2016). These two theories have been developed almost independently of 
one another, and although there are differences with respect to grammar, they seem to 
complement each other (Bavali & Sadighi, 2008). Systemic Functional Linguistics has 
been useful in educational research and has been applied to interpret the grammar of 
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semiotic modes other than words such as visuals (Almurashi, 2016). Hence, this view 
on grammar is adopted in this study. Similarly to the manner in which the grammar of 
language describes how words combine in clauses and sentences, visual grammar adds 
structure and meaning to otherwise unspecific graphics by allowing these graphics to 
be organized and interpreted according to conventions (Lemke, 2005; Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2006; Baldry & Thibault, 2010). Building on Halliday’s systemic functional 
linguistic (1985) grammar is not viewed as a set of formal rules for expressing 
meaning (i.e., a UG view); rather, grammar is the realization of meaning (Bavali & 
Sadighi, 2008; Knain, 2015). We shape experiences into meaning with grammar 
(Knain, 2015); hence, grammar relates to Lemke’s (2005) semiotic functions. Graphics 
are not intuitive (McTigue & Flowers, 2011), and visual language is not universally 
understood but rather is culturally specific; for example, Western visual 
communication is affected by our convention of writing from left to right (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2006). This feature of visual space affects the meaning that the reader 
ascribes to compositional patterns; for example, the horizontal structure of images 
exhibits similarities to the sequential structure in language (Kress & van Leeuwen, 
2006). Therefore, in addition to interpreting the elements of a representation, it is 
necessary for the reader to understand the representational system to comprehend the 
representation as a whole - which elements the reader prefers to read in relation to 
which other elements, and what goes with what. This organization of verbal and visual 
elements into regions and a whole, and the relationship between regions and the 
whole, is explained by Lemke (2005) as the organizational function. Some 
representation systems are challenging to learn spontaneously due to their high level of 
formalization, and difficulties are especially patent in the learning of science and 
mathematics (Echeverría & Scheuer, 2009). Understanding the system involves 
knowing how to process the information in the representation, and different 
representations require different processes (de Vries et al., 2009). For example, finding 
the maximum wind speed in a wind/time diagram at Yr.no requires the reader to 
decipher the coordinate system and the two axes of the system. Finding the maximum 
wind speed in a table requires a different process. In this system, the data are arranged 
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in rows and columns, and these must be comprehended by the reader to make meaning 
of the information. Thus, a reader might understand that the arrows indicate the wind 
speed, but if he does not understand the table as a system, it is not possible to 
determine what the wind speed is at a certain point in time. If the reader lacks context 
or knowledge of the representational system, it can be impossible to make meaning 
due to the (spatial, temporal, material or cultural) distance between the producer and 
the user of the system (de Vries et al., 2009). Hence, understanding the 
representational system also relates to Lemke’s (2005) orientational function. Lemke 
(2002) claims that people typically focus consciously only on the presentational 
function. For the orientational and organizational function, people typically rely on 
familiarity and automate their use unless in special circumstances (orientational 
function) or for professional users (organizational function) (Lemke, 2002). In the 
present study, the participants provide reasons for using different representations in a 
weather report with multiple representations (RQ3). The results from this study can 
therefore contribute knowledge concerning the understanding of representational 
systems.  
The second key process of meaning-making related to multimodal reading is 
integration of information, and this process is described in the next subsection. 
1.3.3 Multimodal reading: Integration of information 
Similar to other interactive multimodal texts, online weather reports are not primarily 
linear but are relatively open in their organization; they are not meant to be read 
according to a unique implied sequence (Lemke, 2005; Yerushalmy, 2005). These 
texts are not only multimodal; rather, they are hypermodal, in which the text is 
organized in a web of pages (Lemke, 2002). Although the sender may attempt to 
control the reader’s course of action through text organization (Yerushalmy, 2005), the 
process of reading multimodal information is discontinuous and generates certain 
expected and other unexpected reading paths (Baldry & Thibault, 2010). What is 
considered important is claimed to be culturally determined; therefore, members of 
30 
 
different social groups are likely to construct different reading paths (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2006). Rather than following a linear sequence, the reader may jump to 
various clusters of elements in a fixed sequence. Readers use these clusters and the 
relationships between them to make meaning in a specific context, that is, meanings 
are developed along the reading path. Because the clusters are not separate but are 
combined and integrated to form a complex whole that cannot be reduced to its 
separate parts, combining them can have a synergistic effect that cannot be derived 
from either mode separately (Baldry & Thibault, 2010; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). 
The elements to be integrated can be located in the same representation (fine grained), 
or in different representations (large grained). The elements can hold information 
about the same concept or phenomenon conveyed in different modes, for example 
wind speed and direction expressed by both words and arrows in a table. Alternatively, 
the elements can hold information about different phenomena, for example, 
precipitation expressed by symbols and wind speed and direction by words and 
arrows. Both alternatives are present in the reading material used in this study (Yr.no), 
and are exploited by the participants. 
Integration of elements relates to modal affordances, an important concept in social 
semiotics. Each of the available modes for representation provides specific 
possibilities and limitations (affordances) for communication (Kress, 2005; Bezemer 
& Kress, 2016) and for a representations’ meaning-making potential (Tang et al., 
2014). Different types of meaning are made available via different modalities (Kress et 
al., 2001; Tang et al., 2014). According to the functional specialization of language 
and graphics (Lemke, 2005), verbal language is good at communicating differences 
and (sequential) relationships and allows or affords a person to make categorical types 
of meaning (Lemke, 2005; Tang et al., 2014). For instance, a verbal weather forecast 
affords the reader the information to make meaning of what situation causes the 
precipitation or what type of precipitation is forecast. Conversely, written language has 
not evolved to communicate degree, quantity, continuous change and covariation very 
well; other modes exists that are better suited (Lemke, 2005; Tang et al., 2014; 
31 
 
Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). Spatial information in a map (a visual modality) affords a 
person the opportunity to make meaning of how much precipitation is forecast. Rather 
than adding graphics to words, words and graphics can be integrated to create cohesive 
meaning (Baldry & Thibault, 2010).  
There are potential benefits for meaning-making of integration of different modes. 
Lemke (2005) claims that the integration of elements occurs in an interplay of the 
presentational, orientational, and organizational aspects of meaning (presented above) 
and suggests that this interplay contributes to meaning-making in three ways: 
componentially, combine, and cross-modulate.  
First, each semiotic modality can contribute componentially to each functional aspect 
of meaning. For instance, the concept of identification can be used to model the 
verbal-visual relationships that jointly construct presentational meaning (Unsworth & 
Cléirigh, 2014). Either the language or the image can be the point of departure to 
identify the other. For instance, a girl has heard that cumulus clouds cause rain 
showers but does not know how these clouds appear. If reading a caption helps her 
identify this cloud type in an image, the language’s function is to supplement the 
image by identifying and decoding (glossing) the image (Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). 
Recognizing these clouds can help this girl make her own judgment concerning 
whether it will rain on a day when a chance of rain is forecast for the place in which 
she is living. If written language appears without an image in a text, the language is 
only visualized by the reader based on her experiences related to the actual 
phenomenon or some prior visual representations of it. Then, if any part of the 
language is unfamiliar to the reader, it remains uncoded visually. Alternatively, a boy 
has seen a cumulus cloud but does not know the cloud’s name. In this case, the 
image’s function is to supplement the language by identifying and visualizing the 
language. Therefore, monomodal texts demand more from the visual or verbal 
experience of the reader than do multimodal texts. If the text does not gloss unfamiliar 
image segments or unfamiliar language elements are not visualized in images, 
32 
 
inexperienced readers in the field can face significant difficulty (Unsworth & Cléirigh, 
2014).  
Second, functional specialized meaning resources in one semiotic modality combine 
with those for a different function in another semiotic modality to modulate any aspect 
of the meaning of the joint construct. In the example above, reading a verbal text can 
contribute to making meaning of which cloud types are present (presentational 
function), and this meaning can be combined with examining an image, contributing to 
making meaning of where the clouds are/where it rains (organizational function).  
Third, each semiotic modality can internally cross-modulate (change or adjust) 
meanings across functional aspects. For instance, building on the same example, 
reading a verbal text can contribute to making meaning of which cloud types are 
present (presentational function). However, the reader orients to who the sender is 
(orientational function) and assess how certain the information is. Based on in this 
assessment, he might adjust his meaning. In the present study, the participant’s 
previous knowledge (experiences) used in interpretations is identified – as far as this 
knowledge came to the fore, and how and why the information is integrated and used 
(RQ1 and RQ3). 
Similar to the fine grained level (presented above), Ainsworth (1999) provides a 
framework for potential meaning-making through integration of information across 
representations. Research on multiple representations recognizes that different 
representations can complement one another, constrain interpretation, or help 
construct a deeper understanding of the domain (Ainsworth, 1999). Multiple 
representations can provide both benefits and challenges for the meaning-making 
process (de Vries et al., 2009). A representation is never the “whole object” (Kress & 
van Leeuwen, 2006), because all representations are partial, focus on certain aspects 
and contribute to the construction of meaning in various ways (Jewitt, 2008; 
Echeverría & Scheuer, 2009). Because they have different modal affordances, words 
and graphics can together represent more aspects of a phenomenon than they can 
alone. For example, a picture of the sky can provide visual information on how 
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different clouds appear, a table can provide information about different cloud 
characteristics (height, name), and a verbal text can provide information on how the 
different clouds develop over time – supported by a diagram with vectors showing air 
movement. Together, these representations can provide a broad picture of the 
phenomenon “cloud” in a weather report. Thus, several representations can be used to 
complement one another (Ainsworth, 1999; de Vries et al., 2009). In addition to 
providing complementary information, they can support complementary processes by 
focusing on different modal affordances (Ainsworth, 1999). The extended information 
provides complementary representation through its place in the larger text organization 
(organizational function), and the reader orients the information to other viewpoints in 
other texts (orientational function) (Lemke, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). 
Several representations can also avoid or resolve misunderstanding via constraining 
interpretation, either by using a familiar representation to support the interpretation of 
a less familiar one or by exploiting the inherent properties of one to constrain the 
interpretation of another (Ainsworth, 1999). To construct a deeper understanding of 
the domain, readers must understand the relationships between the representations 
(Ainsworth, 1999; de Vries et al., 2009). This relationship is a sort of enhancement 
that can be achieved if one representation provides information such as how, when, 
where, or why in relation to another (organizational meaning) (Unsworth & Cléirigh, 
2014). By identifying correlations and patterns across various representations, readers 
can develop a deeper understanding of the underlying structure of the domain being 
represented. For example, by reading the wind arrows in a table and the words 
“breeze”, “gale”, or “storm” in a verbal text forecast, the reader can identify a pattern 
in which a certain wind arrow is connected to the use of a certain word and thus 
develop a deeper understanding of the structure. This understanding might be further 
refined by acquiring real life outdoor experiences and new readings of the forecasts. 
How information in different representations is integrated and the reasons for this 
integration are examined in this study (RQ1, RQ3). 
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Graphics have the potential to enhance reading comprehension (McTigue & Flowers, 
2011) resulting from a deeper and more effortful processing of text content. A possible 
explanation for why graphics enhance comprehension is related to human memory; 
according to Hannus and Hyönä (1999), it is well established in research on human 
memory that memory is improved if both a verbal and visual representation can be 
constructed of the stimuli. For example, the memory of the illustrated text will be 
richer in detail than the memory for reading material consisting of verbal text alone 
(Hannus & Hyönä, 1999). However, the potential benefits of graphics can be impaired 
by superficial or inadequate processing or if graphics makes the text more complex 
(Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; McTigue & Flowers, 2011). Integration of information is the 
greatest challenge associated with the reading of multimodal information (Ainsworth, 
2006). There are typically few or no textual cues that indicate explicit connections 
(references in the text, e.g., labels or captions) between representations to help guide 
the reader, and this lack can make integration of information more demanding (Hannus 
& Hyönä, 1999; Holsanova et al., 2009; McTigue & Flowers, 2011). Thus, in addition 
to comprehending the different parts of the text, the reader must determine which 
pieces of the text are related and integrate these pieces (Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; 
McTigue & Flowers, 2011). Challenges reading and comprehending the text also 
relate to decision-making. Particularly with a nonlinear and highly visual text such as 
Yr.no, the reader must decide in what order to read the different parts, what 
information is relevant to the task, and what information is superfluous (Hannus & 
Hyönä, 1999; McTigue & Flowers, 2011). This selection relates to RQ2 and RQ3 in 
the present study.  
In general, multimodal texts are the dominant form of communication in our society. 
Analyzing this type of text provides a foundation for both designing and criticizing the 
texts (Baldry & Thibault, 2010). By analyzing multimodal texts, we can determine 
how combinations of representations can provide more meaning together than via 
individual representations (Baldry & Thibault, 2010). According to Unsworth & 
Cléirigh (2014), considerable past research addresses how graphics construct meaning. 
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However, little has specifically addressed the relationships between graphics and 
words to show how the visual and verbal modes interact to construct integrated 
meanings (Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2014). More research is needed to achieve a greater 
understanding of multiple representations and multimodality (Tang et al., 2014). 
Additionally, studies focusing on readers’ reasons for selecting information and the 
cognitive processes involved in integrating and comprehending information from 
representations are rare; more research is needed (Holsanova, 2012; Mason et al., 
2013). Tang et al. (2014) suggest using an integrated framework considering 
representations as whole and modal affordances in the analysis of learning with 
representations. Thus, it was interesting in my data collection to consider not only how 
different representations are interpreted but also how and why information from 
different representations was integrated and used (RQ1/3).  
In the final subsection, I review literature concerning the truth value of texts (1.3.4). 
1.3.4 Truth value 
Knain (2015) claims that the ability to convey nuances in terms of degrees of certainty 
is perhaps the most important characteristic of scientific texts. Expressions of doubt 
and uncertainty are commonly used in scientific texts such as weather reports. In 
linguistic communication, verbs (for example, “may”) and their related adjectives (for 
example, “possible” and “certain”) indicate the degree of certainty in statements 
(Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). Qualifying terms are also used; for example, “dream” 
or “belief,” which indicate a low degree of certainty in Western culture, or the 
contrasting “reality” or “fact,” which indicate a high degree of certainty (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2006). People routinely assess the truth value of messages (Kress and van 
Leeuwen, 2006); the truth value that is assigned to the message is determined by the 
values and beliefs of a person and his social group. which relates to Lemke’s (2005) 
orientational function. The concept of truth value is equally important in visual 
communication. Graphics can represent people and things as they are or as they are 
imagined. People’s assessments of the truth value of graphics are also dependent upon 
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what is considered real in the social group. Based on a naturalistic view of reality, 
people assign a high truth value to things that they can see with the eye; for example, a 
picture with colors that appear similar to the colors we see in nature. However, digital 
technology is open to easy manipulation of pictures (Knain, 2015), and this ease might 
reduce the truth value assigned to them. Decontextualizing an object reduces the truth 
value of the message; the same situation applies to a high degree of abstraction. A 
scientific view of reality is based on generalizations and typical conditions (Knain, 
2015); for example, a diagram can be assigned a higher truth value compared with a 
picture in the social group. In science, what is real is what is known through the 
methods of science. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) note that diagrams and maps can 
be naturalized for lay readers (to increase the truth value of the message), for example, 
by showing them in perspective, adding color, and placing them into a context. How 
the participants assess the degree of certainty in a weather report (RQ1) and which 
uncertainty information from the text they use (RQ2 and RQ3) are examined in the 




1.4 Human decision-making 
Empowering people to participate in a democracy and make informed decisions is 
considered an important achievement for both public communication and multimodal 
reading.  
All humans make numerous decisions every day, and information about present and 
future weather conditions plays an important role in many of them. Prior knowledge 
related to weather and our experiences with sun, rain, snow and wind in different 
situations, affecting our emotions about different circumstances, are likely to affect the 
decisions we make. Studying how humans make decisions is important for improving 
communication of weather information between experts and laypeople. 
 
Some of the decisions we make are unconscious. For example, when I put on a pair of 
shoes, I automatically put the left shoe on my left foot and the right shoe on my right 
foot. However, I am conscious about the choice of which shoes to wear; that choice 
depends upon my schedule for the day in combination with the weather conditions. 
When I walk and have to cross a road, I look to my right and then to my left for traffic. 
Then, I decide, based on my estimate of the risk, whether to walk calmly, to run fast, 
or to wait for passing cars. If my friend run, I am might be more likely to run myself. 
The road may be slippery because of snow or ice, and that brings another piece of 
information into consideration. Personally, I would be influenced by negative feelings 
brought to mind recalling earlier incidents in which I ran into a puddle and ruined a 
pair of new shoes. I do not want that to happen again. All of these choices are 
examples of everyday decisions. Although my life is at stake when crossing the road, I 
make the decision with little effort. I can do so because I have acquired experience 
from making similar decisions for years, making the risk known, or at least appear 
controllable, to me. Occasionally, we have to make decisions with higher uncertainty, 
making them more effortful. For example, in a situation with low temperatures and 
strong winds last winter, I had to decide whether to bring my wife and newborn son to 
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a place with more secure heating in case of a loss of electricity in our own house. I 
spent much time and effort considering the pros and cons of several options before I 
made my decision to stay home. This decision was influenced by not only weather 
forecast information and its associated uncertainty but also media reports and 
associated costs (baby crying all night in new bed) and benefits (secure light and 
heating) from changing residence, in addition to positive feelings related to earlier 
events with similar weather conditions that went well and my conversations with other 
persons.   
In the following subsections, I summarize the literature on decision-making relevant to 
this work (particularly RQ2): theories of information processing in the human brain 
(subsection 1.4.1.); information search and decision-making behavior (subsection 
1.4.2.); and perspectives on research on decision-making and rationality (subsection 
1.4.3.). 
1.4.1 Information processing in the human brain 
“Thinking is a process in which different pieces of information (cues) are combined 
and transformed into a useful product such as an idea, an estimate, a decision, or a 
solution to a problem” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2014, p. 355). However, thought processes 
can vary. According to Dijksterhuis et al. (2014), individuals can think quickly or 
slowly, associatively or logically, and consciously or unconsciously. The literature on 
thought processes is useful background information to the present study, to understand 
information processing and decision-making behavior better. 
Many researchers appear to agree that there are two types of information processing 
involved in human decision-making. Type 1 is autonomous and does not require 
working memory processing (the function for temporarily storing and manipulating 
information). Type 2 requires working memory processing and enables hypothetical 
thinking and mental simulation (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In addition to these 
defining features, the two types of processing have several associated features. 
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Intuition (Type 1) operates quickly and automatically with little or no effort and 
handles output information (integrating input information and producing preferences). 
However, reasoning or analysis (Type 2) is conscious, governed by rules, relatively 
slow, deliberate, effortful, and handles input information (controlled search of 
information, making sense of information, and integrating the information) (Slovic et 
al., 2004; Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Evans, 2012; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Dijksterhuis et al., 2014). This general view is, however, a 
simplification. Notably, fast processing alone does not automatically indicate intuition 
(Evans, 2012). For example, individuals may adopt experience-based techniques 
(heuristics), allowing a decision to be made quickly by means of following simple 
decision rules rather than intuition. Because these procedures require conscious 
calculation, they are considered Type 2 processing (by some researchers, see 
discussion below) (Evans, 2012). Intuition is typically considered unconscious. Betsch 
and Glöckner (2010) also expand on the general view, providing interesting additions 
related to the type and amount of information to be processed and to processing time. 
Analytic processes are sequential and consume time; hence, an increasing amount of 
information is automatically supposed to take a longer time to process. Betsch and 
Glöckner (2010), however, argue that if the information is coherent (e.g., all 
information favors one option and speaks against other options), decisions are easier to 
make. If additional information increases the coherence of one option, then decision 
time should decrease as the decision becomes easier (although it is more information 
to consider, and vice versa). For example, if I look at a symbol indicating cloudy but 
dry weather and then read a verbal text expressing a possibility for local rain showers, 
adding information from rainfall radar can make it easier for me to decide when this 
information supports one option.  
Whereas earlier studies discussed affect (a feeling that something is good or bad) and 
emotions as unhealthy influences on decision-making that cloud judgment and 
increase susceptibility to temptation, studies from the last two decades are beginning 
to highlight healthy influences (Reyna & Farley, 2006). There are strong indications 
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that affect and emotions can serve as information in decision-making (Slovic et al., 
2004), shaping the gist of information (Reyna, 2012), serving as a spotlight for 
directing our attention, helping to trade-off between decision alternatives, and as 
motivation for actions (Peters, 2006; Dickert et al., 2014). Additionally, the latter view 
acknowledges that affect and emotions allow people to learn from experience (the 
consequences that follow their actions) acquired when making decisions (Reyna & 
Farley, 2006). Learning leads decision outcomes to become “marked” by positive and 
negative feelings, providing information about what to choose and what to avoid 
(Peters, 2006), and thus influencing the construction of preferences. Studies have 
found that individuals differ in how they react affectively and to what extent they rely 
on intuition (Slovic et al., 2004). Dickert et al. (2014) expands on the difference 
between emotion and affect; affect typically refers to the first automatic response 
(Type 1 processing), whereas emotions usually are conscious and object-related (Type 
2 processing). Emotions are typically more intense than affect. For example, as a child, 
my feet were often wet and cold because of improper footwear. When snow is 
forecast, these situations from my childhood give rise to a negative feeling (affect), 
and I automatically (by intuition) know that I want to wear waterproof shoes - the 
option that for me is marked with a positive feeling or, alternatively, the option that 
allows me to avoid a situation with negative feelings. In other situations, when strong 
winds almost blew the car I was driving off the road, I was very anxious. This intense 
feeling of fear, which is related to specific incidents of which I am conscious, is a 
likely reason why I prefer not to drive in strong winds.  
Although affect and emotions are likely to be an important part of many weather-
related decisions, the interviewees in the present study do not report directly on affect 
and emotions. There are, however, a handful of exceptions. For example, one 
interviewee reported that she on occasion had experienced gale force winds when 
sailing and that she experienced such situations as unpleasant. For her, this experience 
marked decision options with gale force winds with negative feelings, and she wanted 
to avoid these situations when sailing. A likely reason for the lack of utterances 
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concerning affect and emotions in this study is the focus on conscious search and 
usage of the provided forecast information. Asking the question, “how does it make 
you feel?” can help elicit direct responses on affect and emotions in future studies 
(Peters, 2006). However, the interviewees do report on their experiences related to 
weather, and these experiences are affected by, and cannot be separated from, affect 
and emotions. Thus, affect and emotions are to some extent indirectly included in this 
study.  
Note that there are three ongoing discussions related to dual-process theories of 
particular interest to this study: first, a discussion concerning whether Type 1 and Type 
2 processes are distinct cognitive systems or two modes of thought; second, a 
discussion about the role of unconscious thought; and third, a discussion whether 
intuition and heuristics are the same. 
First, researchers discuss whether Type 1 and Type 2 processes are two modes of 
thinking (related to differences in personality and culture) or two different cognitive 
systems (related to brain architecture). In the first view, intuition and analytic 
processes run in parallel, each providing a response (Evans, 2012). If responses 
conflict, the conflict must be resolved by relying on either intuition or analysis. Based 
on findings in their study from 2010, Betsch and Glöckner argue that intuition and 
analysis are two distinct cognitive systems. This view is supported by converging 
evidence (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Most importantly, Betsch and Glöckner (2010) 
claim that a decision is made by neither intuition nor analysis; rather, intuition and 
analysis guide different types of sub-processes. The second view means that decision-
making is neither automatic nor controlled but reflects both processes, both giving 
important contributions (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). Whereas the depth of the analysis 
can vary, intuition always works in the mental background (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). 
Occasionally salient information in the environment and accessible information from 
the memory provide input information sufficient to reach a decision without any 
analysis (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). This situation can exist for many routine decision 
situations that typically do not require additional information search (Betsch & 
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Glöckner, 2010), for example, when I walk from my car to the entrance door and 
automatically choose the shortest path. This situation appears to occur when encoding 
information is easy (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). If I walk under more challenging 
conditions, for example, when it is windy and the sidewalk is slippery, I acquire 
information about my environment and conduct a brief analysis before reaching a 
conclusion about where to put my feet. In the present study, the same participants were 
found to use different types and amounts of information for different decision 
situations, indicating that the depth of their analyses varied.  
From the second point of view, both types of processing are active when we are awake 
(Kahneman, 2011; Evans, 2012). Usually, Type 2 processing adopts suggestions 
(impressions, intentions, preferences, associations, and feelings) from Type 1 
processing with little or no modification (Kahneman, 2011). Type 2 processing 
operates in a low-effort mode. Occasionally, Type 1 processing encounters difficulties. 
Then, Type 2 processing increases its effort to solve the task (Kahneman, 2011; Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). We consider this process to be conscious thought.  
Fuzzy-trace theory has refined the dual-process theories by studying the effects of 
memory representations. According to fuzzy-trace theory, in a given situation, 
verbatim (exact words, numbers, or pictures) and gist (essential meaning of words, 
numbers, or pictures) memory representations are separately encoded from the 
environment (Reyna, 2012). Gist representation of information supports intuition and 
is always used in decisions, whereas the extent to which verbatim representation, 
supporting analysis, is used will vary (Reyna, 2012; McFall, 2015). Memory 
representations are directly relevant to the present study. For example, when a person 
views a weather forecast in which 10 mm of rain is forecast, this information can be 
encoded and stored as heavy rain (gist representation) and 10 mm rain (verbatim 
representation). Importantly, if a person is unable to interpret 10 mm rain because he 
lacks relevant experiences, then it is difficult to encode the gist representation, and 
decision quality could suffer. 
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Second, the discussion on conscious versus unconscious thought is important in 
relation to the interviews conducted in the present study. In their critical review on the 
role of unconscious thought in decision-making, Newell and Shanks (2014) claim that 
unconscious thoughts have limited influence, and that conscious thought is the primary 
driver of behavior. Whether unconscious thought actually exists or our mind simply 
benefits from a period of distraction when solving a problem is an old question. 
However, there are studies in recent decades suggesting that unconscious thought 
actually occurs (Dijksterhuis et al., 2014). Newell and Shanks (2014) do agree that 
there are differences between intuition-based and deliberation-based decisions, taking 
Simon’s (1992) view that intuition is recognition and relies heavily on prior 
experiences. Thus, in line with dual process theories, intuitive decisions are fast and 
effortless because they are made based on recognition in situations in which the cues 
are readily apparent (Newell & Shanks, 2014). For example, the situation provides a 
cue (clouds), the cue provides us access to information stored in memory (likely to 
rain when that type of cloud is visible), and the information provides an immediate 
answer (wear waterproof shoes) (Newell & Shanks, 2014). Because the cue is readily 
apparent there are no intermediate cognitive steps, and the decision does not feel 
effortful (Newell & Shanks, 2014). In other situations, our decisions shift to become 
more deliberate and we are aware of the intermediate cognitive steps by which 
information is processed, for example, when the cues are not so readily apparent or 
when information in memory is more absent or more difficult to access (Newell & 
Shanks, 2014). A cue can then be the amount of rain forecast in a weather report. 
Agreeing about the duality of Type 1 and Type 2 processes, the main critique from 
Newell and Shanks (2014) is that the role of unconscious thought has been inflated and 
given too much explanatory power in decision-making. They claim that much of what 
is considered unconscious thought actually is conscious; the challenge is for 
researchers to use methods that can make people/experts elicit factors influencing their 
decision-making (Newell & Shanks, 2014). For example, Newell and Shanks (2014) 
question to what extent individuals are aware of the information that is triggering their 
decision at the point of choice (proximal cues) compared with information in the past 
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(distal cues) that might have caused the current information (thoughts) to be present at 
the point of choice. This concern is also valid for the interviews in this study, in which 
it is possible that I do not manage to elicit all of the interviewees’ thoughts and thus 
mix up conscious and unconscious thoughts. In a response to the critical review, 
Bernacer et al. (2014) problematize that Newell and Shanks (2014) do not consider 
habit learning. Through habit learning, a fundamental feature of decision-making 
(Bernacer et al., 2014), particular actions transfer from conscious to unconscious 
performance. For example, when I walk from my car to the entrance door in the winter 
season and there is snow on the trees, I must decide whether to use the shortest path 
under the trees or a longer path avoiding the trees. I have bad feelings related to earlier 
incidents in which snow fell off the trees and on my head and went down the back of 
my neck. Because of these feelings, I make conscious decisions in the start of the 
winter season to walk the longest path to avoid the possibility of falling snow from the 
trees. Later on, this choice becomes a habit and I unconsciously decide to walk the 
longest path. In another response to Newell and Shanks (2014), Baumeister et al. 
(2014) call on researchers to stop pitting the conscious against unconscious and instead 
ascertain how the two work together. All agree that more research is needed before 
strong conclusions can be drawn on the role of unconscious thought (Newell & 
Shanks, 2014). 
Third, the terms heuristics and intuition are used differently. On the one hand, 
Dijksterhuis et al. (2014) use heuristics as an example of Type 1 processing, such as 
the affect heuristic (influence of a person’s current emotion and affect on a decision) 
or the availability heuristic (reliance on immediate examples coming to a person’s 
mind). On the other hand, Betsch and Glöckner (2010) claim that heuristics do not 
cover the potential of intuitive thought. Rather, heuristics seem to be a simplification 
of analytic thought, coping with cognitive limitations by leaving out the most effortful 
information processes and reducing the amount of information considered by reducing 
complex judgments to simpler ones (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). An example of such a 
heuristic would be the satisficing heuristic (information search stops when a “good 
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enough” option is found) (Simon, 1955). Betsch and Glöckner (2010) believes there is 
much more to intuition than reducing task complexity; in contrast to Type 2 
processing, intuition is unconstrained by the amount of information and cognitive 
capacity and thus capable of processing and integrating multiple pieces of information 
without noticeable cognitive effort. The discussion might be more about the definition 
and usage of the word heuristic than about how Type 1 and Type 2 processes work. In 
their review of heuristic decision-making, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) claim 
that heuristic processed can be both unconscious and conscious. In such a view, 
heuristics can be both Type 1 and Type 2 processing. I take this view in this study. For 
example, the affect and availability heuristics are about (unconscious) recognition and 
associations and are thus Type 1 processing. The satisficing heuristics are concerned 
with (conscious) use of simple rules for information search and stoppings, and are thus 
Type 2 processing. 
Whereas most of the decisions we make take seconds, minutes or perhaps hours, we 
occasionally take days or weeks to reach a decision. Recently, Dijksterhuis et al. 
(2014) proposed prolonged thought as a third type of processing (Type 3). Although 
the framework for prolonged thought remains crude, it has interesting features worth 
mentioning. According to Dijksterhuis et al. (2014), prolonged thought processes 
typically involve three separate stages. First, we collect information and consciously 
think about it for a while. Thereafter, we put the whole aside and do not consciously 
engage in it (unconscious thought). Finally, all of a sudden, a solution presents itself to 
the consciousness, and we are able to make a decision. According to Dijksterhuis et al. 
(2014) Type 3 processing is characterized by being unconscious, very slow, 
exploratory, and able to organize and handle large amounts of information. 
Importantly, Type 3 processing is goal-dependent and is claimed to work only when 
we want it to work. Type 2 (first, conscious stage, and most effortful) and Type 3 
(second, unconscious stage, and less effortful) processes can work with different 
aspects of the same problem. In very slow processes, there might be several iterations 
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between Type 2 and Type 3 processes before a conclusion is reached. In other words, 
Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 processes can coexist and work together in our minds. 
Initially, Type 3 processes do not appear to be influential for everyday decisions 
related to weather because we are rarely aware of a weather event more than hours or 
perhaps a few days in advance, giving us little time to think about it. Obviously, there 
is a possibility that prolonged thought plays a role in decisions related to extreme 
weather events or seasonal phenomena such as monsoon rain. These high-consequence 
events are often communicated to the public several days in advance even when the 
probabilities are low. This information gives people time to take action and time to 
think over what to do, allowing for Type 3 processes. Such decisions, related to severe 
weather, are not considered in this study. There is, however, also a possibility that 
prolonged thought plays a role in many everyday decisions. For example, if I plan for 
holiday travel, I may initially view the weather forecast for several possible 
destinations and study this information together with other relevant information. 
Thereafter, unable to decide immediately between two or three good options, I put the 
delicate problem away for a while. Some days later, I suddenly know where I want to 
go. I may also check forecast updates for a period of time before I make my decision. 
In the present study, this behavior would be denoted “prolonged usage” of forecasts. It 
is possible that prolonged usage also involves prolonged thought, but this is not 
discussed in the interviews. 
The literature indicates that there is an interplay between all three types of processing 
used in decision-making to a varying extent depending upon the situation and, perhaps, 
upon the individual. Although intuition, analysis, and prolonged thought refer to 
different cognitive systems rather than different decision-making strategies, it is 
assumed that people use different strategies to obtain input information, that is, for 
information search related to Type 2 processing (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). 
Interviewees in the present study are provided forecast information, and I study their 
conscious use of this information. In the following, I delve further into the literature on 
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human decision-making behavior to elaborate on (conscious) information search in 
decision situations, which is importantly related to the weather forecast usage studied. 
1.4.2 Information search and decision-making behavior 
Although huge amounts of information are processed by intuition continuously and 
unconsciously, there is also a controlled search of input information which is 
important for analytic processing. As mentioned above, the depth of the analytic 
processes varies. Thus, the amount of information to be searched and processed 
consciously will vary and can depend upon the situation and restrictions in time and 
the capacity of the working memory. Variations in information search and usage are 
suggested to be related to certain types of decision-making behavior and are of interest 
to the present study. 
It appears that some individuals habitually adopt a maximizing behavior across several 
decision situations (Schwartz et al., 2002). Resolute maximizers typically spend much 
time and effort searching a huge amount of information to compare all available 
alternatives to find what they consider the best option (Misuraca et al., 2015a). Such 
behavior indicates an in-depth analysis (Type 2 processing). Misuraca et al. (2015b) 
speculate that maximizers’ behavior may be driven by their tendency to focus on 
tomorrow, reflecting their tendency to consider not only the immediate but also the 
long-term consequences of their choice. Misuraca et al. (2015b) found a positive 
correlation between maximizing behavior and the capacity to comprehend and use 
basic probability and numerical concepts (numeracy). This correlation might mean that 
maximizers are more likely to make analytic trade-offs and comparisons than are less 
numerate individuals (Misuraca et al., 2015b). However, regret aversion - the desire to 
avoid potential regret - might have an effect on maximizing behavior (Schwartz et al., 
2002; Parker et al., 2007; Misuraca et al., 2015a). Fearful maximizers focus their 
attention on the fear of making wrong or non-optimal decisions, and this focus can 
result in an almost endless search for information without moving forward toward a 
decision (Misuraca et al., 2015a). Facing an abundance of options might lead a 
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maximizer to choose almost arbitrarily just to complete the decision process (Schwartz 
et al., 2002). Maximizers might also more often than others postpone their decisions, 
to search for more information and ponder possibilities (Parker et al., 2007). Although 
not mentioned in the literature, this postponement appears (in some situations) related 
to prolonged thought (Type 3 processing). Additionally, maximizers would attempt to 
avoid relying on feelings and instincts (Slovic et al., 2004).  
Other individuals appear to adapt a satisficing behavior habitually, attempting to find 
an option that they consider satisfactory or “good enough” (Schwartz et al., 2002). 
Unlike the maximizers, the satisficers would select only a few criteria that they 
consider important, and once they find an option in which these criteria are met, they 
are satisfied because the threshold of acceptance is crossed (Misuraca et al., 2015a). 
Less ambitious satisficers have lower standards and search and process less 
information than more ambitious satisficers (Misuraca et al., 2015a). Both types of 
satisficing behavior indicate a more concise analysis (Type 2). Regret aversion is not 
considered a problem to satisficers because they seek a “good enough” rather than the 
“best” option (Schwartz et al., 2002). Likewise, added options are not typically 
problematic to satisficers because the added options only provide new possibilities to 
find an option that crosses their threshold of acceptance (Schwartz et al., 2002). For 
example, rejecting a formerly chosen option for a higher-ranked one, which is possible 
through prolonged thought or prolonged forecast usage, can make a satisficer move in 
the direction of maximization without having maximization as a deliberate goal 
(Schwartz et al., 2002). Similarly, Misuraca and Teuscher (2013) suggest that many 
options have an effect on satisficers, leading them to behave more like maximizers, 
engaging more cognitive resources and making more comparisons. Apparently, the 
availability of options also relates to coherence: if the new information does not favor 
one option, decisions are more challenging to make (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). 
Interestingly, Jain et al. (2011) found in their study that satisficers made use of fewer 
cues and paid less attention to irrelevant cues (i.e., noise), enabling them to perform 
better than maximizers in a decision task. However, previous research provides mixed 
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evidence on who makes superior decisions, and results might differ in situations when 
maximizers do better or worse (Jain et al., 2011). 
There is a discussion of whether satisficing and maximizing can be measured on one 
scale and are opposite ends of a continuum (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2002) or whether 
they should be measured as separate dimensions, independent of each other (e.g., 
Turner et al., 2012; Misuraca et al., 2015a). The discussion relates to how satisficing 
and maximizing behavior correlate to measures of, among others, happiness, 
perfectionism, optimism, and regret. The interviewees in the present study do elaborate 
on what information they use and why they use it, but they do not report on their 
happiness and so on. Hence, this discussion is outside the scope of the present study. 
More important for this study appears to be an agreement that a greater amount of 
information is considered in the decision process for maximizing than for satisficing 
behavior. Although individuals might tend to adopt a certain type of behavior more 
often than type, it is not very likely that this behavior is adopted in all situations (Janis 
& Mann, 1977; Schwartz et al., 2002). This view is in accordance with dual-process 
theories, in which the depth of the analysis is supposed to vary, as described above. 
Thus, independent of the discussion, individuals most likely have variations in their 
information search and processing with respect to effort and accuracy across different 
situations. These variations are assumed to depend upon environmental, task, and 
personal factors, allowing individuals to achieve a high level of decision accuracy 
even under processing constraints (e.g., time pressure) (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). 
This study does not contribute to the discussion of whether maximizing and satisficing 
behavior are separate dimensions. In this study, in which handling the complexity of 
information in different decision situations is the focus, variations in the amount of 
information used are discussed. 
Importantly, both satisficers and maximizers are interested in the quality of their 
decisions and can have high and ambitious standards (Misuraca et al., 2015a). 
However, satisficers are not willing to invest the extra time and effort required to 
move from the “good enough” option to the “absolute best” (Misuraca et al., 2015a). 
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Misuraca et al. (2015a) expand previous studies on decision-making tendencies by 
proposing a third type of individual behavior, the minimizers. These individuals are 
uninterested in the quality of their decisions, and they choose the option that meets the 
absolute minimum criteria, with minimal effort expended (Misuraca et al., 2015a). 
Indolent minimizers and parsimonious minimizers are both characterized by a quick 
and superficial evaluation of alternatives (Misuraca et al., 2015a). 
Both satisficing and maximizing behavior are considered analytic processes because 
they are conscious. Intuition - building on experience – is also a part of the decision 
process through unconscious integration of emotions, affect, preferences and so on. 
Information search and decision-making behavior is closely linked to different 
perspectives in research on decision-making. In the following subsection, I examine 
more closely different perspectives adopted in research on decision-making. 
1.4.3 Perspectives on research on decision-making and rationality 
The long history of research on decision-making has led to several competing models 
and a theoretical battle between different camps or perspectives.  
There are three major competing models in research on decision-making (McFall, 
2015): 
Optimizing is the oldest (dating back to the 17th century) and likely most well-known 
perspective, focusing on economic models and maximizing expected utility. Decision-
making has been considered one of the supreme disciplines of conscious thought, and 
the maximization principle of utility theory pushes to the extreme the idea that 
decisions require (intense) deliberation (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). Many classic 
models of rationality, such as the optimizing model, view the human mind as having 
almost unlimited knowledge and computational capacity. Making decisions based on a 
classic view of rationality requires substantial computational capacity (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999): For each alternative, all possible consequences should be listed. Each of the 
consequences should be assigned a probability. The utility of each consequence should 
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be estimated to select the alternative with the highest expected utility and to make an 
optimal decision. This type of decision-making requires an unlimited information 
search and describes how ideal people should make decisions (normative). The 
optimizing perspective can be useful and is much used in experimental settings (the 
amount of information provided to the participants is, however, limited in the 
experiments), most likely because it is a simplification of real-world problems and 
allows researchers to compare decision outcomes across individuals. However, an 
increasing number of empirical findings question its validity as a model of human 
behavior (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015). As holes continue to develop in this 
paradigm, Oppenheimer and Kelso (2015) propose a that possible a paradigm shift in 
research on human decision-making began during the past half century, in which 
information-processing models have started to emerge as reasonable alternatives to 
economic models. In this new paradigm, the specific information available to the 
decision-maker, and how that information is sampled, retrieved, integrated, and used, 
is considered. Such models are closer to the approach taken in this study. 
As early as in the 1950s, Simon (1955) doubted whether optimizing (the first 
perspective) could serve as a descriptive model of human decision-making, believing 
that individuals would require supernatural computing powers to implement this 
principle (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). Simon, developing a bounded rationality 
approach, suggested individuals employ simple rules allowing them to reduce 
cognitive effort (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). There are two main camps focusing on 
information processing and actual rather than ideal decisions, and the main theoretical 
battle stands between these two perspectives: the heuristic-and-biases camp (the 
second perspective), who argue that humans are prone to systematic errors in 
judgment, and the satisficing/naturalistic decision-making camp (the third 
perspective), who argue that humans are adept at decision-making. The heuristics and 
biases perspective is descriptive and focuses on the reasoning and arguments that 
influence people’s decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Shafir et al., 2000). In 
some situations, people are assumed to apply heuristics and rules of thumb for 
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judgment intuitively rather than optimizing (Jungermann, 2004). However, research 
from this perspective also focuses on errors by people when they use heuristics instead 
of optimizing (Klein, 2011). Optimizing is viewed as the normative model for 
decision-making, sharing the same classical view on rationality as in the first 
perspective (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
In reality, humans have limited time, knowledge and computational capacity 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999), and this affects our decision-making. This vision of 
rationality, defined by its fit with reality is referred to as ecological or bounded 
rationality (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). This rationality leads to the third perspective 
(satisficing or naturalistic decision-making) in research on decision-making, which is 
descriptive instead of normative. These models of decision-making, which are based 
on the view of bounded rationality, involve a limited information search (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999); a stopping rule that is guided by heuristics indicates when to stop searching 
for more information. Simple decision rules facilitate decision-making. As soon as a 
satisficing alternative is obtained, a “good enough” decision can also be obtained. 
The two competing camps agree that Type 1 and Type 2 processing are both important 
in human decision-making (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). However, their views on 
rationality differ, and this disagreement stems from whether the use of intuition 
improves or degrades the quality of decisions. The heuristics-and-biases camp 
concentrates on intuition arising from (according to their view on rationality) 
inappropriate application of heuristics (and heuristics, e.g. the availability heuristic, are 
considered Type 1 processing in this camp), whereas the naturalistic decision-making 
camp concentrates on intuition derived from expertise or genuine skill. In the 
following, a more balanced discussion of both the benefits and the flaws of intuitive 
thought is provided. Intuition is recognition (Simon, 1992), and when people learn 
elements and patterns in a new situation and how to act appropriately, valid intuition 
might develop (Kahneman, 2011). However, intuitions are not always derived from 
true or relevant experience, which can produce low-quality intuitive judgments 
(Kahneman, 2011). Independent of the viewpoint of rationality, the use of heuristics 
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might not solely produce high-quality or low-quality intuitive judgments. Instead, 
heuristics is dependent upon the quality of the experiences and skills of the decision 
makers, which should be acquired through prolonged practice in a sufficiently 
predictable environment (Kahneman, 2011). With relevant experience, decision 
makers develop more patterns in their mind, which enables recognition of more 
situations and rapid and accurate intuitive judgments (Klein, 2011). For example, it is 
suggested that tourists, due to their unfamiliarity with the local environment, may be 
more vulnerable to being surprised by flash flooding (Becker et al., 2015). Weather 
forecasting can be considered a sufficiently predictable environment for the 
development of intuitive skills of satisfactory quality. In their study of Navy 
forecasters, Joslyn and Jones (2008) discovered that the most experienced forecaster 
had a more complete mental representation of the atmospheric conditions, including 
both spatial and temporal components, compared with the novice forecasters. Thus, the 
more experienced forecaster was able to recognize more atmospheric patterns than the 
novice forecaster, which enabled the more experienced forecaster to make faster and 
better intuitive judgments when making a forecast. This view on valid intuition, arising 
from true expertise based on relevant experience, is also in line with fuzzy-trace 
theory, which describes gist representations of information to be increasingly 
important when they are informed by increasing age and experience (Reyna, 2012). 
Thus, it appears that the focus on participants’ prior experiences with weather in the 
present study is important because it relates to the validity of intuition. According to 
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006), valid intuition might also arise from prolonged 
thought (Type 3) processes based on extensive unconscious thought (the deliberation-
without-attention effect). Note that Newell and Shanks (2014) question whether the 
deliberation-without-attention effect is due to disadvantages conferred on conscious 
thought due to experimental procedures rather than hypothesized advantages of 
unconscious thought. 
People are involved in many different types of decision processes, and there are 
different views on the rationality of individuals’ decision-making. For example, 
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decisions can have fatal consequences or go awry because of ignorance. However, 
such results do not necessarily mean that the decisions were irrational; rather, the 
decisions could require knowledge or information that the decision-maker did not have 
(Reyna & Farley, 2006). The aim of the present study is to describe decision 
processes, not to judge whether these are good or bad, or rational or not rational.  
According to Eiser et al. (2012), the traditional economic and heuristic models of 
human decision-making inadequately describe decision-making under uncertainty; 
both paradigms fail to incorporate factors that are critical to much real-life decision-
making. Affect and emotions are quite recently incorporated into decision research 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Work by Slovic et al. (2004) on the affect heuristic (Eiser et 
al., 2012) is of special interest to decision-making under uncertainty. Because the 
weather forecasts used in the present study included uncertainty information, the 
participants had to make decisions under uncertainty. Therefore, I examine more 
closely the theory on risk and uncertainty related to decision-making and 




1.5 Risk and uncertainty 
All science and all predictions of the future have uncertainty (National Research 
Council, 2006; Fischhoff & Davis, 2014), which explain why expressing nuances in 
terms of degrees of certainty is common in scientific texts (see subsection 1.3.4). 
Many classifications of uncertainty exist (e.g., see Riesch, 2012). Traditionally, the 
classifications have focused on where uncertainty derives from, with a main distinction 
being made between uncertainty arising from natural variability inherent in the system 
(aleatory) and uncertainty arising from incomplete knowledge (epistemic) (Strand & 
Oughton, 2009; Riesch, 2012). Paradoxically, when the understanding of a problem 
grows richer, the uncertainty may increase because research reveals processes that had 
not previously been understood and that were not described realistically in the models 
(Morgan et al., 2009). For weather predictions and many natural hazards (e.g., 
flooding, snow avalanches, tsunamis, and earthquakes), there is a growing 
understanding of the underlying laws (Hirschberg et al. 2011; Kunz et al. 2011). Thus, 
epistemic uncertainties can be reduced (to a certain level) by collecting more data of 
higher quality and improving the models (Der Kiureghian & Ditlevsen, 2009; Kunz et 
al. 2011; Daipha, 2012). However, the predictions will remain uncertain, for example, 
because of unpredictable variations in the systems and the chaotic nature of the 
atmosphere (aleatory uncertainties) (May, 2001; Challenor et al., 2010; Kunz et al. 
2011). Historically, the focus of uncertainty analysis has been on quantifiable aspects, 
with uncertainties represented using statistics (Strand & Oughton, 2009). There are, 
however, also other and less quantifiable aspects of uncertainty (Strand & Oughton, 
2009), for example, ignorance (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993) and indeterminacy 
(Wynne, 1992). These aspects of uncertainty are discussed in subsection 1.5.3. Most 
importantly, uncertainties should be communicated properly to enable people to make 
informed decisions. 
In the following subsections, I present theory on risk, uncertainty, and decision-
making (subsection 1.5.1.); decision-making related to weather and uncertainty 
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(subsection 1.5.2.); risk communication (subsection 1.5.3.); and finally communication 
of uncertain weather information (subsection 1.5.4.) 
1.5.1 Risk, uncertainty, and decision-making 
“All decision-making involve risk at some level, at minimum they involve the risk of 
being the wrong decision to have made” (Breakwell, 2014, p. 85).  
Many classifications of risk and uncertainty exist (e.g., see Riesch, 2012). One known 
mathematical definition of the concept is: risk is a product of the likelihood that a 
harm will happen and the magnitude of the consequences (Eiser et al., 2012; Riesch, 
2012; Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2014). In other words, it is only possible to calculate 
the risk if harm and likelihood is known and can be quantified. Harm refers to threats 
to humans and things they value (Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2014). Because the harm 
may occur but is not inevitable, individuals can seek to avoid or limit the harm 
(Breakwell, 2014). If the likelihood of the harm is known (e.g., risk of car accident for 
a given population), this situation involves decision-making under risk (National 
Research Council, 2006; Eiser et al., 2012). However, there might be uncertainty over 
the likelihood of an event and uncertainty over the magnitude of the consequences 
(Eiser et al., 2012). The case of uncertain or unknown likelihood or uncertain 
consequences is called decision-making under uncertainty (National Research Council, 
2006; Eiser et al., 2012). All weather forecast information is uncertain; hence, the 
participants in the present study made decisions under uncertainty. Therefore, 
uncertainty is a focus of all three papers in this study. 
Natural hazards represent risks in our lives (Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2014), with 
flooding representing one of the leading causes of death associated with natural 
disasters (Becker et al., 2015). The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
defines natural hazards as severe or extreme weather and climate events (e.g., 
hurricanes). However, more general discussions exist concerning who determines what 
is harmful and how harmful it must be (Breakwell, 2014). In other words, more normal 
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weather events, which I focus in the present study, also can be considered harmful 
events.  
Slovic et al. (2004) suggested that humans use two types of processing to comprehend 
risk: Risk-as-feelings and risk-as-analysis. This distinction is in line with a large body 
of dual-processing theories (Dickert et al., 2014). Risk-as-feelings is considered by 
Slovic et al. (2004) a human’s most natural and common means of responding to 
danger, relying on associations linked by experience to emotions and affect. This 
response is pleasure-pain oriented and represents risk as a feeling, telling us whether 
something is safe (Slovic et al., 2004). Risk-as-feelings is linked to intuition, or Type 1 
processing, and is of interest for decisions made under all weather conditions. For 
example, when we are trying to decide whether we should host a barbeque party when 
a thunderstorm is forecast, there is an automatic search in memory for similar 
experiences and related emotions. If activated feelings are unpleasant, they motivate 
actions to avoid reproducing those feelings. Some interviewees in this study provided 
examples of such behavior. Risk-as-analysis, however, is analytical and oriented to 
what is sensible, using probability calculus, formal logic and scientific deliberation 
(Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2012) and is clearly linked to Type 2 processing. 
Importantly, analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless guided by emotion and 
affect (Slovic et al., 2004). Although in-depth analysis is important in some decision 
situations (e.g., hazard management), it appears that emotions and affect serve as 
orienting mechanisms, helping us to navigate efficiently in the complex and uncertain 
world in which we are living (Slovic et al., 2004). In the present study the participants 
are asked to report on how they evaluate uncertainty in the forecasts they are provided. 
People are not always conscious about consulting affect in decision processes (Slovic 
et al., 2004), which may explain why the interviewees in the present study typically 
did not report on affect, but rather on conscious thought processes (Type 2). This result 
is similar to the challenge described by Newell and Shanks (2014), suggesting that 
people are not always aware of the information triggering their decisions, and it is 
challenging for researchers to make people elicit all factors influencing their decision-
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making. Additionally, how to produce clear and replicable empirical evidence on 
unconscious thought processes is much discussed; research on the topic remains 
premature (Newell & Shanks, 2014). Another possible explanation for the lack of 
utterances concerning affect and emotion in the present study is that the interviewees 
are not asked directly that lack. Hence, even when they are conscious about their 
feelings, they may not find them worth mentioning; I speculate that it is easier to talk 
to a stranger about facts than about feelings. Although the participants typically do not 
report on their feelings, they do report on their experiences and these are closely linked 
to feelings. Thus, feelings are indirectly a part of the analysis in this study. 
A person can be either risk-seeking (accept high uncertainty) or risk-averse (want to 
reduce or avoid uncertainty) in a specific decision situation. Research has found that 
affect and emotions play a role in whether we are risk-seeking or risk-averse. Several 
studies have found an inverse relationship between interpreted risk and benefit, 
implying that if feelings toward an activity are favorable, risk is judged as low and 
benefits as high (Slovic et al., 2004). Thus, if a person has positive feelings about an 
event, she will typically view it as having more benefits and fewer costs (Eiser et al., 
2012). For example, a considerable number of Australian flood victims entered 
floodwater for recreational purposes (e.g., swimming, playing, or bathing) and likely 
underestimated the dangers (Becker et al., 2015). By studying specific emotions, 
Lerner and Keltner (2001) expand on studies that link affect and emotion to decision-
making. Different appraisals of certainty and control moderated and mediated emotion 
effects (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The authors found that fear and anger due to these 
differences have opposite effects on how risk is interpreted; fearful people expressed 
pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices (which relates to a sense of 
uncertainty and a lack of control), whereas angry people expressed optimistic risk 
estimates and risk-seeking choices. Similarly, a positive mood (happy people) 
typically leads to more optimistic risk estimates (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). However, 
Västfjäll et al. (2014) found that, when studying the 2004 south Asian tsunami, a 
positive mood occasionally led to risk taking and occasionally to risk aversion. 
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Additionally, if one has not experienced a disaster, reliance on personal experience can 
lead to an underestimation of risk (Eiser et al., 2012).  
Interpretation of risk always occurs in a social and cultural context (Bodemer & 
Gaissmaier, 2014). Similarly, in their model of protective action decision-making, 
Lindell and Perry (2012) claim that, in addition to the warning, the process starts with 
environmental cues (e.g., sights, smells, or sounds) and social cues. The social 
processes are important, and risk messages can have a social amplification or 
attenuation, depending upon the attention from media, people’s conversations with one 
another, and so on (Eiser et al., 2012; Becker et al., 2015). Risk interpretation and 
action is also influenced by our trust in others, and laypeople may need to rely on 
information from experts (Eiser et al., 2012). Thus, communication is important 
because it can influence and possibly improve trust in experts (Eiser et al., 2012). For 
example, earthquake decision-making (low-probability and high-consequence) relies 
on effective communication of risk and uncertainty, but what is effective varies with 
type of decision-maker (Bostrom et al., 2008). Different types of visualizations have 
different effects on interpretation of risk; graphical displays of comparative risk (e.g., 
bar graph) increase risk-aversion for low-probability events relative to presenting 
numbers alone by weakening awareness of the upper bounds of the probabilities of 
adverse outcomes (Bostrom et al., 2008). Graphical displays can help people with low 
numeracy; however, graphics can also arouse emotions and overemphasis on negative 
consequences and can lead to risk aversion (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011) 
Previous research has shown that our decisions are highly influenced by contextual 
factors such as emotion and affect (Västfjäll et al., 2014). In their study of the 2004 
south Asian tsunami, Västfjäll et al. (2014) found that people used the affect elicited 
by thinking of the natural disaster (tsunami) to infer the risk of an activity in other 
domains. Thus, the affect elicited by major environmental events such as a hurricane 
or other natural disasters is likely to influence everyday decision-making (Västfjäll et 
al., 2014). Natural disasters can induce affect (they are likely to elicit negative affect) 
and different ways to think about risk (Västfjäll et al., 2014). Thus, people’s recent 
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experiences with extreme weather can influence their everyday weather-related 
decision-making. For example, one participant in this study said that in the time after a 
flood in which his house was water damaged, he was more worried when a large 
amount of rain was forecast. These feelings might subsequently lead him to examine 
forecast information more carefully. However, as discussed earlier, feelings are not 
studied directly in the present study. 
In this study, the focus is on everyday decisions and non-extreme weather conditions, 
in which risk is relatively low. Forecast uncertainty, however, is important in this 
study and requires closer examination. 
1.5.2 Decision-making related to weather and uncertainty 
“A weather forecast, however skilful, has no intrinsic value unless it can be used to 
make decisions that bring some benefit to the end user” (Mylne, 2002, p. 307). 
Indeed, weather forecasts have become important for both daily and hazardous-
weather decision-making, with users ranging from members of the public to 
professionals (National Research Council, 2006). There is always an uncertainty 
associated with weather forecast information (what, where, and when), and if 
communicated, this uncertainty can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Numerical probability statements are commonly used to express uncertainty in risk 
science and weather forecasting (National Research Council, 2006; Handmer & 
Proudley, 2007). The National Research Council (2006, p. 12) claims in their report 
that “the failure to provide forecast uncertainty information can contribute to damage 
and loss of life”. Delaying decisions until certainty increases is not always possible, 
and we cannot assume that the information needed will become significantly more 
certain in a time frame that is realistic for decision-making (Dietz, 2013). If not 
provided, people attempt to estimate forecast uncertainty themselves (Joslyn & 
LeClerc, 2012). The participants’ evaluations of forecast uncertainty and their own 
estimates of uncertainty are central in the present study (particularly in paper 1). 
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The ability to cope with natural hazards and everyday weather depends upon several 
factors, among them the interpretation of probabilistic information (Broad et al., 2007) 
and the use of this information in decision-making. Numerous studies have shown 
people to have difficulty addressing probability and risk (National Research Council, 
2006; Nadav-Greenberg et al., 2008; Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Problems interpreting 
probabilities might occur when the class of events referred to is not specified. For 
example, “a 30% chance of rain” can be interpreted as “rain 30% of the time”, “rain in 
30% of an area”, or “rain in 3 out of 10 cases” (Gigerenzer et al., 2005). This and other 
challenges have led to suggestions to replace numerical probabilities with verbal 
expression (e.g., rain is likely). There are, however, challenges related to use of verbal 
probability expressions. The numerical likelihood ranges people assign to common 
verbal expressions are wide (National Research Council, 2006), most likely wider than 
is appreciated by forecast providers. The numeric interpretation of verbal expressions 
also depends upon contextual factors such as the base rate of the event (e.g., a good 
chance of rain is typically interpreted as more likely in London where it rains often 
than in the Gobi Desert where it rarely rains) and the severity of the event (e.g., a good 
chance of a hurricane can be interpreted as more likely than a good chance of a breeze) 
(Wallsten et al., 1986; National Research Council, 2006). Providing both numerical 
and verbal expressions of probability, such as in the reports from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is recommended by Morgan 
(2014). This recommendation is important because without quantification, different 
verbal expressions of uncertainty can mask important differences between the experts 
using them, in addition to being interpreted differently by users (Morgan, 2014). 
Providing both may provide an opportunity to narrow the range of interpretations (e.g., 
Budescu et al., 2012), in which one representation may constrain the interpretation of 
the other (as discussed in subsection 1.3.3 with reference to Ainsworth, 1999), and the 
verbal expression (which represents the essential meaning of numerical values) may 
shape the gist representation.  
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Despite indications that probabilistic information can be demanding for laypeople to 
interpret, several studies have focused on how individuals make weather-related 
decisions and whether the uncertainty information provided in the forecasts enabled 
users to make improved decisions (e.g., Roulston et al., 2006; Joslyn et al., 2007; 
Joslyn et al., 2009; Joslyn & Nichols, 2009; Roulston & Kaplan, 2009; Morss et al., 
2010; LeClerc & Joslyn, 2012). Many of these studies were conducted in controlled 
contexts in laboratories or with surveys from a cost-loss perspective. As discussed 
earlier, the economic models are flawed with respect to human behavior, and Morss et 
al. (2010) report that not all participants in their study made decisions according to the 
cost-loss model. However, the models are viewed as a useful tool when studying the 
usefulness of probability forecasts. The simplified decisions allow comparison 
between deterministic (single-valued outcome) and probabilistic (multi-valued 
outcomes) forecast information (Mylne, 2002) and between probabilistic information 
in different formats (e.g., probability versus frequency). Probabilistic forecast 
information is usually found to have greater value for users than is equivalent 
deterministic information (Mylne, 2002; Joslyn & Nichols, 2009; LeClerc & Joslyn, 
2012), suggesting that understanding the information is not really a problem. Another 
possible explanation for the improved decision-making is that people use probabilities 
as triggers to make decisions and thus do not need a precise interpretation but a 
functional understanding; for example, action may always be taken at a 70% chance of 
rain or higher (Handmer & Proudley, 2007). This explanation is supported by Konold 
(1989), who found that values sufficiently over (under) 50% were interpreted as “it 
will (not) rain” and mapped them to a yes or no decision, whereas values of 
approximately 50% were interpreted as “the forecaster doesn`t know” and did not 
serve as useful information. Making decisions using such simple rules is similar to the 
idea introduced by Simon (1955) with the satisficing heuristic. Visual displays of 
uncertainty information are assumed particularly helpful to both experts and laypeople 
(Nadav-Greenberg et al., 2008). To improve decision-making, presentation format 
should be compatible with the task to reduce the cognitive processing required to 
incorporate uncertainty information (Joslyn et al., 2009).  
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Small probabilities are found to be particularly challenging to interpret. In some cases, 
they are overestimated; in others, they are rounded down to zero (National Research 
Council, 2006). LeClerc and Joslyn (2012) expand on previous studies, suggesting that 
odds ratio is more suited than both deterministic and probabilistic information to 
communicate the relative risk in the case of rare but extreme weather, whereas 
probabilistic information is superior in normal (not extreme) weather conditions. 
People can underestimate personal risk in the case of rare but extreme events, due to 
availability heuristics (examples of precautionary actions, such as access to storm 
shelter, come easily to mind), affective factors (such as overoptimism), past experience 
(recent events play a greater role and rare events are more distant), or cultural 
worldviews (National Research Council, 2006; LeClerc & Joslyn, 2012; Morss et al., 
2016). Deterministic forecasts might lead to more false alarms and to distrust in 
forecasts. However, this possibility is debated. Whereas some studies on hazards 
(hurricanes, tornados, and floods) suggest no cry-wolf effect or a negative influence of 
false alarms on an individual’s decision to take protective action against future events, 
other studies (on tornados) provide alternative and more complex results (Trainor et 
al., 2015). For example, Trainor et al. (2015) found in their study that a substantial 
portion (almost 20%) of the sample believed that false alarms were unjustified, 
misinformed, or even lies, and this belief could lead to mistrust in future events. 
Importantly, if people like their local weather providers and believe them to be 
providing a good service, they tend to believe that there are fewer false alarms than 
there actually are (Trainor et al., 2015). Nevertheless, uncertainty information may 
increase trust in forecasts, because such forecasts seem less “wrong” than single-
valued forecasts failing to verify (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2012). Over 70% of the 
respondents in O´ Hanrahan and Sweeney’s (2013) study also found uncertainty 
information to increase confidence in the weather forecasts. However, some of their 
respondents thought such probabilities would be meaningless and confusing, or that 
they should only be used for severe weather (O´ Hanrahan & Sweeney, 2013). In the 
case of severe weather, Joslyn and LeClerc (2012) suggest odds might be better to 
stimulate precautionary action than percentages. However, odds should be used with 
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care. Even when they stimulate action, they might also lead to an increased false-alarm 
ratio because odds can be very persuasive for taking action; however, there will not 
always be a strike (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2012). Importantly, probabilistic forecasts 
should be sufficiently sharp to provide precise and useful information for decision-
making (Joslyn & Savelli, 2010).  
The participants in the aforementioned studies concerned with uncertain decision-
making were typically asked to pretend that they were managers or forecasters and 
thus to make (high-stakes) decisions as though it were their professional responsibility. 
Moreover, the studies were concerned with the use of selected pieces of information 
detached from the context of a real weather report and did not represent normal user 
situations. Although studying authentic real-world situations is impossible, normal 
user situations are replicated in this study by using holistic forecast information and 
allowing participants to talk about their own everyday decision situations. In fact, the 
most frequent use of weather forecasts is related to leisure activities (Demuth et al., 
2011). Most weather-related decisions are everyday decisions (e.g., planning for a trip 
or clothing) (Silver, 2015), and such non-severe weather has been much less addressed 
in previous research (with important exceptions) (Demuth et al., 2011). Recent studies 
have begun to address the use of weather information for leisure activities; for 
example, Savelli and Joslyn (2012) study communication of weather forecast 
information to recreational boaters and Rutty and Andrey (2014) study weather 
forecast use for winter recreation. Understanding such decision-making requires, at a 
minimum, describing the information used (Rutty & Andrey, 2014). The present study 
aims to be a contribution to this area of research, focusing on information processing 
rather than taking a cost-loss perspective. Note that the participants in this study are 
told to report on their use of information provided in weather reports; there may be 
other sources of information they use privately that are not included in this study.  
The role of analytical (conscious) processes in the interpretation and use of uncertain 
weather information in decision-making has typically been overestimated whereas 
affect and emotions have been ignored (National Research Council, 2006), which is 
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also a flaw for the present study. A few participants in the interviews reported 
emotions when interpreting the forecast information. For example, one participant was 
scared of driving when snow was forecast, which might explain why forecast 
information was explored in more detail in such cases. These reports are very rare, and 
they are not elaborated on. There is a possibility that the interviewees did not report 
more emotions because they did not make true decisions, but rather described 
hypothetical decisions in which conscious thought prevailed. The eye-tracking study 
(i.e., paper 3), in which the decision-situation is more authentic, may be better suited 
for eliciting affect and emotions. However, the eye-tracking study is not about 
decision-making, but about reading. In future research, eye-tracking followed by 
think-aloud and interviews might be a more suitable approach than interviews alone to 
elicit participants’ emotions when interpreting and using forecast information. 
Moreover, in future studies, the participants should be asked directly, “how does it 
make you feel?” to help elicit their responses about feelings (Peters, 2006). 
My personal experiences as a forecaster, people’s calls and e-mails to MET Norway, 
and the results from this study all indicate that people’s interpretations of weather 
forecast information vary. People interpreting forecasts too differently can have a 
negative effect on decision-making, such as setting out on a fishing expedition when 
the forecast indicates an impending storm. In general, most of our judgments are 
appropriate most of the time (Kahneman, 2011). At the same time, media reports 
suggest that decisions with unintended fatal consequences are occasionally made 
(discussed in Section 4.3). Informed decision-making, however, produces desirable 
outcomes, avoids unnecessary costs to society (Pielke & Carbone, 2002) and can be 
helpful in protecting people’s interests, lives and property (Hirschberg et al., 2011). 
Improved communication can contribute to an increased forecast value for users 
(Stuart et al., 2006) and help to enhance people’s decision-making. In the following 
subsection, I present an overview of existing research on risk communication relevant 
for this study. 
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1.5.3 Risk communication 
Risk communication has been a growing field since the 1980s (Kasperson, 2014), 
emerging from two stand-out reports: The 1989 report “Improving Risk 
Communication,” from the National Research Council, and the 1985 report entitled 
“The Public Understanding of Science,” published by The Royal Society. To achieve 
the desired level of public understanding, the committee suggested a proper science 
education for all (Royal Society & Bodmer, 1985). Understanding the nature of risk 
and uncertainty was considered “an important part of the scientific understanding 
needed for everyday decisions in our personal lives” (Royal Society & Bodmer, 1985, 
p.10). Notably, the public understanding of science discourse does not only focus on 
school education. In the report, British scientists were told that they had a duty to 
communicate with the public about their work (Royal Society & Bodmer, 1985), 
“aiming to reverse a tendency for scientists to retreat into their shells” (Miller, 2001, 
p.115). One motivation for the communication was to “make people understand” 
(Davies, 2008). The emphasis was on the public’s attitudes toward science, assuming 
better knowledge and understanding of probabilities would engender positive attitudes 
and more support for science: “the more you know, the more you love it” (Bauer, 
2009, p.4). Although there might be some relationship, the correlation between 
knowledge and attitudes is not confirmed, particularly not for controversial issues 
(Bauer, 2009). Rather than being more positive, attitudes that are based on knowledge 
seem to be more resistant to change (Bauer, 2009). In contrast, for some public 
understanding of science realists, attitudes are related to emotions rather than to 
knowledge. Hence, scientists have to “sex up” evidence to attract public attention 
(Bauer, 2009). “The critique of the public understanding of science focused on the 
deficit models of knowledge or attitude, claiming that negative attitudes are neither an 
expression of lack of knowledge nor of good judgment” (Bauer, 2009, p. 5).  
Risk communication is viewed as a dialog conducted to help facilitate a more accurate 
understanding of risk among people and, relatedly, the decisions they make to manage 
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them (Àrvai, 2014). However, although this definition of risk communication is widely 
accepted, it is often practiced differently (Àrvai, 2014). Despite the growth of risk 
communication in the past 30 years, Kasperson (2014) argues that the practices appear 
little changed. Àrvai (2014) claims that risk communication continues to be often 
viewed as a means of simply educating people and correcting “misconceptions” about 
risk, and argues that risk communication must be more decision-focused to be truly 
effective. Because different people are worried about different aspects of the risks and 
attach the uncertainty to different objects, Riesch (2012) claims that risk 
communication strategies often fail to convey the information that people actually find 
important.  
In traditional risk analysis and communications, the focus has been and still is on the 
quantitative aspects of uncertainty (Strand & Oughton, 2009). In recent decades, 
however, science has been coping with increasing uncertainties resulting from a 
complex interplay between new technologies, cultural and political development, and 
the natural environment in badly structured extensive problems (e.g., hazardous 
wastes, the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion) (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Beck, 
1992; Wynne, 1992). These problems affect environmental systems on a global scale, 
and the existing models for risk analysis and communication are not considered 
adequate or effective for handling them (Wynne, 1992; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; 
Turnpenny et al., 2011; Meadow et al., 2015). Shifting the focus to preventive 
strategies for integrating environmental criteria into decision-making (i.e., the 
precautionary principle) exposes not only more uncertainty but also fundamentally 
different types of uncertainty (Wynne, 1992). When “facts are uncertain, values in 
dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993, p. 744), 
approaches aiming at a more transparent treatment of (epistemic and ethical) 
uncertainty are suggested, one of the most influential approaches being post-normal 
science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Strand & Oughton, 2009; Turnpenny et al., 2011; 
Blanchard et al., 2014). The uncertainties associated with these types of extensive 
problems are generally less quantifiable and are described as partial ignorance (“we 
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know what we don’t know”, or “known unknowns”) or total ignorance (“we don’t 
know what we don’t know”, or “unknown unknowns”) (Strand & Oughton, 2009). 
These limitations to models could for example arise because some aspects that we 
know of have been omitted because of extrapolations from data or limitations in the 
computations, or because of things we suspect could occur but about which we do not 
have sufficient knowledge to be able to include them in the model (imaginable 
surprises) (Riesch, 2012). Despite remarkable progress in weather forecasting over the 
past 50 years some challenges remain (Lynch, 2008), and it is possible to find 
examples of uncertainties associated with partial ignorance in weather forecasting. 
Polar mesoscale cyclones (polar lows) are small but intense lows north of the polar 
front, with thunderstorms, heavy snow, and strong winds (Rojo et al., 2015). These are 
examples of an extreme weather phenomenon that may impact coastal and maritime 
activities (Rojo et al., 2015). Polar low forecasts have improved lately by using, for 
example, synoptic and climatological rules along with high resolution numerical 
weather prediction models for predicting their development and movement, and 
satellite imagery for identifying existing polar lows (Turner et al., 2003). Nevertheless, 
polar lows are still difficult to forecast due to their relatively small size and rapid 
development away from conventional observing sites (Rojo et al., 2015). In other 
words, even though meteorologists are aware of, and increase their knowledge of, the 
phenomenon, it is not always possible to forecast polar lows with enough lead time for 
people to take protective action.  
Post-normal science is based on the principle that ignorance cannot be easily 
accounted for using standard statistical methods or by traditional probabilistic risk 
analysis; thus, qualitative methodologies are required to characterize the (unknown) 
uncertainties and make our ignorance explicit and usable (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; 
Strand & Oughton, 2009). In communication, addressing acknowledged inadequacies 
(i.e., partial ignorance) can be done through informal, qualitatively formulated 
acknowledgement or by listing the factors that have been left out of the model (Riesch, 
2012). In the case of polar lows, this means that forecast providers must communicate 
that the uncertainty in the forecast is not only whether it will be, for example, breeze 
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and 3 or 5 millimeters of rain. Something completely different can happen due to a 
(“known unknown”) polar low - it can possibly become heavy snow and strong winds.  
The unknown inadequacies (i.e., total ignorance) are difficult to address because we do 
not actually know what they may be, and we are currently constrained by the limits of 
our imagination concerning what could possibly go wrong (Riesch, 2012; Blanchard et 
al., 2014). We can however acknowledge through simple humility that it is always 
possible that we are mistaken (Riesch, 2012).  
In addition to ignorance, studies indicate that scientists, partly depending on their 
scientific background, interpret data differently in situations characterized by high 
system complexity and thus express a diversity of opinions on a specific issue (Strand 
& Oughton, 2009). Moreover, the identification of the system to be studied, as part 
from its wider context, might influence the identification of relevant data and 
conclusions. When problems of defining the relevant system are a central 
characteristic of scientific research, the corresponding uncertainty is denoted as 
indeterminacy by Wynne (1992). Indeterminacy means that there is no unique way of 
defining the system to be studied and/or acted upon (Strand et al., 2010). 
Consequently, indeterminacy is associated with the questions that do not even get 
asked (Curry, 2011); that is, investigating a restricted set of uncertainties, due to 
system definition, and leaving others invisible. For example, if an agreement exist that 
many people in coastal areas need improved wind forecasts, how should this challenge 
be identified as a system and how should the challenge be approached? A 
meteorologist could see this as a question of increasing the quality of the numerical 
weather predictions by increasing model resolution. Another meteorologist could 
argue that better predictions of polar lows are essential to the case. Importantly, how 
the system is defined will influence which information/knowledge that is produced and 
which uncertainties that are made visible, and the communication of this information 
and uncertainty.   
In situations when facts are uncertain and decision-stakes are high, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1993) suggest we should establish and maintain a dialogue among the various 
interested parties. According to Wesselink and Hoppe (2011), post-normal science has 
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been suggested implemented as a scientific method, which, in addition to focus and 
communicate more in-depth on uncertainties, to improve the relevance and the quality 
of information using extended peer review in which all of those with a stake in the 
issue are invited to participate in the dialogue. For example, Morss et al. (2005) study 
how flood risk managers make decisions in complex settings and with high stakes, and 
suggest that understanding how the different participants interact can be a key 
component in generating usable science. Traditional experts should be flanked by, and 
interact with, an extended peer community of those affected by or with special 
knowledge of the issue (Turnpenny et al., 2011). A transparent discussion of all forms 
of uncertainty is welcomed in these dialogues (Blanchard et al., 2014). This process 
with stakeholder involvement and dialogue was noted as a co-production of 
knowledge (Meadow et al., 2015), a process that is more closely discussed in 
subsections 1.6.2 and 1.6.3. 
In sum, there are two contributions from post-normal science I find of special interest 
for weather forecasting: First, risk communication is important and (all types of) 
uncertainty needs to be discussed and communicated, and second, all with interest in 
an issue should be invited to participate in a dialogue to co-produce knowledge. By 
doing this, people’s knowledge and local experiences, and also their needs, can be 
recognized and the information produced and communicated can be relevant and 
useful. In practice, co-production of all information is difficult. For weather 
forecasting, I mean that co-production should be considered useful for how forecasts 
(and uncertainty) are communicated and for making the forecasts relevant, not the 
technical aspects and the production of the forecasts themselves.  
Although interesting, the qualitative aspects of uncertainty (ignorance and 
indeterminacy) are not further discussed in the present study. Rather, the co-
production model is focused.  
Àrvai (2014) suggests two-way dialog as a way forward for risk communication in 
general rather than the dominating one-way transmission of risk information from 
experts to laypeople. Sharing everything that experts know about risk uncertainty can 
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be counterproductive for decision-makers. For instance, before Hurricane Sandy, more 
than 500 different warnings, forecasts, and advisories were issued (Bostrom et al., 
2016). However, in this sea of available information, some members of the public still 
failed to receive a key message (Bostrom et al., 2016). Moreover, the participants in 
the present study occasionally left out evaluation of forecast uncertainty. Thus, the 
public does need to know the uncertainties that really matter concerning the magnitude 
of a risk and its management (Kasperson, 2014), in situations where this is important 
to them. Interpretations and assessments of risk are value-laden and subjective and 
make decisions no less problematic; experts and laypeople have much to learn from 
one another (Àrvai, 2014; Kasperson, 2014). For instance, laypeople should learn what 
experts know about the hazards they face, and experts should learn how laypeople 
conceive risk, how emotions influence risk assessment (Àrvai, 2014), and the 
influence of values/goals and judgments about trustworthiness of sources. Learning 
from one another could increase trust (Dietz, 2013). A large body of decision-research 
has shown that people tend to leave out key information when thinking about risks 
and, instead, utilize a variety of judgmental heuristics (Àrvai, 2014). Accordingly, how 
to communicate uncertainties to decision-makers remains challenging (Kasperson, 
2014). Morgan et al. (2002) argue that the design of risk communication often relies 
on intuition and conventional wisdom; some of these communications have worked 
well, whereas others have been less successful. To meet this challenge, Morgan et al. 
(2002) developed a method that reflects both the natural science of how risks are 
created and controlled and the social science of how people comprehend and respond 
to such risk - a mental model approach. How to conduct mental model research is 
outlined in subsection 1.6.3. From mental model research, it is clear that understanding 
interpretations can be very helpful in improving communication (Kasperson, 2014). 
This study focuses on understanding users’ interpretations (relates to RQ1) and uses 
(relates to RQ2) of uncertain weather information.  
There have been several interesting recent attempts to improve severe weather risk-
communication. Severe weather warnings are becoming increasingly risk-based as 
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forecasters aim to communicate both the uncertainty in the forecast and the likely 
levels of the impact of severe weather (Neal et al., 2014). For instance, in 2014 the 
National Weather Service in the U.S. implemented large-scale use of impact-based 
warnings designed to improve severe weather risk communication. The warnings use 
expanded and more specific wording with respect to the hazard, source, and impact of 
the forecast storm that clearly identifies potential threats (Casteel, 2016). Similarly, the 
UK National Severe Weather Warning Service issues warnings with three colors based 
on the likelihood of the severe weather event and its expected impact (Neal et al., 
2014). The warnings are designed to inform both the public and government with 
defined level of response to different levels of warning (i.e., colors) (Neal et al., 2014). 
Adding text to the warning that specifies hazard, source, and impact information is 
consistent with the risk communication literature (Casteel, 2016). Impact-based 
forecasting is also encouraged by the WMO; in its guidelines on impact-based forecast 
and warning services, it recognizes that “it is no longer enough to provide a good 
weather forecast or warning – people are now demanding information about what to 
do to ensure their safety and protect their property” (WMO, 2015, p. 1).  
Casteel (2016) claims that research has shown that effective warning messages must 
both be viewed as personally relevant and spur one to take protective action. In fact, 
personalization of risk plays a crucial role because it has been linked to an increased 
likelihood of taking protective action (Casteel, 2016). 
These issues make uncertain information interesting and important to study, and the 
weather forecasts included in the data collection of this study contain deterministic and 
probabilistic information. The uncertainty information in the forecasts used in this 
study is presented with words, numbers and graphics. Regardless of people’s format 
preferences, a fundamental question is whether laypeople obtain the information from 
the uncertainty information that the forecasters intend (Handmer & Proudley, 2007). In 
the following subsection, I summarize earlier research on how laypeople interpret 
uncertainty information conveyed in different formats in weather reports.  
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1.5.4 Communication of uncertain weather information 
Data and uncertainty can be communicated in multiple ways using different 
representations, such as words, numbers, or graphics, and can be adjusted to different 
end-users needs and capabilities (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Although most weather 
forecast information remains deterministic, there is a movement toward again 
including more uncertainty information (National Research Council, 2006; Joslyn & 
Savelli, 2010), and a great deal of research exists on uncertainty communication. 
Three issues concerning communication of uncertainty include which format to use 
(words, numbers, or graphics), the choice of perspective in presenting information 
(framing), and the inclusion of reference class (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Note that all 
of these issues are concerned with the quantifiable aspects of uncertainty. To my 
knowledge, other aspects of uncertainty (ignorance and indeterminacy) are not usually 
discussed in relation to communication of uncertain weather information, although 
such a discussion could be interesting for events in which decision-stakes might be 
high such as extreme weather or in flood management (e.g., see Morss et al., 2005). 
 
Here, I present examples related to format. Probabilities have a long history in weather 
forecasting. In 1965, the first operational probabilistic forecasts were produced in the 
U.S. These probabilities of precipitation were in the beginning subjective predictions 
by the meteorologists. A few years later, they became model-based calculations 
(National Research Council, 2006). Particularly since the 1990s, degree of certainty in 
a forecast is objectively calculated by using ensemble prediction systems (EPS). By 
running a series (ensemble) of forecasts (e.g., the model is run 51 times by the 
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts) with slightly different initial 
states, it is possible to calculate probabilities about future changes in the atmosphere 
(Lynch, 2008) and to overcome some of the error introduced by the chaotic nature of 
the atmosphere (Lynch, 2008). However, a challenge is the reliability of the 
probabilities calculated in the EPS systems (Atger, 2004). An 80% chance of rain does 
not mean it will rain 8 out of 10 times (Hamill 2012), and the forecast uncertainty is 
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often underestimated (Hirschberg et al., 2011). This challenge is due to systematic 
errors in the ensemble (Hamill 2012). The probabilities must be calibrated using 
comprehensive post-processing to produce more reliable probabilities (Atger, 2004; 
National Research Council, 2006). For example, “if the observed frequency in the past 
was 30% when the forecast probability was 40%, the calibrated probability will be 
30% when the raw probability is 40%” (Atger, 2004 p. 628). Thus, a main goal of EPS 
forecasting must be to provide reliable percentages such that an 80% chance in the 
model corresponds to an 80% chance in the real world. In my experience (e.g., the 
Royal Society meeting “Handling uncertainty in weather and climate prediction” in 
which I attended to in 2012), whether it is a good idea to communicate percentages 
before this goal is accomplished is also occasionally discussed. However, percentages 
are already in use, and they are unlikely to be removed. Importantly, these should be 
calibrated before being used.  
 
There are indications that relative frequencies (3 out of 10) might be a more effective 
communication format than probabilities, because they are easier to connect to 
people’s experiences (Gigerenzer, 1996; National Research Council, 2006). There is 
evidence that the frequency format increases the saliency of very small risks, 
highlighting individual occurrences and making them more imaginable (Joslyn & 
Nichols, 2009). However, Joslyn and Nichols (2009) found the opposite in their study 
of wind speed, in which the probability format was superior to the frequency format. 
Studies showing the advantages of frequencies are typically conducted in health 
research (e.g., biomedical screening), and it is speculated that it might be easier to 
interpret 1 out of 10 persons than 1 out of 10 days with similar atmospheric conditions 
(Joslyn & Nichols, 2009). Another important format conveying forecast uncertainty is 
the “cone of uncertainty”, used by the National Hurricane Center (NHC) in the USA to 
illustrate the potential geographical range of a tropical cyclone (Broad et al., 2007). 
However, this approach to communicating probabilistic information leads to a variety 
of interpretations and many people underestimate the risk of the hurricane in their 
vicinity (Broad et al., 2007). Moreover, Ash et al. (2014) found that different visual 
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design choices in the “cone of uncertainty” resulted in differences in self-reported fear 
and anticipated protective responses when viewing a tornado warning.  
Graphical displays of uncertainty may help people process the information; however, 
the quality of the presentation is suggested to be a critical factor in decision-making 
(MacEachren et al., 2005). There are numerous ideas and suggestions about how to use 
and manipulate visual variables (e.g., size, color hue, color value, color saturation, 
orientation, texture, clarity, and shape) to alter existing symbology (intrinsic 
techniques) to depict uncertainty (Bostrom et al., 2008; Kinkeldey et al., 2014). 
Adding new objects (extrinsic techniques) to the display to depict uncertainty, for 
example error bars, is another possibility (Bostrom et al., 2008; Kinkeldey et al., 
2014). Intrinsic approaches are assumed to be better for communicating overall 
uncertainty, whereas extrinsic approaches are suggested to be used for specific or 
locational uncertainties (MacEachren et al., 2005). However, for natural hazards, most 
of these techniques are not empirically tested about how they are interpreted by users 
and whether they are helpful or disruptive in decision-making (Bostrom et al., 2008). 
Despite all attempts, many of the alterations are demanding to interpret, mixed results 
indicate that visualizing and representing geospatial information uncertainty remains a 
challenge, and there is no consensus on the best means of communication 
(MacEachren et al., 2005; Bostrom et al., 2008; Kunz et al., 2011; Kinkeldey et al., 
2014; Stauffer et al., 2015). For heterogeneous user groups such as the public, 
providing multiple types of information (Becker et al., 2015) and allowing users to 
customize the visualizations according to their needs appears to be beneficial (Kunz et 
al., 2011). For example, the most effective color palette likely depends upon the user 
task, that is, on who the end-users are and on their visual constraints, prior knowledge, 
and requirements (Stauffer et al., 2015). Notably, a number of studies have shown that 
what users prefer to view at is not necessarily the same as what works best for them 
(Kinkeldey et al., 2014). Some studies report that adding uncertainty information 
overwhelmed users and had negative effects on map readability and decision-making, 
whereas other studies suggest that including uncertainty information clarified the 
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information rather than cluttering it (Kinkeldey et al., 2014). Even in situations in 
which uncertainty information are assumed to be beneficial to the end-users, they have 
to accept the additional effort to incorporate it into their decision-making processes 
(Kinkeldey et al., 2015). In summary, communicating uncertainties to laypeople 
remains a relevant challenge (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011).  
Multimodality, however, might be an advantage when communicating uncertainty and 
you want people to understand one fact in isolation (Fischhoff et al., 2002; Morgan et 
al., 2009) because users seem to respond well to multiple types of display of the same 
information (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Most previous studies of uncertainty 
communication are of percentages. In this study, other ways to express uncertainty 
(intervals and colors) are included in the multimodal reading material for the 
participants. Hence, this study should add a relevant contribution to the existing body 
of research. In the last Section of the theory part of the thesis, I focus on the literature 
on communication between experts and laypeople and on models to carry out and to 
improve this communication. This literature might not be directly related to the 
research questions and the aim of the study. However, the literature is related to how 
to conduct the research and to the motivation of the study (i.e., the communication 




1.6 Communication between experts and laypeople 
At the beginning of the study, I received a question from my main supervisor: “What 
do you think about the rationality of laypeople?” I admit that I was unsure whether the 
end-users of forecasts were able to comprehend the information, and I occasionally 
used words such as “wrong,” “don’t know,” “misinterpretation,” and 
“misunderstanding.” After discussions with my main supervisor and considerable 
thinking, I realized that years of work as a weather forecaster had made me biased. I 
thought that the forecasters were right and that end-users sometimes were wrong in 
their interpretations. Could it be the other way around? Could the forecasters 
miscommunicate the forecasts, thus leading to unintended interpretations of the 
information? I realized the potential for such miscommunication. Did I use my 
colleagues and myself as a model audience, presenting information that I found 
interesting without remembering what it was like to be a novice in the field? de Bruin 
and Bostrom (2013) suggest that such an approach may cause miscommunication of 
information. Most importantly, I now realize that both the sender and receiver of a 
message have a responsibility for the message to be understood, and this potential 
should be achieved through a dialog process.  
Although they have evolved as separate academic fields, science education and science 
communication share common goals; they both seek to educate, entertain and engage 
the public with and about science and prepare individuals to make informed decisions 
(the emphasis on these aspects may, however, vary) (Baram Tsabari & Osborne, 
2015). In the following subsections I summarize the literature on the development of 
science education and public communication relevant to this work: Science literacy 
and deficit models of communication (subsection 1.6.1); public participation and 
dialog models of communication (subsection 1.6.2); and the literature on carrying out 
and improving communication (subsection 1.6.3).  
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1.6.1 Science literacy and deficit models of communication 
With the advent of technologies such as nuclear fission, artificial satellites circling the 
earth, plastics and pesticides since World War II, “science with its applications in 
technology was recognized as the most characteristic feature of modern society” 
(Hurd, 1958, p. 13). Because of the many new achievements in science in this period, 
Paul deHard Hurd introduced the term science literacy in 1958 (Hurd, 1958) as a goal 
for science education. Hurd (1958), who considered education in science essential for 
effective citizenship, called for a reinvention of school science curricula. The need for 
education in science for all was recognized by a national committee of scientists and 
engineers appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959; the committee saw the 
need for a democratic citizenry that understand science for intelligent democratic 
participation (Hurd, 1998). 
Initially, science literacy discourse was primarily introduced for curriculum planning 
for educating the broad proportion of students not likely to become scientists (Roberts, 
2007). Since Paul deHard Hurd introduced the term in 1958, many definitions of 
science literacy have been advanced but not always with the same meaning (Holbrook 
& Rannikmae, 2009). Although there is no agreement on the meaning of science 
literacy, there appear to be two major existing views (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009). 
Most definitions have focused on identifying the science valuable for students over a 
lifetime (Roberts, 2007). This view (Vision I), focusing on content knowledge, 
remains prevalent (Roberts, 2007; Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009). In this view, 
individuals are required to hold a certain amount of scientific knowledge (Roberts, 
2007). This idea of science literacy attributes a knowledge deficit to the public (Bauer, 
2009). The science literacy discourse is criticized for focusing on factual and 
conceptual knowledge, arguing that the essence of science is the methods, not the facts 
(Bauer, 2009). Another critique of the science literacy idea is its ignoring of the 
significance of other types of knowledge (Bauer, 2009). This narrowing down of the 
student’s experience with the breadth of science is found problematic with Vision I 
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(Roberts, 2007). Similar to the science literacy discourse, the idea behind the public 
understanding of science discourse is that of a public deficit (Bauer, 2009). 
My early perspective, which has been typical in national weather services for several 
decades, had certain similarities to such a “deficit model” of science communication 
(Daipha, 2012); describing the public as having a cognitive deficit and being ignorant 
or scientifically illiterate (Ziman, 1992). Deficit models adopt a top-down 
communication process in which experts fill a knowledge vacuum in the general 
public (Davies, 2008). The main purpose of the communication is to “make people 
understand,” that is, to “educate” them (Davies, 2008) and increase their science 
literacy (Miller, 2001). Communication is considered a one-way process, that is, a 
transfer of information/knowledge from scientists to laypeople (Trench, 2008). The 
experts set the information agenda, and push information to potential users (Dilling & 
Lemos, 2011). According to a deficit model view, reception of the information should 
result in a predicted effect on the receiver (Davies, 2008). Davies (2008), talking to 
scientists about talking to the public, discovered that scientists describe 
communication as difficult and dangerous because the public might misunderstand and 
misuse science. Holbrook and Rannikmae (2009, p. 276) argues, “The use of literacy 
is still appropriate, but it is necessary to relate it to an appreciation of the nature of 
science, personal learning attributes including attitudes and also the development of 
social values”. The term literacy, in addition to its use in science communication 
models, has been developed further in recent years and is presented in the following 
subsection. 
1.6.2 Public participation and dialog models 
In the early 2000s, the concept of science literacy has seen a renaissance (Bauer, 
2009), and the concept has been rephrased as scientific literacy. This second view, 
Vision II, focuses on embedding science subject matter in situational contexts 
(Roberts, 2007). This view (as with Vision I, although more implicit in that view) 
recognizes “that scientific literacy relates to enabling citizens to effectively participate 
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in the real world” (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009, p. 279). However, the need to 
consider economical, aesthetic, political, ethical and social perspectives, in addition to 
science, in understanding an issue is emphasized (Roberts, 2007). This mentality is 
similar to the way of thinking originating from approaches such as post-modern 
science in the 1990s (see subsection 1.5.3). Additionally, the view on transfer of 
knowledge (the ability to extend what has been learned in one context to new contexts, 
Bransford et al., 2000) is different in Vision II (transfer is “problematic”) than in 
Vision I (transfer is “easy”). Hence, Vision I and Vision II provide different views of 
what it means to be scientifically literate (Roberts, 2007), and Vision II meets some of 
the critiques raised for Vision I. The trend in Vision II is toward less attention to 
purely understanding science, more attention to functionality and developing students’ 
ability to read and reflect critically on the information in media reports, and toward 
making informed personal decisions in the face of uncertainty (Bransford et al., 2000; 
Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009; Roberts & Bybee, 2014). This trend is similar to the 
new trend in risk communication described above (subsection 1.5.3), and a true 
dialogue with users is appreciated in some recent work related to communication of 
weather information (e.g., Morss et al., 2005). The Vision II perspective has informed 
this study, enabling a broad view of knowledge of potential relevance for interpreting 
weather forecasts and a better informed discussion of possible implications of results 
for school science.  
Norris and Phillips (2002) argue that the ability to read science is important for the 
lifelong learning of nonscientists beyond their formal science education. Although a 
person can learn by trial and error, word of mouth and apprenticeship, science is 
unthinkable without text, and the inability to read and write will limit a person’s 
potential to acquire scientific knowledge (Norris & Phillips, 2002). However, results 
from the 2006 PISA test (focused on scientific literacy) indicate low engagement in 
leisure reading of science (Kjærnsli et al., 2007). Engagement in reading is considered 
crucial for achievement in reading literacy; better readers tend to read more (Brozo et 
al., 2007; Wigfield & Guthrie, 2010). Additionally, due to the shift in communication 
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from written text to digital multimodal texts with images, scientific literacy should 
encompass more than the ability to handle written and spoken language (Jewitt, 2008). 
In an extended view on literacy, Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) consider being 
visually literate important because visual communication has become dominant. The 
meaning of a visual representation differs among societies and social groups (Kress & 
van Leeuwen, 2006). Being able to comprehend visual information is important also in 
science texts (McTigue & Flowers, 2011). Few studies have addressed the relationship 
between images and language to show how visual and verbal modes interact to 
construct integrated meaning in multimodal texts (Unsworth & Clèirigh, 2014). This 
study examines the reading of a multimodal science text and how verbal and visual 
information is integrated (RQ1/3), thus aiming at contributing new knowledge in this 
field. 
In an update to the comprehensive review presented in Roberts (2007), Roberts and 
Bybee (2014) argue that the terms scientific literacy and science literacy have played a 
less significant role in literature in the last decade. For instance, the terms have limited 
presence in the U.S. Framework for K-12 Science Education from 2012 and in the 
framework for Assessment of Science in PISA 2015 (Roberts & Bybee, 2014). Both 
documents are reducing the attention to personal and societal perspectives (Roberts & 
Bybee, 2014). By staying strictly with scientific and engineering aspects of the issues, 
these documents do what Sadler and Zeidler (2009) warned about; that is, they assume 
that knowing science will automatically enable students to transfer knowledge to a 
variety of situations (Roberts & Bybee, 2014). Some studies exist that examine how 
people actually use science in daily life (e.g., see Ryder (2001) and Aikenhead (2006)) 
and sociocultural studies of literacy (a social view of literacy) pay specific attention to 
the contexts in which scientific information is used (Sørvik & Mork, 2015); 
nonetheless, additional studies are needed (Roberts & Bybee, 2014).  
Although there appears to be a reduced focus on functionality and personal decision-
making in science education/school curriculum planning, this emphasis remains in 
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science communication and in weather communication. Davies (2008), talking to 
scientists about talking to the public, also discovered that some scientists describe 
communication as a context-dependent process in which experts inform a particular 
and knowledgeable public and empower them to participate in a democracy and make 
decisions. In this model, which holds similarities to Vision II rather than deficit 
models, science is no longer perceived as a special type of knowledge that is only 
misunderstood by ignorant people (Ziman, 1992). Instead, the public voice should not 
be ignored because it facilitates a two-way communication process (Davies, 2008). 
This perspective is typical for dialog models of science communication (Miller, 2001). 
A viewpoint in which the science communicator adjusts to the needs of the general 
public (and not vice versa) is considered valuable in pull models of communication. 
Here, potential users of the information set the information agenda (Dilling & Lemos, 
2011). The downside of pull models is that decision-makers may demand information 
that is not feasible or scientifically robust (Dilling & Lemos, 2011). This downside is 
possibly greater for certain members of the public who do not necessarily know what 
is useful information in a given situation than for professional decision-makers (e.g., 
policy-makers, or water managers). In a second viewpoint, scientists provide scientific 
knowledge, and the public contributes local knowledge and understanding of the 
specific problem to be solved (Miller, 2001). This dialog, or co-production, requires 
iterativity between experts and users (Dilling & Lemos, 2011) to achieve a 
communication that both acknowledge. Dilling and Lemos (2011), reviewing over 30 
empirical studies focusing on seasonal climate forecast use, argue that usability is a 
function of how the information is produced (push) and how it is needed (pull) in 
different decision contexts. For instance, there is empirical evidence that successful 
use of climate forecasts is due to the creation of forums or networks in which 
forecasters and potential users repeatedly participate together (Dilling & Lemos, 
2011). Providing usable information therefore requires bridging differences between 
what providers think is useful and what is actually usable in practice (i.e., to 
understand the decision context), such that the information is not overshadowed other 
types of information and other priorities (Dilling & Lemos, 2011). The level of trust of 
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users in the forecasts and the level of skill of the information presentation influence 
usability; additionally, the accessibility and the timing of the release of the information 
can be critical for whether it is usable. Decision-makers should be given sufficient 
time to prepare but not so much time that information is forgotten (Dilling & Lemos, 
2011). The time needed to prepare will vary; for example, Carr et al. (2016) found that 
emergency managers preferred to receive storm information earlier prior to storm 
landfall than what residential participants did. Accessibility is influenced by language, 
graphical representations, and format (Dilling & Lemos, 2011). 
Co-production takes time and resources to do well, and Meadow et al. (2015) claim 
that, currently, a limited numbers of scientists undertake it. Notably, Dilling and 
Lemos (2011) argue that there often is a lack iterative meetings between producers and 
users because neither of them “own the problem” of creating usable information. Thus, 
a key challenge to producing usable information is to determine who is responsible for 
owning the process of connecting scientists/forecasters and decision-makers. In the 
last subsection, I present a model described in the science/risk communication 
literature suggesting how communication can be improved through co-production of 
communication materials.  
1.6.3 Communication, decision-making, and this study 
One important aspect of communicating (uncertain) weather forecast information is to 
inform decisions, both high-stakes decisions (e.g., about extreme weather events and 
big consequences for the society) and low-stakes decisions (i.e., for the society; 
individuals may experience stakes to be high if their economy or life is threatened). In 
this study, everyday decisions made by non-experts are the focus. To inform people’s 
decisions, communication must reach people with the information they need and in a 
form they can use (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013; Fischhoff, 2013). Dietz (2013) and von 
Winterfeldt (2013) claim that decisions involve both facts (including uncertainties and 
expert opinions) and values (goals, objectives, and tradeoffs) whereas most science 
communication focuses on facts. If science communication is intended to inform 
decisions, it must be competent with respect to both scientists’ facts and decision-
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makers’ values (Dietz, 2013; Fischhoff & Davis, 2014). According to Dietz (2013), 
research on public participation suggests that an iterative process linking science and 
public participation can help decision-making address both facts and values. Such a 
dialog (i.e., scientific studies in which people are interviewed about their values, 
experiences, and needs, not everyday conversations) can help to understand the local 
context and constraints on decision-making and clarify which conflicts are about 
differences in values, about differences in interests, and about different understandings 
of the facts (Dietz, 2013). Similarly, Fischhoff (2013) claims that for communication 
to inform decision-making, it is important to maintain a dialog and listen to the end-
users. Building on the mental model approach from Morgan et al. (2002), de Bruin and 
Bostrom (2013) and Fischhoff (2013) propose using a mental model research approach 
to improve risk communication and science communication. Rather than relying on 
experts’ intuition, communication materials should be based on evidence from 
research including both experts and end-users (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013). Fischhoff 
(2013, p. 14034) suggests that four interrelated tasks must be fulfilled to achieve 
useful and effective communication: 
1)  Experts identify the information most relevant to the decisions people face 
2)  Experts determine what people already know 
3) Experts design communications to fill critical gaps 
4) Experts evaluate the adequacy of the communications 
Repeating tasks 1-4 generates an iterative process. This model targets experts who 
seek to develop communication materials with the goal of informing individuals’ 
decisions (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013; Fischhoff, 2013). Thus, experts establish and 
lead the process; however, laypeople’s interests are addressed by including their needs, 




Table 1: The relation between the four tasks in the mental model approach and the aim 




Task 1 -  
Task 2 Aim 
Identify different 
interpretations, 






Task 3 Motivation 
Insight into the 
communication 
process between 
forecast providers and 
end-users 
 
Task 4 -  
The present study is motivated by the idea of gaining insight into the communication 
process between forecast providers and end-users, that is, into how to achieve useful 
and effective communication. All four tasks in the mental model approach are 
important and interesting. Nevertheless, due to the constraints limiting this work, I 
concentrated on the second and to some extent the third task (Table 1). Related to the 
first task, de Bruin and Bostrom (2013) suggest conducting a literature review and 
consult an expert panel to identify what people must know to make informed decisions 
(expert decision model). Different users of weather reports are likely to need different 
information. Therefore, it is relevant to identify which parameters are to be 
communicated. For example, most weather reports include information on temperature 
and precipitation; fewer include information on wind gust or the altitude of the cloud 
cover. In the data collection, what information each participant uses is discussed. 
However, the focus is on which representations that are used, not whether they are 
interested in temperature, precipitation, or other parameters. Moreover, information 
other than weather information such as environmental (e.g., signs or barricades) or 
social (e.g., others’ actions or conversations with others) cues might be important 
when making weather related decisions (e.g., see Morss et al., 2005; Becker et al., 
2015). This point is also briefly discussed in the interviews in the present study in 
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relation to decision-making processes. However, to limit the study, I do not spend time 
identifying what information should be presented in weather reports (there are other 
studies discussing the importance of different potential components of weather reports 
e.g., Lazo et al., 2009; Rutty & Andrey, 2014). Rather, I use one selected online 
weather report (Yr.no) as a case and study how the information in this report is 
interpreted, integrated, and used. Thus, in the data collection, the aim is to determine 
what people already know (lay decision model). This second task is performed by 
conducting semi-structured interviews, as suggested in the mental model approach, 
and by recordings of participants’ eye-movements. de Bruin and Bostrom (2013) also 
suggest conducting follow-up surveys with larger samples. Such surveys should be 
conducted in future research to examine the prevalence of the results from this study. 
After analyzing the data, I discuss (in the papers and this extended summary) ideas 
how communication can be designed to fill gaps; that is, the third task (which relates 
to the motivation of the study). However, the discussed design of the communication 
material is not accomplished via a systematic comparison of an expert and lay decision 
model, as suggested by de Bruin and Bostrom (2013). Importantly, a comprehensive 
approach to communication would include not only principles of judgment and choice 
but also how feelings can both aid and undermine communication (Fischhoff, 2013). 
Finally (the fourth task), Fischhoff (2013, p. 14037) suggests communication is 
“adequate if it (i) contains the information that recipients need, (ii) in places that they 
can access, and (iii) in a form that they can comprehend”. This testing whether 
resulting communication is effective (in terms of facilitating understanding and 
informed decision-making) should involve an iterative dialog by repeating tasks 1-4. 
This iterative process is not a part of the present study.   
Bostrom et al. (2016) claim that it is critical to incorporate in the forecast development 
process a more comprehensive understanding of what essential aspects of extreme 
weather risks various citizens lack knowledge of and a deeper expertise on risk 
communication and decision-making. For risks under personal control, successful 
communication can help people to identify those risks that are sufficiently large to 
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warrant some of their limited time and attention (Morgan et al., 2002). Because 
people’s time is short, they cannot learn about, much less influence, all risks (Morgan 
et al., 2002). Improving forecast products based on feedback from users and other 
professionals with a better understanding of the social and behavioral contexts of how 
the information is used may help address such disconnects (Bostrom et al., 2016). By 
making such an improvement, it is possible to create and communicate useful weather 
information through co-production, as proposed by Dilling and Lemos (2011). 
In designing a communication, especially in situations involving severe weather and 
big consequences for the society, qualitative aspects of uncertainty (ignorance and 
indeterminacy) can also be important factors to discuss in a dialogue with 
stakeholders. We may want to focus in particular on how the design was developed, 
what the uncertainties with the parameters are, what was the choice of models 
available, why this particular model was chosen, what possible inadequacies were not 
modeled and finally what are the plans for action should unforeseen consequences 
occur (Riesch, 2012). At times information may be theoretically useful or useful in a 
general sense, but might not be used because it does not, for example, fit certain 
decision goals (Dilling & Lemos, 2011) or because uncertainty complicates already 
difficult judgements (Morss et al., 2005). For example, flood managers making 
decisions in complex environments may find the best information they can quickly, 
make the decision required, and then moving on (Morss et al., 2005). Managing risk 
and uncertainty in this zone requires extended consultation with a wider community 
and involves assessing social values and scientific facts and expertise (Grinnell, 2015).  
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2. Methodological considerations 
The main aim of this study was to gain insight into different interpretations, 
integrations, and uses of the information in online weather reports (see also Table 2): 
How did persons from selected user groups interpret, integrate, and use the 
information when they made everyday decisions regarding weather-related activities? 
Did the interpretations differ from the intention of the forecast provider? In the 
beginning of this study, I articulated research questions (RQ1 and RQ2) based on these 
ideas. With my quantitative background, I admit I was initially seeking the opportunity 
to conduct a survey and perform a statistical analysis. However, I soon realized the 
challenge of creating a quantitative design in this study: How can I develop an 
adequate survey without knowing which possible interpretations of the information to 
establish as response alternatives? Those alternatives would have been very limited 
(the interviews revealed several factors affecting the interpretation of information that 
I had never previously considered, such as the importance of cloud color in weather 
symbols). Instead, I reviewed the literature on methodology and spoke with 
experienced researchers who were familiar with different methods in order to obtain 
suitable methods to answer the research questions (see Table 2 for an overview of the 
study design). I learned about the strong agreement regarding the use of qualitative 
methods and the importance of beginning with interviews, for example as suggested in 
the mental model approach (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013). Qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews were suitable for this study due to the lack of previous research in this area 
and to answer the specific research questions concerned with the participants’ mental 
models and their interpretations of phenomena (Johannessen et al., 2010; de Bruin & 
Bostrom, 2013).  
In the following, considerations related to the interview study are provided (Section 
2.1). Thereafter (Section 2.2), there are considerations regarding a second data 
collection using eye-tracking equipment (see Table 2). Reflections related to 
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generalization of the study findings are provided in Section 2.3. Finally, there are some 
considerations related to the study ethics (Section 2.4). 
Table 2: Overview of study aim, motivation, and design. 





uses of weather 
information 
RQ1 






(Table 5 – App.D) 
Motivation 









the study findings 
 
 
There is an ongoing discussion among researchers regarding which terms that should 
be used to describe the quality of qualitative research. For example, in the 1980s Guba 
and Lincoln substituted reliability and validity with the concept of trustworthiness 
(Morse et al., 2002). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) argue that the traditional terms 
reliability and validity are meaningful and are used also in everyday language. Thus, 
similar to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) and many qualitative researchers in Europe 
(Morse et al., 2002), these terms are used when discussing quality of data and findings 
in the present study. Importantly, to avoid missing serious threats to the reliability and 
validity, quality of the study is focused from the very beginning rather than taking a 




2.1 The interview study 
A major feature of qualitative interviews is that they focus on ordinary events in 
natural settings (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data can be collected in close proximity 
to a specific situation by emphasizing a specific case. The influences of the local 
context are considered and not eliminated (Miles & Huberman, 1994). By mimicking 
normal user situations, high ecological validity can be achieved (Hannus & Hyönä, 
1999).  
One of the advantages of interviews is the ability to collect rich descriptions of 
personal interpretations of phenomena (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and to allow the 
interviewees to express the beliefs (i.e., the mental models) they use in interpreting the 
information (Morgan et al., 2002; de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013). The interviewer is the 
instrument that is used to collect the data. He must decide which questions to ask, and 
how to ask them. Therefore, the interviewer should be knowledgeable about the theme 
of the study and have good conversational skills (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). These 
skills should be practiced by performing interviews to become an effective 
(instrument) and experienced interviewer.  
One objection associated with interview studies concerns the use of leading questions, 
which sometimes reduce the possible range of answers and the validity of the 
interview findings. However, leading questions that are employed systematically to 
control the reliability of the informants’ answers are considered an advantage of 
qualitative interviews and may contribute to valid knowledge (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009). Guiding criteria exist regarding how to conduct qualitative interviews to 
achieve reliable and valid data. Ideally, interpretation and validation should be 
performed during the interview (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009): The first ideal—
interpretation —can be achieved by repeating the different versions of the same 
question. This variation gives the interviewer the opportunity to interpret the meanings 
of the informants’ responses in a preliminary analysis as the interview is conducted. 
By asking different versions of the same question, the interviewer can test the 
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reliability of the answers (are the answers similar?) and validate (the second ideal) his 
interpretations of the informants’ answers. Spontaneous, prolific, specific and relevant 
answers from the informants contribute to high-quality interview data (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009).  
Interviews are sometimes accused of being subjective because the questions and 
interpretations of informants’ responses are influenced by the context and are highly 
person dependent (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the following Section, I discuss my 
efforts to acquire experience, avoid leading questions and subjectivity, and achieve 
high-quality interview data. 
2.1.1 Experience, preparations, and rich descriptions 
With the exception of a few interviews that were conducted late in my undergraduate 
studies, I had no experience with interview studies. Fortunately, I received support 
from the literature and supervisors. In September 2011, I conducted a pilot study. The 
pilot study was important to practice interview techniques and gain experience as well 
as to test the interview guide and check practical details (where to sit and how to use 
the digital voice recorder) (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). A month after the pilot 
study, I conducted the first interviews of the main study. The first part of the data 
collection occurred in October and November 2011. These eighteen interviews were 
transcribed and analyzed, and some patterns in the data were identified. To verify the 
reliability of the findings and determine whether saturation was attained, three final 
interviews were conducted in May 2012. Breaks between the interviews were allowed 
in order to reflect on the technique, questions, and analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009). By doing this, I was able to improve my skills as an interviewer.  
Some may question whether an inexperienced interviewer such as myself can collect 
rich descriptions of personal interpretations, integrations, and uses of weather forecast 
information. The average length of the interviews in this study was 44 minutes, which 
suggests the collection of rich descriptions. The subject of the study may have 
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improved the flow of the dialog. Weather is a harmless and familiar subject for 
conversation between two strangers. A more experienced interviewer could collect 
even richer descriptions because he would have been a finer “instrument.” Similar to a 
quantitative study, a better instrument (e.g., thermometer) facilitates the collection of 
more precise data (e.g., degrees Celsius in decimal numbers instead of integers). A 
more experienced interviewer would ideally not collect different data but rather richer 
descriptions. That said, my background as a meteorologist and experience as a 
forecaster makes me knowledgeable about the theme of the study, which is 
advantageous. As a result, I am capable of identifying interesting interpretations, 
integrations, and uses of weather and uncertainty information and I can follow-up the 
most interesting utterances with relevant questions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). An 
experienced interviewer without a background in weather forecasting may not have 
noticed the same distinctions. Few people are experienced in both forecasting and 
interviewing, and the study must be conducted with the resources available.  
2.1.2 Dialog, interpretation, validation, and leading questions 
A phenomenological interview design is suitable to examine people’s interpretations 
of a phenomenon (weather forecasts) (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). An open approach 
is important in this design because the informants’ descriptions of phenomena should 
not be restricted by the interviewers’ prior understanding. The phenomena should be 
described as perceived by the informants in their lifeworld (Gubrium & Holstein, 
2000; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  In this study, the interviews were centered around 
actual information from a weather report using one selected online weather report 
(Yr.no) as a case. By contextualizing the dialog rather than having a dialog based on 
memory of how the forecasts look, a typical normal user situation was simulated and 
the ecological validity of the data was strengthened.  
The desire for an open approach in the phenomenological design also indicates that the 
interview guide should not be too structured. In this study, the dialog in the interviews 
was based on a semi-structured interview guide that facilitated the discussion of new 
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and unexpected interpretations of weather forecast information. The questions were 
planned to generate thematic knowledge and encourage open conversation (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). However, I considered the order of the questions in the pilot-study 
to be unsatisfactory, because it resulted in too much repetition and division of the 
dialog. This outcome was improved in the final pilot interviews after changing the 
order and re-articulating and clarifying some of the questions. Clear questions increase 
the reliability of a study (Hansen, 1996). Related to cultural manifestations there are 
different ways of saying things (Fontana & Frey, 2000). This means that different 
informants are likely to interpret the same question differently. Therefore, the 
articulation of questions may exhibit some variation among informants (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). In this study, the questions were (orally) refined to achieve similar 
perceptions by the informants. 
Active vocabulary differs from passive vocabulary; it is easier to recognize something 
(passive) than to recall it (active). Thus, I tried to avoid “putting the answer in the 
mouth of the informant” (Hansen, 1996, p. 211). Instead, the informants were always 
asked open-ended opening questions (refer to Appendix A), to facilitate new 
interpretations of information. By doing this, I also avoided asking leading questions 
suggesting specific ideas (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013) and narrowing the range of 
possible answers (Fontana & Frey, 2000). An example of an open question from one 
of the transcribed interviews is as follows: 
Interviewer:  What time would you expect the rain to begin, based on the forecast? 
Informant:  I would have been pessimistic regarding six o’clock in the morning, 
based on the first gray cloud symbol. Even though the forecast indicates 
dry weather, it shows a gray cloud. 
The open questions in the interviews were followed by additional questions as 
necessary to clarify informants’ responses or to validate my interpretations of their 
answers. This process is exemplified in the following sequence from the same 
transcription:   
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Interviewer:  You expect rain even if there are no raindrops in the symbol? 
Informant:  Yes. 
Interviewer:  So, the color of the cloud has an influence? 
Informant:  It does. Sometimes when it is light rain, this is not a large enough 
amount of rain to put raindrops in the symbol. 
These questions cannot be planned in advance of the interviews. The opportunity for 
the interviewer to verify his understanding of the informants’ answers during the data 
collection is an important advantage of qualitative interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009) because it contributes to a common understanding between the interviewer and 
the informant. By clarifying the informants’ responses I was able to increase the 
validity of my interpretations and construct a more certain foundation for the analysis 
of the data (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  
2.1.3 Interview knowledge and person dependency 
In an interview, the interviewer and the informant engage in a dialog. It is not possible 
or desirable to plan all questions in advance. Therefore, the dialog may follow 
different paths for different informants. In a qualitative interview, the interviewer 
serves as the instrument in the data collection (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). A different 
interviewer will most likely engage in another dialog with the same informant based 
on the same interview guide (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The two interviewers should 
obtain the same information regardless of the path in the dialog. Another interviewer 
with the same research questions should ideally not end up with different knowledge. 
This situation highlights the issue of reliability and can be compared with the use of 
two instruments; such as thermometers in a quantitative study. The two instruments 
are supposed to yield similar measurements. However, the uncertainty associated with 
these instruments may result in small differences in the measurements.  
In the real world, for two different researchers to obtain the same information and 
knowledge would be very difficult. To make it possible for another researcher to 
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replicate my study, I needed to make it as transparent and clear as possible. Therefore, 
the background, theory, methods and data analysis are detailed in the papers to enable 
other researchers to take the same view and use the same methods when evaluating or 
replicating my study. This approach should enable two researchers to obtain similar 
(and not overly individual-dependent) outcome.  
In addition, my ideas were tested via social interaction at seminars and conferences 
and by code-checking by a colleague. My interpretations of informants’ utterances 
were verified and challenged. If my ideas differed from the ideas of others, they were 
adjusted according to feedback from these other people in the environment. If my 
ideas corresponded with the ideas of others, they were consolidated. This iterative 
process reduced the possibility of individual dependency in the study. 
2.1.4 Paper versus screen 
Another challenge experienced in this study was related to the authenticity of the 
weather forecasts. The use of real forecasts and holistic forecast information would 
increase the validity of the study. Therefore, forecasts from the Yr.no website were 
selected for the interviews. Printouts were selected to ensure interesting forecasts and 
because they offered a basis for comparison among different informants’ answers. 
Because printouts were used, interactive functions in the form of animations and 
“mouse over” interactivity were not included. However, the interviewees expressed 
that these functionalities were rarely used, and the loss of information pertaining to 
interactivity seems insignificant for the purposes of the study. Thus, the use of 
printouts only slightly reduced the validity of the study. In this study, the possibility to 
compare answers and the assurance of interesting forecasts were determined to be 
more important. The use of printouts also eliminated the risk of troublesome Internet 
connections.  
Because I wanted the printouts to provide a basis for comparison among the answers, I 
had to select forecasts from one location for all informants. All forecasts pertained to 
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Stavanger; all informants were familiar with the city, but none lived there. A problem 
regarding the use of forecasts for Stavanger, compared with the informants’ 
hometowns, was that it was more difficult for them to use local knowledge, which can 
reduce the validity of the study. However, some informants interpreted the forecasts as 
if they were forecasts both for their hometowns and for Stavanger, which mitigated 
this problem. 
2.1.5 Possible improvements 
I am very satisfied with the use of qualitative interviews as the primary method in this 
study because the method provided valid data and reliable findings for the first and 
second research questions. However, I suggest the following improvements for future 
studies:  
First, I would have considered including more user groups in the sample. By doing 
this, I would win some and loose some. The inclusion of other groups that are familiar 
with and dependent on weather forecasts or groups that are not dependent on weather 
in their daily lives would allow for a greater number of interpretations, integrations, 
and uses to be discovered in the interviews. However, the number of informants that 
were used in this study resulted in a rather large amount of data. Thus, the inclusion of 
more user groups would require reduction in the number of members in each group or 
in each location, to avoid ending up with more data than it is possible to handle (Kvale 
& Brinkmann, 2009). 
Second, I would have performed a more thorough analysis of the first interviews at an 
earlier time. It is strongly recommended (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to cycle back and 
forth between existing data, and collecting new data to fill in the gaps. However, I was 
unfamiliar with qualitative analysis, which was challenging. Because of this, the first 
analysis of the first interviews was somewhat superficial. Spending more time on the 




Third, as suggested by Peters (2006), I would have asked the participants directly 
about their feelings. Additionally, to help elicit their responses, I would have asked 
them about their values and how these could have influenced their decision-making.  
2.2 The eye-tracking study 
After the interviews were conducted and analyzed, I had some time to consider the 
next step. Data were needed to answer the third research question (RQ3), and these 
data were not obtained in the previous interviews. As I reviewed the literature on the 
reading of multimodal texts, I became interested in eye-tracking methodology, which 
is commonly employed in studies involving reading (Hannus & Hyönä, 1999; Solheim 
& Uppstad, 2011). After careful consideration, I decided to use this technology in the 
present study. Eye-tracking provided the opportunity to use more authentic texts (i.e., 
interactive forecasts) compared with the interview study. With this technology, I was 
able to study real-time online weather forecasts (on the Yr.no website). The use of eye 
tracking enabled me to complement previous interviews by examining the participants’ 
use of forecasts in a specific (although still hypothetical) situation versus the use of an 
expired forecast. The primary aim for this final data collection was to investigate the 
participants reasons for reading the various representations, constructing the reading 
paths, and integration of multimodal information. This approach is slightly more 
theoretical compared with the examination of interpretations and decision-making 
processes. However, both data collection methods related to forecast and uncertainty 
information and provides a foundation for improving our knowledge about 
interpretations, integrations, and uses of online weather information.  
Eye-trackers have shown themselves valuable in diagnostic studies of reading and 
information-processing (Duchowski, 2002). The advantage of using eye-tracking 
technology in reading studies is the ability to examine the participants’ eye movements 
when reading authentic texts in real time. One the one hand, high-quality eye-tracking 
data are dependent on properties of the eye-tracker (Holmqvist et al., 2011): Generally, 
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a higher sampling frequency (measured in hertz) can provide more precise data but 
makes the eye tracker more expensive and more restrictive for the participants. For 
example, an eye tracker with higher frequency may require restraining the head 
movement of the participant with forehead and chin rests. The required sampling 
frequency for a study is dependent on a combination of these elements. Today’s eye 
trackers are available in the range from 30 Hz up to 2000 Hz (e.g., a 50 Hz eye tracker 
records 50 individual gaze points per second). On the other hand, the quality of the 
data is dependent on participant-specific properties (e.g., mascara and calibration) and 
the recording environment (e.g., light and movement) (Holmqvist et al., 2011): Stable 
light in the room increases data quality because changing light conditions are likely to 
alter the pupil size and thus decrease precision (the ability of the eye tracker to reliably 
reproduce a measurement). Movement can also decrease data quality; for example, 
vibrations caused by mouse-clicks or a person walking around may decrease the 
precision of the measurements. Other types of noise, such as sounds, may distract the 
participants and should be avoided. Participant-specific properties primarily affect 
accuracy (the difference between the true gaze position and the recorded gaze 
position). Manufacturers typically refer to an accuracy of <0.5°, or 5 mm at a distance 
of 70 cm as the accuracy of their eye trackers. However, accuracy should be measured 
by performing a calibration of the equipment for the individual participants in each 
study. Because accuracy is highly dependent on the characteristics of each participant, 
such as whether they wear glasses, their eye-color, and their eye physiology, it is likely 
to vary. Participants should not be allowed to wear mascara because the software that 
identifies the pupil (of the eyes) may be confused by other large, dark areas. In 
addition, large head movements or position changes after calibration will reduce the 
accuracy of the measurements.  
A persons’ visual attention, and thus the eye-tracking data, are sensitive to the task the 
person are given (Yarbus, 1967; DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009) (see also Figure 2). An 
appropriate task should be engaging to ensure that the participants are distracted from 
the fact that they are conducting a study. The task should also have a plausible cover 
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story to prevent the participant from trying to guess the nature of the experiment 
(Johansson et al., 2006; Holmqvist et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 2: “Seven records of eye movements by one subject. 1) Free examination. Before the 
subsequent recordings, the subject was asked to 2) estimate the wealth of the family; 3) give 
the ages of the people; 4) surmise what the family had been doing before the arrival of the 
'unexpected visitor'; 5) memorize the clothes worn by the position of the objects and people in 
the room; 6) memorize the location of the people and objects in the painting; and 7) estimate 
how long the 'unexpected visitor' had been away.”  
Reused (Figure 109; Yarbus, 1967) with permission from Springer.  
This person performed seven different tasks (1-7), viewing the painting “An Unexpected 
Visitor” for three minutes in each task. The figure shows that the eye movements depended on 
the task he was engaged in (Yarbus, 1967).  
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According to the eye-mind assumption, the information currently being viewed is what 
is being processed because the direction of gaze is closely related to the focus of 
attention (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Duchowski, 2007). However, it is possible to move 
attention without moving our eyes (Rayner, 1998). Thus, a basic limitation of eye-
tracking data is that it is not possible to use the data to deduce what people think 
(Holmqvist et al., 2011): Do long gaze durations correspond with a high information 
value for the participant or with difficulties in information intake? Verbal data should 
be collected to avoid forming invalid conclusions regarding reasons for the 
participants’ eye movements (van Gog et al., 2005; Holmqvist et al., 2011; Bucher & 
Niemann, 2012). The participants are commonly instructed to verbalize their thoughts 
(thinking out loud) either during (concurrent reporting) or immediately after 
(retrospective reporting) the eye tracking recording (van Gog et al., 2005; Holmqvist et 
al., 2011). A concurrent think-aloud may alter the eye movements during a task, 
whereas a retrospective think-aloud may suffer from loss of details from memory, 
which may explain why less information is typically elicited with the latter method 
(van Gog et al., 2005; Holmqvist et al., 2011). Additionally, the ability to think aloud 
can be expected to vary among participants, and participants produce different 
amounts of verbalization. Thus, it is crucial to provide the participants with 
appropriate instructions regarding how to verbalize their thoughts, to practice this 
approach prior to the task, and to encourage silent participants when they stop talking 
(Holmqvist et al., 2011).  
2.2.1 Sampling frequency and choice of eye tracker 
Eye-tracking equipment is expensive. After several inquiries, I was fortunate to 
borrow equipment from another university (University of Stavanger). This university 
has a reading center with several different eye trackers. On two occasions, I spent a 
day at this university and discussed the study with an experienced researcher. We 
agreed to use a 50 Hz eye tracker for the data collection. We chose a 50 Hz eye tracker 
instead of a faster eye tracker because a 50 Hz eye-tracker is considered to be fast 
enough to study the reading of a text on the level of detail required by this study. This 
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eye tracker consists of two remote cameras, which enable the participants to read the 
texts on an ordinary computer screen and to move their heads relatively freely 
compared to a faster eye tracker. Because this eye tracker was portable, I was able to 
visit the participants. Thus, the study simulated an ordinary reading situation, which 
increases the validity of the study.  
2.2.2 Participants and the recording environment  
All sixteen participants were students at the same upper secondary school. Using a 
sample with students from the same school enabled me to keep the equipment at the 
same location throughout the data collection. Because I borrowed the equipment, I had 
to be sure to conduct the study during the two-week period. At the school, there were 
always students interested in participating if another participant became ill or could not 
participate for other reasons.  
 
Figure 3: The eye-tracking equipment used in this study. My chair and computer are shown 
on the left, and the participants’ chair and computer are shown on the right. The eye-tracking 
hardware is located behind the computers (the black box).  
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The eye-tracking equipment was set up in a sound- and light-isolated room at the 
selected upper secondary school (Figure 3) to minimize the risk of disturbance 
(Holmqvist et al., 2011; Mason et al., 2013). In this room there were few distracting 
sounds or movements. The mouse and two cameras were located on the same table. 
The participants made few mouse clicks, and the slight vibrations caused by the 
clicking did not cause a problem. The room had no windows, which created stable 
light conditions and increased the precision and data quality. 
2.2.3 Participant-specific properties and accuracy 
An experienced researcher from the University of Stavanger taught and trained me 
how to use the eye-tracking equipment. I also practiced using the equipment for a few 
days at home prior to the pilot study. Two upper secondary school teachers 
participated in the pilot study. Different set-ups were tested, which allowed me to find 
the best place to sit during the eye-tracking and the subsequent collection of verbal 
data. In addition, some minor technical issues were discovered and needed to be 
resolved. The pilot study gave me the opportunity to practice the calibration process, 
for example, to determine the height and distance from the screen that provided the 
best data quality. The eye-tracking study was conducted for two weeks in May 2013. 
The eye-tracking equipment was calibrated for each participant until each gaze 
position could be validated with a deviation less than 0.5°. An accuracy that exceeded 
the recommended maximum deviation of 0.5° was achieved (Holmqvist et al., 2011). 
The participants were informed in advance that they could not wear mascara. 
However, make-up remover was provided if make-up was worn. In addition to the 
calibration, the participants practiced how much they could move their head and body 
before the software was unable to identify their pupils. The task was also designed 
such that it was not too time-consuming. When lesser time was spent on performing 
the task, the participants experienced fewer problems maintaining their position in the 
chair. This situation contributed to higher accuracy and improved data quality. 
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2.2.4 Study design and task 
The study design was as follows (see also Table 2 above): 1) Participants’ eye 
movements were recorded as they were provided online weather information with 
which to perform a task. 2) Participants were asked to think aloud when looking at a 
replay of the eye-movements. 3) A semi-structured interview was conducted to clarify 
the meaning of participants’ actions. The task involved the request for advice: which 
day should a close friend of the participant choose to paint a house based on the actual 
weather forecast. This task provided a plausible cover story to the participants, which 
was recommended to prevent their guessing of the nature of the experiment (Johansson 
et al., 2006; Holmqvist et al., 2011). I also had the impression that the participants 
thought the task was engaging, which distracted them from the fact that I measured 
their eye movements (Holmqvist et al., 2011). I expected the students to not be overly 
familiar with outdoor painting. This assumption may reduce the time they spent 
solving the task. To obtain richer data, the students were also provided a text that 
briefly explained the most important weather parameters to be aware of when painting 
outdoors, which helped interested students to provide more informed advice. 
2.2.5 Verbal data: Think-aloud and interviews 
Retrospective think-aloud verbalizations, which are assumed to reflect the sequence 
and content of thoughts that mediate the completion of the task (Holmqvist et al., 
2011), were preferred in this study. To reduce the risk of fabrication and the loss of 
details from memory (van Gog et al., 2005), a think-aloud was recorded immediately 
after the eye-tracking was completed. In addition, the time spent performing the task 
was considerably shorter than the suggested 10 minute maximum limit (Holmqvist et 
al., 2011). Exceeding the limit may cause an increased loss of memory. To encourage 
more details and improve the quality of the verbalizations, the participants were shown 
a replay of their eye-movements when thinking aloud (Holmqvist et al., 2011). Such 
use of cues is recommended in retrospective verbalizations (van Gog et al., 2005). In 
addition, all participants practiced a think-aloud in advance of the task. When 
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practicing, all were talkative and produced rich descriptions. However, several 
participants barely spoke when asked to think out loud in the main study. Beside loss 
of memories from long-term memory (van Gog et al., 2005), one reason for this may 
be that they were distracted and intrigued by watching their own eye-movements. 
Observing your own reading behavior is interesting the first time that you view eye-
tracking data. Thus, the participants were likely surprised and forgot to talk. Showing 
the participants examples of eye-tracking data in advance may alleviate this challenge. 
Importantly, the think-aloud protocols provided useful data for all participants. 
The variation in the ability to think out loud was not surprising, because this variation 
is described in the literature (Holmqvist et al., 2011). For this reason, qualitative semi-
structured interviews were planned and an interview guide was constructed. While the 
participants solved the task, I watched their eye movements on another screen, which 
enabled me to prepare individual questions for each participant based on their actual 
information use in addition to questions from the interview guide. To notice all 
information used by each participant was challenging, especially all their attempts to 
integrate information. Because their eyes moved rapidly, I did not manage to record all 
of my questions. This problem was partly solved by replaying the eye movements 
during the interviews, which provided another look at the data. However, this action 
affected the flow of the conversation. The dilemma was whether I should spend some 
time viewing the recording and writing questions before the participant was told to 
think aloud. However, this process may result in the loss of details in participants’ 
memories. After all, the interviews provided the opportunity to elaborate on the 
participants’ attempts to use and integrate information. These interviews supplemented 
the think-aloud protocols and provided high-quality data. 
2.2.6 Possible improvements 
I am very satisfied with the use of eye-tracking technology as a method for answering 
the second research question because the method provided high-quality data. However, 
I recommend the following improvements.  
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The sample selection was crucial performing the study with the available resources. 
Although the sample revealed interesting differences in information use, I would like 
to conduct a similar study with a more varied sample or a sample of more experienced 
users. Other user groups may use other/more information and may perform the task 
differently. I would also like to conduct other studies with different tasks. 
I reflected on both the eye movements and verbal response, but a more systematic 
analysis was not feasible during the two weeks of recordings. If I owned my own eye-
tracking equipment or had been able to borrow the equipment for a longer period of 
time, I would have preferred to work with one or two participants each day instead of 
three or four participants. In addition, I would implement a one-day break to begin 
analyzing the data, which would have simplified the identification of interesting 
interview questions. 
2.3 Generalization 
“One criticism about qualitative studies is that it is difficult to generalize findings to 
settings not studied” (Firestone, 1993, p. 16). This concern is also valid for the present 
study. Valid data and reliable findings in this study show the existence of a variety of 
interpretations, integrations, and uses of weather information; however, no claims are 
advanced for the frequencies of occurrence in the wider public. According to Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2009) and Firestone (1993) there are three typical arguments for 
generalizing from data: 1) sample-to-population extrapolation, 2) case-to-case transfer, 
and 3) analytic generalization. In practice, sampling has been linked with survey 
research, case-to-case translation with qualitative methods, and analytic generalization 
with experimental methods (Firestone, 1993). In the following I provide a short 
discussion of how the three arguments relate to the present study. 
The sample-to-population argument relies on probability theory; thus, this is a 
statistical generalization (Yin, 2014). If the sample is drawn randomly from the 
population of interest, sampling theory can be used to make inferences about how 
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characteristics of the sample reflect the larger population (Firestone, 1993; Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). Such sampling requires large populations and large samples (e.g., 
1000 respondents). With this requirement in mind, Firestone (1993) argues that 
sample-to-population extrapolation does not apply adequately to qualitative work 
primarily because the samples are too small. Additionally, it is challenging to have 
large samples in qualitative studies due to the large amount of data to analyze (e.g., the 
“1000-page question”, Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Moreover, the sample in 
qualitative interview studies is normally not random; rather, it is selected based on 
other criteria (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). For instance, in this study I sought variation 
in interviewees backgrounds by purposeful sampling (Johannesen et al., 2010) to 
achieve a variety in forecast interpretations. 
However, rather than generalizing the findings from interview studies, follow-up 
surveys with larger samples should be conducted to examine the prevalence of the 
specific beliefs expressed in the qualitative interviews (de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013). In 
these surveys, the articulation of the questions can be informed by findings from the 
interviews. However, a major difficulty related to the first argument is that it is 
difficult to sample all of the things that must be sampled to make a generalization 
(Firestone, 1993). For instance, in this study, my experience is that it is difficult to 
involve persons who find it hard to interpret and understand some weather 
information, possibly because people do not want to show what they do not know.  
Case-to-case transfer is the argument most closely associated with qualitative research 
(Firestone, 1993). This type of generalization occurs when a person in one setting 
considers adopting an idea from another study (Firestone, 1993). Thus, the transfer of 
findings from one case to another is performed by the reader. Therefore, as noted in 
subsection 2.1.3., the researcher must provide rich, detailed descriptions of the case 
allowing the reader to understand the study context and assess the match between this 
situation and their own. These descriptions should describe a broad range of 
background features, aspects of the processes studied, and outcomes (Firestone, 1993). 
Case-to-case transfer appears to be the most useful argument to be used for the present 
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study, with rich descriptions of background theory and motivations provided in the 
papers and in this thesis. The present study use one selected online weather report 
(Yr.no) as a case and studies how the weather information in this report is interpreted, 
integrated, and used. I find this website, however, to have similarities in design and 
presentation with other websites presenting weather information. Thus, the findings 
from the present study might also be interesting for other weather websites, for 
instance concerning designing weather symbols (e.g., take care in the details of the 
information presented because nuances such as cloud color and number of drops might 
be interpreted as substantial information). These similarities can be found across 
national borders, so the findings can be equally as interesting for Norwegians as they 
can be for international websites. However, the findings are more related to everyday 
decision processes than to extreme weather situations involving higher decision stakes. 
Additionally, some of the findings might have interest for science educators because 
reading is studied and many of the participants are upper secondary school students. 
Finally, Firestone (1993) and Yin (2014) suggests that analytic generalization can be 
helpful for qualitative researchers. This argument is about generalizing own results to 
a theory rather than to a population. The generalization can take the form of for 
example lessons learned or principles that may be applicable to other situations (Yin, 
2014). Analytic generalization is facilitated by specifying the conditions under which a 
study is performed (Firestone, 1993). One approach to generalizing analytically, which 
is particularly appropriate for extending and refining theories, is to select a critical case 
or a deviant case (Firestone, 1993). This selection would also help specify under which 
conditions a theory holds, by considering similarities and differences between the case 
and the theory (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the present study, an example of a 
suggestion for a small refinement of a theory can be found in paper 3 in which a new 
operationalization of multimodal reading (seven or more fixations in one AOI) was 
suggested. The earlier operationalization (Holmqvist et al., 2011), suggesting reading 
be present if at least three fixations satisfy the detection conditions, was not sufficient 
to detect multimodal reading in the present study. 
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For end-users for whom findings must hold “on average” and exceptions are allowed, 
for instance politicians and managers, Firestone (1993) argues that analytic 
generalization appears superior to case-to-case transfer.  
2.4 Ethics 
 “Because the objects of inquiry in interviewing are human beings, researchers must 
take extreme care to avoid any harm to them” (Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 662). 
According to Fontana and Frey (2000), ethical concerns in qualitative research have 
traditionally revolved around the topics of informed consent (receiving consent by the 
participant after having been carefully informed about the research), right to privacy 
(protecting the identity of the subject), and protection from harm (physical, emotional, 
or any other type). 
This study submitted the obliged notification forms to the Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data (NSD). NSD commented on the study plans, and the plans were 
adjusted accordingly to ensure that the ethical requirements were fulfilled. All 
participation was voluntary. To ensure that people participated voluntarily and that 
they were informed about the purpose of the study, they had to provide their written 
consent. Additionally, the participants could withdraw without cause at any time, as 
recommended (Johannesen et al., 2010). Each participant in the interview study and in 
the eye-tracking study is anonymized and to maintain their privacy no personal data 
are reported in the project. An interview can be a vulnerable situation for the 
interviewee. Therefore, to protect the participants from harm, I tried always to be 
careful and not to let them feel stupid. With this approach, I also calibrated the social 
distance between me and the interviewees (Sennett, 2004) and created a space in 
which they could speak freely (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). According to The National 
Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH, 




In addition, a positive effect of participating in the study could be that the participants 
felt that they learned something new during the interview or eye-tracking session.  
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3. Introducing the papers 
The overarching aim of this study was to identify different interpretations, 
integrations, and uses of the weather forecasts and uncertainty information on Yr.no. 
Based on experience, I knew that some users experienced difficulties with some 
weather information and that the information was interpreted differently at other times. 
Thus, I aimed to discover intended as well as unintended but informative 
interpretations, and a variety in integrations and uses of the weather information. To 
fulfill the aim of the study, a question was articulated: 
How is information in online weather reports interpreted, integrated, and used by 
laypeople when making everyday decisions for weather-dependent activities? 
To address this question, three research questions were developed (presented in the 
Outline Section), and each paper contributes to one of these research questions (Table 
3). 
The first paper focuses on how the information on Yr.no is interpreted and integrated 
by laypeople (emphasizing uncertainty). The second paper focuses on how the 
information is used in everyday decision-making processes. The third paper focuses on 
the reading process, that is, how laypeople make meaning by interpreting and 
integrating information in a multimodal science text. 
Additionally, the study is motivated by the communication process between experts 
and laypeople. I already knew the web service was very popular with millions of users 
each week. Therefore, I assumed not only to identify unintended forecast 
interpretations, but also methods for communicating weather information that appealed 
to a large group of users and that could be used as examples of good practice for other 
websites. Therefore, implications of the findings for the communication process are 




Table 3: Overview of study aim and motivation, and the relation between the research 
questions and the three papers. 





uses of weather 
information 
RQ1 Paper 1 (interpretation & integration) 
RQ2 Paper 2 (use) 
RQ3 Paper 3 (interpretation & integration) 
Motivation 




and the end-users 
 
All papers (discussions) 
 
In the following Sections the three papers in the study are introduced, with basis in the 
abstracts in paper 1 (Section 3.1), paper 2 (Section 3.2), and paper 3 (Section 3.3). 
3.1 Paper 1 
Many people depend on and use weather forecasts to plan their schedules. Ordinary 
people with no expertise in meteorology are frequently called upon to interpret 
uncertainty with respect to weather forecasts. With this in mind, the first study 
addresses two main questions (i.e., RQ1 of the thesis): 1) How do laypeople interpret 
online weather reports with respect to the degree of certainty and how is previous 
knowledge employed in this interpretation? 2) How do laypeople integrate information 
in weather reports to determine the degree of certainty? This qualitative study is based 
on semi-structured interviews with 21 Norwegians from selected user groups (farmers, 
exterior painters, tour-guides, and upper secondary school teachers and students). The 
results are as follows: a) Only a portion of uncertainty information was used. b) 
Symbols were sometimes ascribed different meanings than intended. c) Interpretations 
were affected by local experiences with wind direction and forecast quality. The 
informant’s prior knowledge prevailed in the event of a conflict with forecast 
information, and an expected range of uncertainty was often inferred in single-valued 
forecasts. In addition, d) interpretations were affected by the integration of information 
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used to predict the time and location of precipitation. Informants typically interpreted 
the degree of certainty differently (more or less uncertain) than was intended. Based on 
these findings, implications for the communication process are discussed: A clearer 
presentation of uncertainty information, a clear intent of all nuances in information, a 
comprehensive use of multimodal information and the consideration of users’ needs 
can help improve the communication of forecast uncertainty. The diversity of user 
approaches makes forecast uncertainty more difficult to communicate and provides 
possible explanations for the challenges in communicating uncertainty. 
3.2 Paper 2 
The second paper is based on the same interviews and the same data as the first paper. 
However, the focus of the analysis differed. Previous studies regarding how people use 
weather forecasts to schedule activities were primarily concerned with the use of 
selected pieces of information detached from the context of a full weather report. 
Therefore, the second study contains two areas of focus (i.e., RQ2 of the thesis): 1) 
factors influencing the amount of information from a full weather report that are used 
by laypeople for everyday decision-making and 2) how the complexity in information 
in a full weather report is handled in the decision-making processes. In this qualitative 
study, semi-structured interviews were conducted. In the sample consisting of 21 
persons from Norway, farmers, exterior painters, tour guides, teachers, and students 
were included to obtain a fair variance in the number of user situations. The 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews were centred on a multimodal weather report 
from the online web-service Yr.no. In this study, a varying amount of information was 
used by the participants in their decision-making; furthermore, the amount of 
information used appears to depend on a) the importance of the envisaged activity and 
b) the suitability of the weather conditions. The amount of information (i.e., 
complexity) must be reduced to make a quick decision, which typically was 
accomplished by c) choosing a suitable starting point and leaving out evaluations of d) 
weather dynamics and e) forecast uncertainty. Based on these findings, implications 
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for the communication process are discussed. Communicating a multiplicity of 
representations in weather reports appears favourable for enabling the use of different 
types and amounts of information such that it allows both quick and more elaborate 
decision-making processes. 
3.3 Paper 3 
Earlier studies of multimodal reading typically focused on successful reading rather 
than how meaning is made. The third study examined how sixteen upper secondary 
students made meaning of online information that presented weather forecasts using a 
variety of representations, and three research questions were focused (i.e., RQ3 of the 
thesis): 1) What reasons are given for reading the various representations in a 
multimodal website? 2) What reasons are given for constructing reading paths? 3) 
What reasons are given for making a transition from one to another representation? 
The students participating in this study were told to advise a friend, who was planning 
to paint the exterior of his house, based on the online information. Eye-tracking 
equipment was used along with think-aloud protocols and qualitative interviews for 
data collection. The eye-tracking data support the verbal data, indicating that (a) the 
participants ascribed a set of affordances to each representation, (b) decision-making 
processes influenced the construction of reading paths, and (c) the participants’ 
reasons for making transitions between representations were to control and compare 
information. Possible advantages of multimodality were typically not exploited. 
Related to the communication process, it is discussed that guiding the reader among 
various representations may help her integrate information, but only in situations 
where she aims for an elaborate decision process. 
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4. Discussions and implications 
The results from the three papers are discussed collectively, and this discussion is 
based on the theories presented in Sections 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, i.e., multimodal 
reading and meaning-making, human decision-making, risk and uncertainty, and 
communication between experts and laypeople, respectively. After summing up the 
lessons learned from the present study (4.1) I discuss research-based weather 
communication (4.2) and the difficulties inherent in communicating and learning terms 
(4.3), before a discussion of accidents, rationality, and decision-making is provided 
(4.4). 
4.1 Lessons learned from the present study 
The overarching aim of the study is to identify different interpretations, integrations, 
and uses of online weather information in everyday decision-making by laypeople. As 
suggested by de Bruin and Bostrom (2013) when using the mental model approach, 
qualitative interviews are conducted on selected user groups. According to the four-
task model for achieving useful information and effective communication presented in 
subsection 1.6.3, the contribution of this study is to determine what people already 
know, i.e., the second task in the model (Table 1). In the following, I summarize the 
main findings related to the three focuses of the study (interpretation, integration, and 
use) and note interesting topics to be discussed. Because the study is motivated by and 
provides insight into the weather communication process, these discussions also relate 
to the third task of the model (subsection 1.6.3), i.e., design of communication (Table 
1). 
As described above, one focus of the study is how laypeople interpret online weather 
information to be used in everyday decision-making. Interpretations of information are 
examined primarily in the first and third paper of the study (Table 3) and by using 
qualitative interviews (Table 2). The use of interviews is recommended in the mental 
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model approach to elicit people’s mental models (de Bruin & Bostrom (2013). The 
interviews conducted in this study provided rich descriptions of personal 
interpretations of weather forecast information and provided valid data and reliable 
findings (see Section 2.1 for a discussion). In the third paper, it is found that for each 
representation, such as tables, diagrams, numbers and symbols, a set of strengths and 
functions (affordances) was ascribed and exploited by the participants. Related to 
interpretations of information, a finding from the first paper is that symbols were 
occasionally ascribed different meanings than those intended by the forecast provider. 
Nuances such as color and the number of drops were important in the interpretations of 
the weather symbols and forecast uncertainty. Participants typically interpreted the 
degree of certainty differently (more or less uncertain) than was intended by the 
forecast provider. The interpretations were also affected by the integration of 
information used to predict the time and location of precipitation, which was 
performed to create a dynamic picture of the weather and to control and compare 
information. How these findings can be used in the design and communication of 
graphical weather information is discussed in Section 4.2. For example, one possible 
implication of this study is that providers of online weather reports should take care in 
the details of the information they present because such nuances may be interpreted as 
substantial information. Although the present study uses one selected online weather 
report (Yr.no) as a case, the study should be informative for other providers of weather 
information. After all, there are many similarities between weather and weather 
forecasts around the world. The diversity of uses, needs and situations found in this 
study indicates that it is demanding to establish effective communication of weather 
information to the public. Thus, communication to a wide variety of user groups must 
be a part of the discussion in Section 4.2.  
To limit the study, the three papers concentrate on how graphical representations are 
interpreted, and verbal information is only briefly mentioned. However, all 
participants in the study also reported on their interpretations of verbal information. 
Verbal information remains an important part of weather reports around the world, for 
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instance in all of the top five weather sites. Therefore, I find it interesting to discuss 
challenges related to the learning and communication of verbal texts. This discussion 
is provided in Section 4.3. 
The second and third focus of the study is how laypeople integrate and use online 
weather information to be used in everyday decision-making. These focuses are 
closely related and are examined in all three papers. From the mental model approach, 
qualitative interviews are recommended and used in the data collection. Additionally, 
eye-tracking technology is used in this study as an innovative approach to study 
integration and the use of online weather information (Table 2). The method provided 
high-quality data (see Section 2.2 for a discussion) and was a fine addition to the 
interviews. There are several findings in the three papers related to these two areas of 
focus. Only a portion of the provided information on Yr.no is used by each participant. 
What information and how much is used appears to be influenced by the participants’ 
decision-making processes. Their selection was dependent upon the importance of the 
envisaged activity and the weather conditions for the day. Evaluations of weather 
dynamics and the degree of certainty in the forecast were disregarded when quick 
decisions were made. Interestingly, in the second paper, it is found that even when 
using little information and making quick decisions, users state reasons for their 
choices and thus appear rational in the sense of bounded rationality, choosing a 
reasoned and apparently suitable strategy in each situation. Nevertheless, there is 
anecdotal evidence that accidents with fatal consequences occasionally do happen in 
weather-related decisions. Forecast providers should try to understand possible reasons 
these accidents occur (when these accidents are related to evaluations of the weather 
conditions) such that they can assist people in making high-quality decisions. A 
discussion is provided in Section 4.4.  
The importance of experiences in interpretation of visual and verbal information 
stands out from the first research question, from the three papers, and from this 
discussion as worthy elaboration. For example, it is found in the first paper that local 
experiences with wind direction and forecast quality affected the participants’ 
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interpretations. The participant’s prior knowledge prevailed in the event of a conflict 
with forecast information. Moreover, an expected range of uncertainty is often inferred 
by participants in single-valued forecasts. This finding supports earlier findings 
(similar results have been found for temperature, precipitation, and wind speed; e.g., 
Morss et al., 2008, 2010; Joslyn & Savelli, 2010), but also extends earlier findings to 
the case of weather symbols. Although it also relates to decision-making processes, not 
having the necessary prior knowledge is a possible explanation for why part of the 
representations that provide forecast and uncertainty information on the website is 
occasionally not used by the participants. Further research is needed to examine this in 
more detail. Nevertheless, I believe that it is of special interest to discuss how forecast 
providers can help those persons that lack certain types of experiences in interpreting 
forecast information and thus to make informed decisions. This topic is discussed as a 
part of Sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
4.2 Research-based weather communication 
How can findings from existing and future research be used in the design and 
communication of graphical weather information to support informed and effective 
decision-making? In the following discussion, I use weather symbols from the top five 
global weather sites (refer to subsection 1.2.2.) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) as a point of departure. These websites use slightly different 
depictions of the weather; for example, searching these websites for a forecast for New 
York City (June 17, 2016) resulted in the six different weather symbols, which are 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Weather forecast for New York City, June 17, 2016. The weather symbols (and 
descriptions) are from Weather.com (partly cloudy), Accuweather.com (partly sunny), 
Wunderground.com (partly cloudy), Weather.gov (partly sunny), Yr.no (partly cloudy), and 
Worldweather.wmo.int (sunny periods).  
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Five of these six sites provide worldwide weather forecasts (Weather.gov provides 
national forecasts for the USA). Using a standardized set of symbols worldwide to 
avoid differences in interpretations may seem appealing. After all, to a great extent, 
weather has similar types of variation throughout the world; rain (and snow) falls with 
varying intensity, sunshine or clouds cover part of the sky, and the wind force will 
vary according to the Beaufort wind scale. WMO (2006) claims that using a set of 
standardized symbols facilitates easy interpretation. However, because visual language 
is culturally specific and differs among social groups (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006), 
using a standardized set of weather symbols worldwide should not guarantee similar 
interpretations. Users of these websites are not one homogeneous group. Rather, there 
is a diversity of groups, uses, needs and situations making it challenging to establish 
effective communication of weather information to the public. For example, in the 
present study symbols were occasionally ascribed interpreted as having different 
meanings than were intended. Therefore, I discuss some challenges to the idea that 
standardized symbols worldwide facilitate easy and similar interpretations.  
In the present study, prior experiences with weather and forecasts were found to enable 
the participants to interpret the forecast information. Color, number of drops, and other 
nuances of symbols were important for interpreting the symbols and assessing the 
degree of certainty in the forecast. Similarly, the number of snowflakes was found to 
affect the interpretation of the symbol in a study reported by the National Research 
Council in the USA (2006). Additionally, for the participants in the present study, 
prior experiences were found to prevail in the event of a conflict with forecast 
information. This finding is consistent with earlier research findings in which existing 
knowledge can and often does prevail over textual information when there is a conflict 
between the two (Dole et al., 1991). With these findings in mind, a person interested in 
the forecast for New York City and scrutinizing the weather symbols from the six 
different websites in Figure 4 could have interpreted them differently. For example, 
she might have interpreted the first symbol as chance of rain showers because of the 
large, gray cloud and the small sun, and the last two symbols as mostly sunny without 
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chance of rain (due to the larger sun and the white color of the clouds). Although the 
weather symbols in Figure 4 are slightly different, the forecast descriptions are similar 
(partly cloudy/partly sunny). If forecast providers are not careful with all of the details 
in the symbols, when such nuances are interpreted as intended communication by the 
users of the information, unintended interpretations can result. 
One possible approach to avoid unintended interpretations and to narrow the range of 
interpretations is to combine the weather symbols with verbal descriptions (as 
exemplified above). In the present study, it was found that the participants 
occasionally integrated information from different representations, such as symbols 
and verbal text. Verbal descriptions of symbols also must be interpreted in light of the 
users’ experiences; consequently, reading the descriptions does not guarantee similar 
interpretations of the symbols. However, integrating information from different 
representations has several potential benefits. Ainsworth (2006) argues that multiple 
representations can be used to constrain and complement information and to construct 
deeper understandings. These three functions are exemplified in the following three 
hypothetical texts/descriptions written to support graphical weather information: 
 Warning: The amount of rainfall this evening on the coast might be 30 
millimeters, not 5 millimeters as expressed in the symbols and the numbers. 
This text can be used to constrain the interpretation of automatically generated 
symbols and numbers (e.g., in a table) by providing similar but corrected information. 
Note that the reader must understand the constraining representation (i.e., the text) to 
be able to exploit this function (Ainsworth, 2006). 
 An intense and fast-moving low-pressure system is likely to cause heavy rain on 
the coast this evening, which might arrive earlier than expected. 
This text can be used to complement the symbols in a table by providing other 




 There will be heavy rain this evening, that is, 25-35 millimeters of rain. 
This text provides the opportunity to construct a deeper understanding of the 
underlying structure of the numbers in a table. To be able to understand the connection 
between the numbers and the names of different rainfall amounts (e.g., light rain and 
heavy rain), the reader should be able to translate across the representations and 
integrate the information.  
Forecast providers should be aware of all possible functions. They may benefit from 
having a plan for using various representations, because different user groups and 
different situations are likely to benefit from different functions. For example, 
specialized terms (providing additional information to professional users) might be 
used when the aim of the verbal text is to complement the information communicated 
by the symbols in a table. However, everyday language (easy to understand for all 
users) can be used when the aim of the verbal description/text is to constrain the 
interpretation of symbols in a table. WMO (2006) exploits these functions when it 
emphasizes that subjective descriptive verbal terms provided in addition to the 
standardized symbols should reflect differences from one country to the next. For 
example, 30 millimeters of rain might be described as heavy rain for one location (e.g., 
New York City) whereas the same amount of rain could and possibly should be 
described differently and as less severe for another location (e.g., Bergen). 
Considering local experiences and social and cultural differences facilitates possible 
improvement compared with providing one description associated with one symbol. 
For example, it is conceivable that a person living in New York City (121 days and 
1174 mm average annual rainfall) and a person living in my hometown in Norway, 
Bergen (213 days and 2250 mm average annual rainfall), would interpret worldwide 
standardized symbols differently. By suggesting using a range of descriptions with one 
symbol WMO attempts to handle one concern by using one set of symbols worldwide. 
However, to be effective, also the verbal descriptions must be read.  
In this study, verbal text was only read occasionally. The participants were asked how 
they reached a decision concerning their conduct of various activities. All participants 
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exploited the strengths of different representations, such as reading symbols in tables 
because they considered time-ordered tables to be efficient when seeking weather data 
for a specific location and point of time. Participants were able to adjust the amount 
and type of information according to the situation. Occasionally, they used and 
integrated information from several representations and evaluated the degree of 
certainty in the forecast prior to making a decision. This finding indicates that a 
selection of representations is an advantage for online weather sites when 
communicating to several user groups or when communicating to users of forecasts in 
different situations. Multimodal weather reports enable users to access preferred 
representations that they understand and that fit their particular and actual decision-
making situations. However, information overload must be prevented (Klein, 2011), 
not least in light of the increased use of weather applications (apps) on smartphones 
(e.g., Rutty and Andrey, 2014). Betsch and Glöckner (2010) argue that if all 
information favors one option and speaks against other options, decisions are easier to 
make. Nevertheless, too much information can produce distractions (when information 
is irrelevant in a specific situation), which might create difficulty in making a decision. 
For example, two participants in the eye-tracking study experienced difficulty when 
searching a web page for a period of time because the site provided excessive 
information and they did not know where to locate the information that interested 
them. Because many decisions are based on brief views of the websites and because 
information overload should be prevented, it appears that providing an abundance of 
information is not necessarily efficient in all situations. Still, suggestions to improve 
communication should be co-developed with potential end-users, and followed by 
evaluations of the usefulness of the communications (e.g., Dilling & Lemos, 2011). 
In other words, another (but not mutually exclusive to the one above) possible 
approach to prevent unintended interpretations and to narrow the range of 
interpretations of weather symbols is to approach the details with care when designing 
the symbols and to have an explicit intention for every nuance in the information 
presented. The participants in this study used local experiences with weather to 
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interpret the weather symbols. Hence, I propose that developing a large set of symbols 
in which a range of local experiences are considered and providing users the 
opportunity to customize the website by choosing a subset of symbols suitable to their 
experiences and needs can contribute to reducing unintended interpretations. The 
subsets may or may not contain some of the same symbols, depending on whether 
common features can be found for several groups/cultures. For example, are white 
clouds always associated with dry weather and gray clouds with a possibility of rain? 
More research is needed to answer this and other questions related to the possibility of 
providing different sets of symbols to different user groups. In the process of 
developing and evaluating the symbols, the users’ needs and viewpoints should be 
obtained and recognized. 
Moreover, it was found in this study that the symbols often reminded the participants 
of real-world experiences. This result can explain why the participants occasionally 
experienced difficulty correlating experiences and symbols when the experiences and 
symbols were inconsistent with each other, which is a possible reason for the variety 
of interpretations. Importantly, what seems consistent for a meteorologist is not 
necessarily perceived as consistent by a layperson. Consistency in representation is 
considered crucial for effective communication (National Research Council, 2006). 
Thus, information that appears contradictory across representations should be avoided. 
For example, a white cloud in a symbol without drops combined with the possibility of 
precipitation (e.g., a numerical precipitation interval, 0-1.5 mm) made a forecast 
ambiguous for some participants in this study. As a result, the potential advantages of 
a multimodal communication approach and integrating information were reduced.  
Despite the challenges associated with public communication of weather information, 
I find a promising example of consistent communication across social groups and 
national borders in severe weather warnings (see subsection 1.5.3). Several European 
Meteorological Services (e.g., UK MetOffice, Meteoalarm – alerting Europe for 
extreme weather, and soon MET Norway) are starting to use the same colors in their 
severe weather warning systems. This approach consists of a four-color system that 
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indicates degree of severity and actions needed (Figure 5). Because the colors used are 
similar to the colors used in traffic lights worldwide, I speculate that interpretations 
with little variation across social groups are likely to be achieved. This assumption 
should at least hold for the gist of the message, since the association between red and 
danger is bolstered over time in different contexts. This association may even emerge 
from a biologically based tendency to view red as a danger signal (Elliot et al., 2007). 
In other words, the interpretation of colors in warnings and risk messages can be 
different from interpreting weather symbols and not rely on local experiences to the 
same degree.  
 
Figure 5: Basic messages associated with each of the colors used for weather warnings 
provided by the National Severe Weather Warning Service in the UK (MetOffice, 2015, Dec 
11).  
 
Regardless of whether risk and uncertainty or deterministic weather information is 
being communicated, more attention and multidisciplinary research is needed. If 
forecast providers knew how people interpreted graphics and symbols (weather 
symbols, wind arrows, and uncertainty information, for example), and the results from 
the present study contribute in that respect, the providers could use this information to 
improve their communication and for designing symbols. This potential improvement 
is increasingly important because visual communication is becoming more dominant 
(Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006), particularly in weather reports, and improved 
communication provide an opportunity to reduce variation in the interpretations of 
graphical weather information, leading to more effective decision-making. The design 
and communication of weather symbols and other forecast information should be 
accomplished through extensive and iterative dialog with different groups of end-users 
to facilitate the co-production of useful information (e.g., Dilling & Lemos, 2011; de 
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Bruin & Bostrom, 2013). For example, the communication model based on the mental 
model approach and described in subsection 1.6.3 could be used as a point of departure 
to elicit peoples’ thoughts about local weather experiences and interpretations and 
about their uses of and needs for weather information. Then existing information can 
be adjusted according to new knowledge acquired through research. For example, a 
new rain symbol that provides more nuanced forecasts was recently introduced on 
Yr.no (Figure 6).  
Moreover, if the decision-stakes in certain situations are in the high end of the scale, 
additional aspects of uncertainty (e.g., ignorance) as well as social values should be 
























Figure 6: “Now it rains a little bit less on Yr.no”. This article (Rommetveit, 2014) describes 
the introduction of a new weather symbol on Yr.no. In addition to the previous symbols with 
two and three raindrops, the new symbols only have one raindrop, which provides a more 




If you want to communicate something to a specific user group, a dialog with that 
group is required to develop and find a communication system that is satisfactory to 
all. However, the public consists of an extensive variety of user groups. Maintaining a 
dialog with all possible user groups and reaching agreement about a communication 
system is thus not a feasible solution. Importantly, communication with the public is 
more demanding than communication with specific user groups. Multimodal weather 
reports, which enable different information to be communicated by using different 
representations, can provide a partial solution to this challenge. 
4.3 Communication and learning of verbal information 
Other verbal information than the descriptions of symbols mentioned in the discussion 
above is also used in weather reports. When presenting weather forecasts, 
meteorological terms are still frequently used, such as “low pressure system,” “warm 
front,” and “cold front.” A possible reason for why using such terms in forecasts 
remain popular is because they are precise, which is a characteristic of scientific terms 
(Hyde, 2008). If both the receiver and the sender of a message use and understand the 
scientific terms, the range of variation in interpretations of forecast information can be 
reduced, which might result in more effective and precise communication and 
informed decision-making. However, understanding scientific terms can also be an 
obstacle for many people (Wellington & Osborn, 2001). For example, some 
participants in this study indicated that they did not understand the term “low-pressure 
system” in the verbal text forecast. Problems might result either because the terms 
were never learned/understood in school, or because it is demanding to transfer 
knowledge from one type of situation (terms learned in school) to another (authentic 
texts and situations in daily life) (Anderson et al., 1996; Bransford et al., 2000). 
Without initial learning of the terms, transfer cannot be expected (Bransford et al., 
2000). The demanding nature of knowledge transfer is highlighted by the fact that 
teachers in this study, who have the expected theoretical knowledge, also had 
problems making this transfer. People may have knowledge that is relevant to a 
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situation but not activated (Bransford et al., 2000). Because we all hold a great deal of 
knowledge, we do not always know exactly which knowledge we have to use in each 
new situation without specific guidance (Bransford et al., 2000). Summarized, this 
means that attempting to reduce one problem (diversity of interpretations) introduces 
another problem (understanding the terms).  
Although it is generally acknowledged that scientific terms are difficult to learn 
(Wellington & Osborn, 2001), the use of these terms is nonetheless prevalent in 
weather forecasts. Another possible reason (that I have heard at several occasions) for 
their use is the belief that people will learn, for example, the term “low-pressure 
system” if it is repeated frequently enough in forecasts, even if it is not explained. Of 
course, peoples’ awareness of these terms depends on their interest in them and on the 
strength of other concerns competing for their attention (Beard & Wilson, 2013). Thus, 
some people may learn the terms due to interest or the need to know and are triggered 
to look them up. To people who are not familiar with the terms, they may be empty 
words meant to be filled with meaning (Kress, 2005). Thus, looking at or listening to a 
term is not the same as learning the term; such a transmission of ideas and knowledge 
does not occur (Millar, 2004). For learning to occur, the term must be explained. The 
learner must also assume an active role and be able to relate to the word (Millar, 2004) 
by interpreting it in terms of prior knowledge and experiences with the phenomena 
involved (Dole et al., 1991; Norris & Phillips, 2002; Beard & Wilson, 2013). 
Thorsheim et al. (2016) argue that before students can make meaning in science terms 
they need examples and observations serving as references from specific situations and 
bringing life to the terms. Such activities, in which students make first-hand 
experiences with the phenomena, are distinguished as suitable to trigger off interest 
and engagement (Skaftun & Solheim., 2014). When a person engages with an 
experience and reflects on what, how and why the situation occurred, she can learn 
from the experience (Beard & Wilson, 2013).  
We do not learn from experience. We learn from reflecting on experience. 
(Dewey, 1933, p. 78) 
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Other people will not learn terms because they are not interested or (think they) do not 
need to know the terms. For example, some of the participants in this study 
disregarded the verbal information and did not reflect on their experiences. To teach 
all members of the public the meanings of specific terms is thus demanding. Persons 
who are not familiar with the language are excluded (Martin, 1993). These user groups 
are more likely to benefit from the use of everyday language in forecasts. They may 
consider everyday words to be more relevant, which may engage them to reflect on 
their experiences. An everyday language may improve forecast readability and the 
understandability of the message.  
The participants in this study stated that they engaged in activities such as skiing, 
haying, exterior painting and car driving. In these activities, the participants acquired 
experiences with weather phenomena. Importantly, two different people do not 
experience or perceive an event in exactly the same way, which creates unique 
experiences (Beard & Wilson, 2013). Because people have different experiences, more 
than one relevant interpretation is possible for everyday words and even for precise 
scientific terms. Pennesi (2007) also found that multiple meanings of weather 
terminology exist among different groups of people (Powell & O’Hair, 2008). For 
example, three relevant interpretations of the term “low-pressure system” in this study 
were rain, warmer weather in the autumn and westerly winds. This relates to Lemke’s 
(2005) orientational function for meaning-making, the interpretation is done against 
the background of other information available to the reader such as the local context. 
The relevance of the interpretation depends on the relevance of prior experiences. 
Several participants in this study associated low-pressure systems with inclement 
weather and high-pressure systems with fair weather, which is an appropriate 
association. However, in Norway, which is a narrow country with steep mountains and 
deep fjords, this association may nevertheless not always hold. As discussed in 
subsection 1.4.3, intuitions not derived from true or relevant experience can produce 
low-quality intuitive judgments (Kahneman, 2011). Additionally, as discussed in 
subsection 1.4.1, relevant experiences are important to encode gist representations (the 
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essential meaning) of information. Gist representations support intuition and is always 
used in decisions (Reyna, 2012; McFall, 2015). Thus, to learn the complete meaning 
and implications of the terms, and to make high-quality intuitive judgments, extensive 
practice is required to acquire relevant experiences. Professional end-users may have 
great interest in the terms and may have had experiences that resemble those of 
meteorologists. These user groups have experiences from relevant situations and 
expectations of what are appropriate interpretations (Knain, 2015). Thus, they can 
make rapid and accurate intuitive judgments (Klein, 2011), and take advantage of the 
terms used in weather forecasts.  
Some persons might be interested to learn but struggle to acquire relevant experiences, 
and can benefit from being assisted by the forecast providers. For example, tourists are 
typically more unfamiliar with the local environment (Becker et al., 2015). Hence, 
being supported in situations where they lack local experiences may potentially have 
benefits for their decision-making and seen as worth the struggle. However, according 
to Millar (2004), first-hand experiences with phenomena are required to fully 
understand such phenomena because real events contain more information than any 
representation or combination of representations. Nonetheless, video recordings of 
real-world events can support learning (Millar, 2004). For example, video-recordings 
can be used to show people events that they did not experience (Millar, 2004), or 
events they have rare experience with. Therefore, one possibility might be to provide 
the end-users of forecasts with short videos that show actual weather events or 
examples of wind speeds. The videos might help people with rare experience with a 
phenomenon to calibrate their individual experiences with other examples; for 
example, a video that demonstrates the effect of a gale or a storm or the difference 
between 5 mm and 30 mm of rain per hour. According to Aadland et al. (2016), it is 
well agreed that the learning situation should be context specific to the situation where 
the knowledge is supposed to be applied for the most effective learning to occur. Thus, 
to be helpful, the videos must be relevant for the end-users, for example, by showing 
examples from their country with corresponding vegetation and weather. Another 
challenge with videos is that they are not likely to provoke as strong affect and 
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emotion as when being in the actual situation. Activated feelings motivate actions to 
(avoid) reproducing those feelings (Slovic et al., 2004). Thus, videos will neither allow 
people to learn from the experiences nor to “mark” decision outcomes by positive and 
negative feelings in the same way as real experiences do. Feelings are linked to 
intuition and considered to be human’s most natural and common way to respond to 
danger (Slovic et al., 2004); thus, using videos will not necessarily inform decision-
making. 
Another challenge is that meteorologists typically forecast (with words or symbols) 
rain when stratiform clouds are expected and forecast showers when cumuliform 
clouds are expected. Meteorologists are interested in the processes that cause 
precipitation, even when a day with rain and a day with extensive showers are 
characterized by similar conditions. However, using their own experiences and local 
way of talking about rain and showers, the participants in this study uniformly 
interpreted rain as a continuous event and showers as intermittent events. This finding 
was similar to their interpretations of the rain symbol and the shower symbol. Thus, as 
the divergent interpretations of graphical information, there appear to be 
inconsistencies in verbal language usage between experts and laypeople. To help users 
interpret forecasts consistent with forecasters’ intentions, improved language that 
incorporates everyday words instead of scientific terms when describing processes 
could be developed. For example, the phrase “area of rain/clouds” could be used 
instead of the term “low-pressure system” to describe a phenomenon in an everyday 
language that will most likely enable laypeople to acquire relevant experiences. This 
change may also make the text more consistent with interpretations of symbols and 
prevent the communication of what might appear to be contradictory information. 
Notably, Betsch and Glöckner (2010) argue that if the information is coherent 
decisions are easier to make. 
How much meteorology people need to understand to be properly informed should be 
carefully considered (Pennesi, 2007). Pennesi (2007) argues that in some cases 
“translating” scientific information into common terms improves comprehension more 
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than using public education programs. I agree, and do not think that the omission of 
scientific terms will foster stupidity in the public (i.e., a deficit view); on the contrary, 
using such terms likely makes persons who are unfamiliar with them feel stupid. 
Moreover, if a person is unable to interpret a term because he lacks relevant 
experiences, then it is difficult to encode the gist representation, and decision quality 
could suffer. However, modifications of the language should be considered with care 
because scientific terms can convey information that everyday words cannot. For 
example, “low-pressure system” may communicate supplemental information about 
dynamics as well as changed air-pressure to persons who are familiar with the term. If 
comprehension is improved sufficiently, this should justify sacrificing technical 
accuracy somewhat (Pennesi, 2007). Here, the meteorological society is facing a 
dilemma which rather than being solved may result in a trade-off between using 
scientific terms and using everyday language. From a communication perspective, a 
possible solution might be to provide scientific terms and everyday language that is 
adapted to different user groups (this approach is more resource demanding). This 
duality in language use is emerging in several national weather services, where verbal 
forecasts presented at the websites and in Twitter messages often make use of and 
alternate between a technical language and everyday language (e.g., Figure 7). 
Additionally, the use of Twitter also allows for a dialogue with end-users and to 





Figure 7: In this Tweet (upper panel; Wunderground.com, 2016) from Wunderground.com, an 
everyday language is used. The Tweet ends with a link, leading the reader to 
Wunderground.com’s Blog. In this Blog (an excerpt is presented in the lower panel of the 
Figure; Henson, 2016), a more technical language is used allowing certain interested readers 
to get more (and more precise) information. 
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Thus, scientific terms can be used by persons who are familiar with them and by 
persons who are willing to learn them. For others, an everyday language is likely to be 
easier to learn and understand, and may lead to better communication. To achieve 
useful information and effective communication, the information should be co-
produced through a dialog between forecast providers and end-users (e.g., see Dilling 
& Lemos, 2011; Fischhoff, 2013). Increased attention to the transfer and application of 
textbook knowledge in school may also be beneficial for addressing the language 
challenge in communication between experts and laypeople. For example, knowledge 
that is learned in multiple contexts is more likely to support flexible transfer than 
knowledge learned in a single context (Bransford et al., 2000).  
4.4 Rational decision-making and accidents 
The results from the three studies indicate that only parts of the information provided 
in the forecast were integrated and used by participants, and that different participants 
were integrating and using different parts of the information. What information and 
how much information was utilized apparently depended less on participant’s reading 
skills and more on the actual decision-making situation (the person, the weather 
conditions, and the task/activity). Because they used only parts of the information, the 
participants did not obtain the richest possible understanding of the forecast, and they 
typically evaluated the degree of certainty in the forecast differently from the intended 
meaning. However, being rational in a bounded rationality paradigm does not require 
reading all of the available information. The participants in this study state reasons for 
their choices and appear rational in the sense of bounded rationality. Thus, the 
participants appeared rational in their decision-making processes and made reasoned 
and apparently suitable decisions in each situation. For example, one participant did 
not have adequate experience and understanding of wind speed and as a result she did 
not use this information. The participant did not attempt to learn about wind precisely 
because the envisaged activity was not dependent on wind speed in any respect. This 
description of a decision-making process as a rational process in which certain 
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available information is purposely omitted contrasts with the deficit model of science 




Figure 8: Anecdotal evidence from the Norwegian newspaper Bergens Tidende, September 
17, 2015, reporting that people are not always prepared and sometimes get surprised by cold 
weather at night, and need to be rescued (Dyregrov, 2015).  
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Although the participants in this study appeared rational in their decision-making, 
accidents with fatal consequences sometimes occur. For example, in each year since 
2000, an average of approximately ten people have died while engaging in outdoor 
activities (climbing, skiing, canoeing, kayaking, sailing, and surfs) in Norway 
(Horgen, 2013). Some of these accidents occurred during strong winds and inclement 
weather (Horgen, 2013; Aadland et al., 2016). Besides inaccurate weather forecasts, 
one possible reason for these accidents is that the decisions to do the activity or what 
precautions to take, required knowledge or information that the decision-maker did not 
have (Reyna & Farley, 2006). Aadland et al. (2016) suggest that other reasons also 
exist. Anecdotal evidence from media reports indicates that inadequate planning is a 
potential cause of accidents in outdoor activities (Figure 8). 
Those involved in these incidents may have made hasty decisions. However, the 
participants in this study employed more elaborate decision-making processes when 
the activity was important to them. They also exploited a clear set of functions with 
respect to the representations they employed, and they integrated information when 
they had to compare and control information. Thus, another possible reason for the 
accidents is that people make rational (i.e., reasoned) decisions but lack relevant 
experiences and/or do not know that a particular situation may require a more 
exhaustive examination of the weather forecast. Apparently, only a fraction of 
judgements leads to weather-related accidents and the need for rescue services, and the 
present study includes a relatively low number of participants. This means that the 
patterns found in the participants’ decision-making processes in this study are not 
necessarily representative for the persons having accidents. Nevertheless, a main 
challenge is to know which situations and activities require more in-depth use of 
forecasts. This challenge is exemplified by one participant who used to drive a boat 
along the Norwegian coast. The participant stated that she tried to read the wind 
arrows in the forecasts but was unable to fully understand and relate this information 
to the different wind speeds. Instead, the decisions she made in performing the activity 
were based on her observations of waves, which is a rational decision in the sense of 
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being reasoned. The weather conditions along the coast of Norway can change rapidly, 
and an impending storm can surprise anyone if the forecast is not read. Although this 
participant made a rational decision (i.e., reasoned), the lack of consideration for wind 
speed information indicates a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the situation; 
that is, low situation awareness (Aadland et al., 2016). There is also anecdotal 
evidence from media reports that some people hiking in the Norwegian mountains, 
especially non-residents, may not be familiar with rapidly changing weather conditions 
and thus dress improperly (Figure 9). If one has not experienced a disaster, reliance on 
personal experience may lead to an underestimation of risk (Eiser et al., 2012). Thus, if 
these persons have never experienced really bad weather before that may contribute to 
underestimating the risk in these situations. 
 
Figure 9: Police officer Kjetil Føyen reports: “Tourists who have traveled over a long distance 
typically have limited time to undertake their activities in a certain area, and then it is difficult 
to stop them.” Jon Halvorsen from Norwegian People’s Aid continues: “They show up in 
jeans and sandals. They have never experienced such a change in weather.” Reported by the 
Norwegian newspaper Haugesunds Avis, August 09, 2016 (NTB, 2016). 
Additionally, when people have traveled over a distance they sometimes have limited 
time to undertake their activities in this area. This may provide an explanation why the 
hikers mentioned in Figure 10 were still trying to reach the top of the mountain even 
though there was bad weather (strong winds, poor visibility, and heavy rain) and they 
were explicitly warned and advised by the local tourist office agents and others not to 
go. According to a representative from the Norwegian People’s Aid (Figure 9), who 
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sent their Rescue Service to this area, many persons were improperly dressed for the 
bad weather. This resulted in several accidents.  
 
 
Figure 10: Anecdotal evidence from the newspaper newsinenglish.no, August 08, 2016, 
reporting that certain people sometimes walk into the mountains even when they are explicitly 
warned not to do this due to bad weather (NewsinEnglish.no, Aug 08).  
When facing a hazardous weather situation the individual’s cultural worldview (Morss 
et al., 2016) and social processes, for example conversations with one another, are 
important and might have influenced their risk assessment and judgment (Eiser et al., 
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2012; Becker et al., 2015). Moreover, if a person has positive feelings about an event, 
she sees it as having more benefits and fewer costs (Eiser et al., 2012), possibly 
underestimating the dangers. This may well be the situation for tourists, looking 
forward to their holidays. People may want to try to go when they have first traveled to 
this mountain. 
According to Endsley (2006), the main cause for most human errors is poor situation 
awareness (Aadland et al., 2016). Therefore, a lack of relevant experience may explain 
why some persons do not understand the seriousness of certain (not necessarily 
extreme) situations, which can lead to low-quality decision-making.  A critical factor 
when interpreting the weather forecast is that the user understands the forecasts as well 
as the consequences such conditions would have in a given context (e.g., sea kayaking, 
Aadland et al., 2016). For instance, Aadland et al. (2016) suggest that some paddlers 
lack a basic understanding of the hazards they face and of their competence and skill 
to handle those situations. Consistent with the risk communication literature, 
forecasters are increasingly interested in communicating the likely levels of impact of 
severe weather (Neal et al., 2014; Casteel, 2016); that is, possible consequences of the 
forecast weather conditions. For example, when unusually extreme events are expected 
(a situation in which many people have rare experiences), Lejano et al. (2016) claims 
that communication must include reference to a specific context and recommendations 
for action.  
Providing possible consequences of the forecast weather can assist people that lack 
certain types of experiences to increase their situation awareness, and inform their 
decision-making. Nevertheless, people need to acquire experiences on their own. 
Starting out with slightly more demanding weather conditions than they normally 
experience may be more sensible than jumping straight into the more extreme weather 
conditions.  
To identify those situations in which exhaustive examination of the forecast is 
essential, experience with the activity and local weather conditions (including 
knowledge about physiographic conditions such as topology and fiords) is necessary. 
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If people recognize the seriousness of the situation, this study suggests that they will 
be able to adapt the amount and type of information and their decision-making process 
accordingly. However, forecast information competes with other types of information 
and may be seen as less important given the decision goals (Dilling & Lemos, 2011). 
As mentioned, positive feelings about an event (Slovic et al., 2004) or restrictions in 
time to undertake the activity may lead people to become more risk-averse. Therefore, 
as suggested by Dietz (2013) and von Winterfeldt (2013), communication must be 
competent with regard to both facts and values (e.g., goals and associated trade-offs 
that underpin preferences for one course of action) to inform decisions. 
The participants in this study interpreted forecast (including uncertainty) information 
differently from one another and sometimes differently from the intentions of the 
forecast provider. At other times, the participants did not understand part of the 
information and were unable to use it or integrate it across representations. Such 
occurrences are also possible explanations for why accidents happen. Interpreting 
information differently from the provider’s intention should be considered a 
communication challenge (not a misinterpretation) for which the forecast provider has 
the main responsibility. Therefore, in addition to continuing to improve the quality of 
their forecasting models, providers of online weather reports should focus on 
improving communication through co-production of symbols and other ways to 
communicate forecast information, to support informed decision-making. However, 
the end-users are also responsible for scrutinizing background information and 
experiences needed to understand the information. To fully exploit the advantages of 
the multimodal information in situations where this is beneficial for the individual, 
different representations should be used and integrated (Ainsworth, 1999).  
Although the participants in this study appeared rational in their decision-making, the 
results revealed challenges associated with communication to a variety of user groups. 
There is no simple formula for effective forecast communication; what is appropriate 
and easily comprehended by one group may be unhelpful to others (Pennesi, 2007). 
Stephens et al. (2012) argues that a key challenge in communication of probabilistic 
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forecast information is the balance between richness (i.e., the amount of information 
communicated) and saliency (i.e., presenting information in a way that is meaningful 
for the user). To communicate with the public, forecast providers should encourage a 
systematic dialog with forecast users (e.g., the mental model approach, Fischhoff, 
2013), in which the public is separated and includes various user groups. Rather than 
taking a deficit view and asking how forecast providers can educate the public, the 
pertinent question is how the public can assist forecast providers. This study 
constitutes a contribution to this process by focusing on task 2 (and to some extent on 
task 3) in the mental model approach; however, additional research and dialog are 
required to enhance understanding the needs of different groups and to co-produce 
useful information (Dilling & Lemos, 2011).  
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5. Concluding summary 
To summarize my work, I have developed the following questions having the origin in 
the four-task model suggested to achieve useful and effective communication (1.6.3): 
What can I share about “what people know” (the second task of the model); that is, the 
participants’ current interpretations, integrations, and uses of online weather 
information? What can we learn from the results and discussions from this study 
related to “design of communication” (the third task of the model)? By answering 
these questions (Section 5.1), the main question in this study will also be answered: 
How is information in online weather reports interpreted, integrated, and used by 
laypeople when making everyday decisions for weather-dependent activities? 
Additionally, the answers can increase the understanding of the communication 
process between experts and laypeople, from which this study is motivated, and it can 
thus be a contribution in the development of useful and effective communication. 
In Section 5.2, recommendations for future studies are presented, which may be of 
interest to other researchers. 
5.1 Summary 
First, when people ask me what I have achieved, I reply that I have investigated how 
laypeople make everyday decisions based on weather information, specifically, the 
information they use from online weather reports, and how they interpreted and 
integrated this information. Examining these issues improved our understanding of 
communication between experts and laypeople. 
I will inform my colleagues in weather forecasting that forecast information is by 
some users interpreted close to the intended meaning. In addition, prior experiences, in 
combination with reflections on the meaning of symbols and words when comparing 
these with experiences, are critical to the interpretation of information. Because of 
differences in experiences and reflections, information was sometimes interpreted 
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differently than intended. For example, when nuances such as cloud color and the 
number of drops in the symbols were interpreted as substantial information, the 
interpretations of end-users exhibited considerable variation. Additionally, some of the 
information was not integrated or used and/or not understood. The degree of certainty 
in the forecast was evaluated differently; not only deliberate uncertainty information 
given in the weather report such as precipitation intervals, but also the participants’ 
own evaluations of for example cloud color and number of drops in a symbol. 
Communicating an accurate and purposeful degree of certainty in a weather report 
may be one of the greatest communication challenges of weather forecasting. 
Information from weather reports was used in decision-making regarding a variety of 
everyday activities. The decision-making process, e.g., its thoroughness, was 
dependent on the importance of the activity and the weather conditions of the day. The 
participants in the study appeared rational, i.e., reasoned, in their decision-making and 
the decision-making process was typically suitable for the actual situation. They also 
adjusted the type and amount of information that they used. When quick decisions 
were made, the degree of certainty was not evaluated and few representations were 
employed. In general, an inability to understand the seriousness of situations can 
degrade the quality of the decisions, which can be harmful, and even fatal. To achieve 
effective communication of useful information and informed decision-making, 
information in weather reports should be easy to correlate with prior experiences. For 
example, symbols and wind information must be nuanced and should appear 
realistically.  
I would inform my colleagues in web-service development that the multiplicity of 
representations appears to be a great advantage for communicating weather forecast 
information to a variety of users. This feature enables everyone to obtain some 
information that they like and understand; they can also adjust the type and amount of 
information that they acquire to the actual decision-making situation. The participants 
ascribed a set of affordances to each representation and used representations that they 
preferred and considered efficient in each situation. Although information was 
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sometimes integrated across representations to clarify or control and compare forecast 
information, the potential advantages of the multimodal information were not fully 
exploited. To facilitate the use and integration of several representations in situations 
where the users aim for an elaborate decision process, additional guidance can 
possibly direct and make them aware of possible advantages. Importantly, too much 
information should be avoided as this can produce distractions and even make the 
information more demanding to read. Improvements in communicating weather and 
uncertainty information and in finding appropriate solutions to support people who 
lack the relevant experiences to interpret and understand part of the information and 
the seriousness of the situation can assist people in making informed decisions and 
avoid unnecessary fatal events. For instance, although certain people seem to benefit 
from the use of scientific terms in weather reports, many users may benefit from the 
use of an everyday language which is likely to be more relevant and engage them to 
reflect on their experiences.  
Similarities exist between Yr.no and the remaining top five global weather websites 
(Alexa, 2016) (i.e., providing multimodal information to users). Thus, this study is 
informative for providers of online weather web services despite its limitation in 
sample size. Due to the similarities in weather, some common features and principles 
for the development of guidelines for the communication of graphical forecast 
information may be feasible; however, local experiences and differences between 
social groups and cultures are also important in interpretations and should be 
acknowledged by forecast providers. Improved communication may provide an 
opportunity to reduce variation in the interpretations of weather information, leading to 
more effective decision-making. The findings and discussions from this study can be 
informative for research-based weather communication.  
Finally, I would talk to my colleagues in science education about two types of transfer 
that I find important in relation to multimodal reading and literacy. The first type is 
transfer between representations. To master multimodal reading, readers need to make 
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transfers between several representations and integrate the information. Making such 
transfers may be demanding, and in this study the participants did not always integrate 
information from different representations (of different reasons). Thus, possible 
advantages of multimodality are not exploited, and science educators may find it 
important to focus transfer between representations. The second type, knowledge 
transfer from one situation to another, is related to literacy. Some participants in this 
study indicated that they did not understand certain terms, wind speeds, and 
precipitation amounts. These problems might result either because the terms were 
never learned/understood in school, or because it is demanding to transfer knowledge 
from one type of situation to another. Teaching a subject in multiple contexts rather 
than in a single context, for example, is considered beneficial for transfer across 
contexts (Bransford et al., 2000). Increased focus on transfer of knowledge is 
important to how people actually use science in daily life; to functionality and to 
personal decision-making. 
5.2 Future research 
”Human beings are complex, and their lives are ever changing; the more methods we 
use to study them, the better our chances to gain some understanding of how they 
construct their lives and the stories they tell us about them” (Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 
668). 
Other researchers can extend this study in future research. As suggested in the mental 
model approach (e.g., de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013), I also recommend the use of 
qualitative methods, such as the semi-structured interviews used in this study. Using 
qualitative methods enables the acquisition of information regarding the interpretation, 
integration, and use of information that is not otherwise easily noticeable. de Bruin and 
Bostrom (2013) suggest conducting follow-up surveys with larger samples. The results 
from the present study as well as future qualitative studies may be sought quantified 
and generalized by conducting quantitative surveys, based on the findings. Miles and 
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Huberman (1994) agree linking qualitative and quantitative studies is a strength, and 
claims that such triangulation enable the confirmation or corroboration of each other.  
Additional research is required to improve the understanding of interpretation, 
integration, and use, as well as communication, of weather forecast information to the 
public. A dialog between forecast providers and various end-users is considered 
beneficial to this process. I highlight the following two main topics for future studies: 
The first topic is experiences. To establish a foundation for research-based weather 
communication, a dialog among numerous user groups from different areas (with 
differences in weather) is necessary. This dialog should focus on forecast uncertainty 
as well as the situations in which prior experiences prevail over given information. It is 
also important to study which weather parameters are difficult to relate to and how to 
present information in a manner that is useful to people who lack certain types of 
experiences and have low situation awareness. Additionally, exploring different 
aspects of people’s weather experiences (e.g., experiences with impact of weather, 
emotional impact, or experiences with property damage and financial losses) and how 
these can influence future behavior is important and should be focused in future 
studies, as recommended by Demuth et al. (2016).    
The second topic is representations. In which situations is one representation 
considered sufficient, and when are several representations integrated and used? Does 
this decision vary among different user groups? Various user groups should be given 
several different tasks to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses ascribed to the 
different representations. Determining the best method for communicating forecast 
uncertainty information is of particular interest. If forecast providers are interested in 
the use of uncertainty information by laypeople when quick decisions are required, 
methods for effective communicating this information should be developed, preferably 
in a co-production process with the end-users enabling the production of useful 
information (Dilling & Lemos, 2011). 
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For both topics, normal user situations should be replicated and explored in the 
context of different activities and weather conditions. Tasks and restrictions should be 
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Many people use weather reports to plan their activities. Previous studies on this type 
of decision-making were primarily concerned with the use of selected pieces of 
information detached from the context of a full weather report. Therefore, this study 
contains two areas of focus: 1) factors influencing the amount of information from a 
full weather report that are used by laypeople for everyday decision-making and 2) 
how the complexity in information in a full weather report is handled in the decision-
making processes. In this qualitative study, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 21 persons from Norway. Farmers, exterior painters, tour guides, teachers, and 
students were included in the sample to obtain a fair variance in the number of user 
situations. Interviews were centred on a multimodal weather report from the online 
web-service www.Yr.no. In this study, a varying amount of information was used by 
the participants in their decision-making; furthermore, the amount of information used 
appears to depend on a) the importance of the envisaged activity and b) the suitability 
of the weather conditions. The amount of information (i.e., complexity) must be 
reduced to make a quick decision, which typically was accomplished by c) choosing a 
suitable starting point and leaving out evaluations of d) weather dynamics and e) 
forecast uncertainty. Communicating a multiplicity of representations in weather 
reports appears favourable for enabling the use of different types and amounts of 
information such that it allows both quick and more elaborate decision-making 
processes. 









1.1 Background and research questions 
Information from weather reports assist people in taking appropriate actions to protect 
life, property (Schultz et al., 2010; Rutty and Andrey, 2014), and well-being. Such 
informed decision-making leads to desirable outcomes and avoids costs to society 
(Pielke and Carbone, 2002). Studying how people make weather-related decisions is 
important to improving the communication of weather information. Effective 
communication contribute to increased information value for users (Stuart et al., 
2006), informing them about the potential benefits and risks of their decisions and 
providing additional assistance in making informed decisions (Fischhoff, 2013). 
However, a limited understanding exists concerning how information from weather 
reports is used in personal decision-making (Morss et al., 2010), and everyday 
decisions are less focused than situations involving severe weather (Silver, 2015). 
Online weather reports are typically complex in the sense of providing a great deal of 
information. The top five weather sites in the world (as of 15 August 2015), as 
calculated using the number of daily visitors and page views (Alexa 2015), are 
weather.com, accuweather.com, wunderground.com, weather.gov, and Yr.no. All five 
sites are multimodal texts composed of such representations as tables, symbols, maps, 
diagrams, and verbal text forecasts (e.g., Figure 1 and S1). In addition to single-valued 
forecasts, these sites provide uncertainty information in terms of probabilities of 
precipitation and numerical precipitation intervals. Yr.no (Yr is the Norwegian word 
for drizzle) is a collaboration between the Norwegian Meteorological Institute (MET 
Norway) and the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK). A large amount of 
information is available. Statistics from Yr show that approximately 7 million visits or 
5 % of all visits in July 2015 lasted between three and ten minutes (personal 
communication, 12 August 2015). Approximately 97 million visits or 71 % of all visits 
lasted 30 seconds or less. Consequently, most users do not use all of the information 
available on Yr. Certain users make quick decisions. More elaborate decisions are 
made on occasion. The large differences in time consumption suggests that different 
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amounts of information are used in the decision processes. The differences in the 
amount of time taken to examine forecasts could be indicative of different user needs. 
Another reason could be that some users find the information to be ineffective, 
contradictory, or difficult to understand (Sivle et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 1: Segment of the hour-by-hour forecast page of the web-service www.Yr.no (Yr). 
Forecast is in Norwegian language since this is the actual forecast used in the interviews. 
Included in the segment is a diagram (meteogram) with symbols, a temperature graph and 
solid (blue) and hatched precipitation columns (colours online only). There is also a table 
showing numbers and symbols. Hatched precipitation columns and numerical precipitation 
intervals are meant to indicate uncertainty; solid (blue) precipitation columns are meant to 
indicate expected precipitation.  
Previous studies on how members of the public make weather-related decisions have 
focused on the communication of uncertainty and probabilities in weather forecasting 
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(Roulston et al., 2006; Joslyn et al., 2007; Joslyn et al., 2009a; Joslyn and Nichols, 
2009; Roulston and Kaplan, 2009; Morss et al., 2010). The primary concern of these 
studies was whether the forecast uncertainty information was understood and enabled 
forecast users to make better decisions. Probabilistic forecast information (multiple 
possible outcomes) is usually found to have greater value for users than deterministic 
information (single outcome) (LeClerc and Joslyn, 2012). Notably, the studies were 
typically concerned with the use of selected pieces of information detached from the 
context of a full weather report. Thus, these studies are not capturing the more 
common or everyday decision-making situations. As a result, understanding how 
laypeople make everyday decisions in the context of a full weather report is a subject 
that requires further study (Morss et al., 2010; Silver, 2015). 
This qualitative study is designed to mimic normal user situations, by exploring the 
use of weather forecasts from Yr. The main focus is on identifying factors influencing 
the amount of information used by laypeople in decision-making related to different 
types of weather-dependent activities. How complex and uncertain information are 
handled in the decision-making process is further elaborated. Therefore, the following 
research questions (RQ) are asked when making decisions for weather-dependent 
activities: 
RQ1.   What factors influence the amount of information used by laypeople in 
everyday situations that involve the use of weather forecasts from Yr? 
RQ2.   How is complex and uncertain information from Yr handled? 
The answers to these questions can contribute to the knowledge of how to 
communicate weather and uncertainty information to laypeople. The focus on Yr and 






1.2 Theories on human information processing 
Whereas economic models traditionally have been used in studies of decision-making, 
there has been a shift towards information processing related to human decision-
making (Oppenheimer and Kelso, 2015). The specific information available to the 
decision-maker, and how this information is sampled, retrieved, integrated, and used, 
is considered. 
Many researchers agree that there are two types of information processing involved in 
human decision-making. Intuition (Type 1) operates fast and automatic with little or 
no effort, whereas reasoning or analysis (Type 2) is conscious, governed by rules, 
relatively slow, and effortful (Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). The 
literature indicates that there is interplay between the two types of processing in 
decision-making, to a varying extent depending on the situation, and perhaps, on the 
individual. Betsch and Glöckner (2010) claim that intuition and analysis both gives 
important contributions to decision-making processes. This view is supported by 
converging evidence (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Whereas the depth of the analysis 
can vary, intuition always works in the mental background (Betsch and Glöckner, 
2010).  
Fast processing alone does not automatically indicate intuition (Evans, 2012). For 
example, individuals may adopt experience based techniques (heuristics), allowing a 
decision to be made quickly by the means of performing simple decision rules. 
Because these procedures demand conscious calculation, they are considered Type 2 
processing (Evans, 2012). Analytic processes are sequential and consume time, and 
more information should take longer time to process. Betsch and Glöckner, (2010), 
however, argue that if the information is coherent (all information favours one option 
and speaks against another options) decisions are easier to make and decision time 
should decrease.  
Type 2 processing is considered to handle controlled search of information and making 
sense of information, and it is assumed that people use different strategies for getting 
input information (Betsch and Glöckner, 2010). Criteria (basis for judgement) and 
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cues (pieces of information) are the two variables describing the type and amount of 
information used in certain everyday decision-making situations, and which will aid 
answering the research questions. 
There are strong indications that affect (a feeling that something is good or bad) and 
emotions may serve as information in decision-making (Slovic et al., 2004), directing 
our attention, helping trade-off between decision alternatives, and as motivation for 
actions (Dickert et al., 2014). Learning from experiences leads decision outcomes to 
become “marked” by positive and negative feelings, providing information about what 
to choose and what to avoid (Peters, 2006), and thus influencing the construction of 
preferences.  
2. Method 
Semi-structured interviews were the chosen method of data collection. The sample and 
the interviews are the same as employed in Sivle et al. (2014), and the text in 
subsections 2.1 and 2.2 (including Table 1, Figures 1, S2, and S3) are derived from 
there with minor modifications. 
Although data from the interviews are qualitative, the analysis is primarily based on 
established categories and counting of variables and cases, and thus produces 
quantitative data, as described in subsection 2.3. However, no claims are put forth for 
the frequencies of occurrence in the wider public. Instead this study contributes to the 
identification of laypeople’s information use when making weather-related decisions.  
2.1 Sample 
The aim of the purposive sampling method was to capture as many different methods 
of using information provided on Yr as possible using the available study resources 
(Johannessen et al., 2010). Interview studies that aim to identify a diversity of views 
existing on a topic typically include 5 to 25 informants (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). 
To obtain a broad variance in the number of user situations, five user groups were 
included (Table 1). The study sought variation with respect to the demographic 
variables of occupation, education, age, and geographical residence across these 
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groups. Informants were selected to address the potential influence of occupation 
differences. Farmers, exterior painters, and tour guides from the Norwegian Trekking 
Association use weather forecasts to make decisions in their occupations and were 
chosen among other likely user groups.  
 
Table 1: List of informants in the study, from the five selected user groups (based on the 
occupation variable): farmers, tour guides, painters, teachers, and students. The informants are 
given pseudonyms to maintain their confidentiality. Residence area 1 has an extreme west 
coast climate (wet and windy), area 2 is characterised by “Norway`s best climate”, and area 3 
coincides with an extreme inland climate (dry). 
 
Lists of possible informants were drawn up based on the criteria, and schools and 
companies were identified and contacted by e-mail. Informed consent was obtained 
from those who agreed to participate. All informants in the sample were familiar with 
and used Yr. A pilot study with three interviews (1 student, 1 teacher, and 1 painter) 




Interviews with 21 informants were conducted and digitally sound-recorded by the 
first author (sample shown in Table 1, pilot study not included). The interviews (I-1, 
Figure 2) were centred on printouts of one particular forecast from Yr consisting of 
four printed pages with different information/time-scales (front page (Figure S1), 
overview page (Figure S2), hour-by-hour page (Figure 1), and long-term page (Figure 
S3). Although not as authentic as online forecasts, printouts were chosen to ensure 
interesting forecast information and to offer a common basis for comparison across 
answers. The forecast was taken from Stavanger, a city with which all of the 
informants were familiar but in which none of them were living. 
 
Figure 2: Flowchart showing the iterative process between interviews (I-1 and I-2) and the 
four main steps of the data analysis (A-1 to A-4): Coding of interview transcripts; make 





Informants were first asked about their background and their use of Yr (I-2, Figure 2). 
The next question was open-ended: “When you look at this forecast, what can you tell 
about the weather in Stavanger?” With this open-ended question, informants were able 
to comment on as little or much of the information in the forecast as they wished. An 
open question in the context of a full weather report mimics a normal user situation, 
and the validity of the findings is strengthened. The informants typically identified an 
activity and related the forecast information to decision-making on their own. If not, 
the first question was followed by more detailed questions on the use of information in 
various situations. Certain informants were chatty, and only a few additional questions 
were required, but for others, several prompts were offered to elicit response. For 
example, informants were asked about their use of tables or diagrams (Figure 1), the 
uncertainty information that was represented by coloured triangles in the long-term 
forecast (Figure S3), and how they came to a decision for an activity. The informants 
were also allowed and encouraged to take as long time as they needed. Hypothetical 
weather scenarios were also discussed in the interviews where the informant 
elaborated on how she/he usually came to a decision for an activity using alternative 
forecast information (with different weather conditions) other than provided in the 
interview.  
When asked, certain informants in this study said that they spent only a few seconds 
on Yr for every visit, while others spent from 2-5 minutes to 5-10 minutes, that is, 
consistent with the results in Section 1.1. Experience of time is affected by complexity 
of task; a task requiring a high mental workload is associated with underestimating the 
time they spent and vice versa (Misuraca and Teuscher, 2013). This means that the 
informants that reported they spent a short time actually might use even shorter time, 
and the informants spending a long time might spend even longer time. The informants 
who consented to be interviewed might be more interested in the weather than other 
users. These elements could lead the informants to use more information and more 
elaborate decision processes than the average user. Newell and Shanks (2014) question 
to what extent individuals are aware of the information that is triggering their 
188 
 
decisions. They claim that the challenge is for researchers to use methods which can 
make people elicit factors influencing their decision-making. This is a concern also for 
the interviews in this study, where it is possible that not all the informant’s thoughts 
are elicited. Thus, they may use more or other information in private than elicited in 
the interviews, and weather information might only be one of many components of 
decisions (Morss et al., 2005; Dilling and Lemos, 2011). 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim by the first author. 
2.3 Data analysis 
The computer-assisted qualitative data analysis proceeded through four main steps 
(Figure 2): 
First, all relevant and meaningful replies in the transcriptions were marked with a code 
name that described the content of the reply. To reduce the amount of data (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), all replies concerned with a weather dependent activity were 
initially given a code name describing the activity (e.g., hiking), whether the action 
was movable or fixed in time, and whether the activity occurred recently (i.e., last 
couple of weeks). The activities were also classified into work-related activities (given 
the number 1, e.g., harvesting for a farmer) and leisure activities (given the number 2, 
e.g., fishing trip for a teacher). 
In the following analysis, only already coded replies were addressed. The analysis of 
the transcripts identified criteria and cues used by the informants. These two variables 
aid in answering the research questions and explicitly give two predefined categories 
used in the coding process. Data were coded with respect to one variable at a time. 
If the reply was concerned with a criterion for making a decision, it was given the code 
name “criterion”, followed by the name of the weather element (e.g., temperature) in 
addition to the timing or duration of the event or the degree of certainty required. For 
example, the reply “fresh breeze is the strongest wind I accept at sea” is given the code 
name “criterion wind”. Other criteria not related to forecasts were also coded, for 
example sufficient work capacity on the days in question. Additionally, when the 
informants expressed a success criterion for the activity that influenced their planning, 
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this was given the code name “guiding criterion”. Examples of such guiding criteria or 
emphasises are (own or others’) safety or well-being. Guiding criteria were not 
predefined by the interviewer but were coded inductively according to replies made by 
the informants themselves. 
Importantly, the weather forecast does not contain only one piece of information or 
cue. Rather, it is possible to go from one cue to the next, if necessary, based on the 
previous cue. Replies concerned with a cue that was used to assess criteria were given 
the code name “cue”. This code name was followed by the name of the representation 
used (diagram, table, verbal text forecast, or map) and the name of the forecast page 
(A=front page, B=overview, C=hour-by-hour, and D=long-term). For example, the 
reply “I use the map on the overview page, especially if showers are forecast, to see 
how they move” is given the code name “cue map B”. Other pages used were 
identified by the actual page name from Yr (e.g., Statistics). If the degree of certainty 
in the forecast was evaluated by building on the given uncertainty information or by 
other (own) methods, this was included in the code name. Cues other than those from 
Yr were also coded, for example direct referrals to affect and emotions, use of other 
sources of weather information or discussion of the forecast with other persons. 
Additionally, if the informants expressed details related to their usage of Yr and the 
reasons for this usage, this was given the code name “usage”. Coded inductively, an 
example of such usage is prolonged use of the website over a period of time to find a 
suitable period in which to carry out a movable activity.  
The replies were also assessed with respect to data quality, and vague and uncertain 
replies were omitted. The vague and uncertain sequences were replies in which it was 
difficult to understand what the informant meant, for example because of ambiguities 
or low sound quality in the digital recording or because the informants said that they 
used information in their decisions that they do not use privately. Four interviews 
(informants 6, 9, 17, and 18) were assessed as poor data due to scarce replies from the 
informants and were not included in the analysis (i.e., 17 useful participants). 
Saturation is the point in data collection and analysis when information in new 
interviews provides no substantial change to the codes already developed (Guest et al., 
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2006). Breaks between the interviews, where data were analysed and codes developed 
and adjusted, allowed the interviewer to notice when codes stabilised and thus to 
determine that saturation was reached. This iterative process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Second (Figure 2), the criteria and cues used in each activity for each informant were 
listed, and the information used to make the decisions was identified. To ease the 
counting of criteria and cues and to obtain a better display of the information used by 
the informants in the decision-making process, decision trees (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) were built for each case (one activity for one informant constitutes one case). In 
total, 30 decision trees were constructed showing the criteria, cues, and decision 
alternatives (e.g., decide to paint or to postpone the job, Figure 3). It is possible to use 
either a single cue or to “drill down” into the forecasting information by going from 
one cue to the next. This process can be accomplished in a single visit or during 
several visits over time (prolonged usage) before making a final decision on whether 
to omit the activity (negative decision) or to undertake the activity (positive decision). 
Because hypothetical weather scenarios were discussed in the interviews, in certain 
cases, the informants elaborated on different paths (under alternative conditions) that 
would lead to a decision for that activity. Thus, the decision trees include several 
possible paths leading to a decision. In this study, the minimum path is considered the 
shortest possible path to a positive decision in counting the number of cues. Similarly, 
the maximum path is the longest path leading to a positive decision. 
Real-world decisions are probably not as well-structured as presented in the decisions-
trees. In real-world situations it is not solely conscious information use in the decision-
processes, but a blend of intuition and analysis, where affect and emotions (e.g. based 




Figure 3: a) Decision-tree for the activity boat sailing, as explained by the teacher Anita. b) 
Decision-tree for the activity outdoor painting, as explained by the commercial painter Albert. 
Minimum path is shown with (green) dashed lines, maximum path shown with (red) dotted 
lines (colours online only). 
 
Third (Figure 2), to answer the first research question, the number of criteria and cues 
were counted. Both the minimum and maximum numbers of criteria and cues that 
allowed for a positive decision were counted. For example, in Figure 3a, the minimum 
and maximum paths are equal, consisting of one criterion and one cue. In Figure 3b, 
the minimum path consists of four criteria and five cues, and the maximum path 
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consists of ten criteria and nine cues. New cues included at a later point in time were 
included in the decision-trees and counted (e.g., see criterion 10 in Figure 3b). In 
contrast, a revisit to a previously checked (but updated) cue was not included. The 
count of criteria and cues is shown in Table 2. 
Fourth (Figure 2), the decision-trees made it easier to determine what information the 
informants used as a starting point and when they included different representations 
and uncertainty-estimates in the decision-making process. This use of information is 
shown in Table 3. Thus, the decision-trees made it possible to discern how complexity 
in information was handled and thereby to answer the second research question. 
Finally, three of the transcribed interviews (which contained six cases representing 
different activities and strategies) were analysed by another researcher in terms of the 
two variables to check for inter-coder reliability (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
number of agreements (similar codes) was divided by total number of agreements plus 
disagreements (all codes) to calculate reliability expressed in per cent (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). This process yielded an inter-coder reliability of 74 % for the two 
variables, which is within the acceptable 70-90 % range (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Based on the coding and counting and the decision-trees, Tables 2 and 3 indicate the 
amount and type of information involved in the decision-processes. The next two 
sections present the results of the analysis. Section 3 focuses on RQ1 and Section 4 
focuses on RQ2. 
3. Factors influencing the amount of information used 
Table 2 shows the amount of information used by the informants in different decision-
making situations. Sometimes decisions were made quickly using little information. 
The teacher Anita used one criterion for making her decision about sailing. Anita 
reported that she on occasions had experienced gale force winds when sailing, and that 
she found this unpleasant. For her, this marked decision options with gale force winds 
with negative feelings, as described by Peters (2006), and she wanted to avoid these 
situations. To make the decision, she searched a single cue, information on the wind 
speed on table B on Yr (Figure 3a).  
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Table 2: Identified guiding criteria, criteria and cues for the maximum and minimum decision 
paths for each activity identified in the analysis. Decreasing/increasing amount of information 
are indicated with arrows. An asterisk indicates the activity to be recently carried out by the 
informant. Class of activity (1: work-related, 2: leisure time-related) is also included. (The 
table is sorted according to the number of cues used in the maximum path.) 
 
Informants often used more than one cue/criterion to make their decision. If the first 
cue/criterion did not allow for a decision, new cues/criteria were introduced until a 
decision was reached. These decisions were typically related to prolonged use of Yr 
(Table 2). If the activity was fixed in time, the informants had to make a final decision 
(carry out or cancel) based on a deadline prior to the activity. These users continued to 
watch the forecast updates for a period of time to be prepared for this decision. The 
informants checked forecast updates also if the activity was movable. In this case, the 
activity was postponed until they found a day/period during which their criteria were 
met. An example where more information was used is shown in Figure 3b, in which 
the painter Albert addressed the activity of outdoor painting. Albert had several criteria 
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and cues that he checked before he could make a positive decision. He did not refer 
directly to affect and emotions, and there are just a handful of such reports by the 
informants. A likely reason for the lack of replies concerning affect and emotions is 
the focus on conscious search and use of the provided forecast information. However, 
it is likely that affect and emotions do influence decisions, one example being Anita 
(above). The interviewees do report on their experiences related to weather, and these 
experiences are influenced by affect and emotions. Thus, affect and emotions are 
indirectly included in this study.  
There are two key findings related to factors influencing information use (RQ1): the 
amount of information used depends on a) the importance of the activity, and b) the 
weather conditions, the uncertainty, and the impact. These are presented next. 
3.1 The importance of the activity influence the amount of information used 
Informants from all three areas across the entire range of educational backgrounds, 
young and old, and male and female used both small and large amounts of information 
(Table 2). Factor(s) other than demography must therefore explain the amount of 
information used. 
Certain activities discussed in the interviews were recently planned by some of the 
informants. This might have influenced them to remember additional details of the 
criteria and cues. However, as both small and large amounts of information were used 
by these informants (Table 2), recent experience with similar activities does not appear 
as a likely explanation for the amount of information used. 
The importance of the activity appears to be a more likely explanation. Eight 
informants used different amounts of information for various activities (Table 2). 
These informants varied the depth of their analysis, as suggested in earlier research 
(Betsch and Glöckner, 2010). The tour guide Ulf said that he spent more time on Yr 
when planning for a hiking tour with paying participants than for other activities. This 
suggests that the amount of information used and time spent on Yr depends heavily on 
the envisaged activity. A possible explanation for this behavior is the desire to be 
efficient and at the same time use sufficient time and effort to make a comfortable 
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decision depending on the activity. The results in Table 2 indicate that when the 
activity was work-related, and economy and safety were the guiding criteria, the 
informants tended to use more information. Siri said that she used more time and 
information when planning for an activity in which weather was crucial. Earlier 
research also shows that substantial cognitive effort is invested if the problem is 
important to the decision-maker (Jungermann, 2004). The teacher Geir used less 
information to make a decision on outdoor painting in his leisure time than the 
commercial painter Albert did in his work-time. The activity was probably not as 
important for the teacher, who was painting his own house, as it was for the painter, 
who was economically responsible for painting his customers’ houses. 
Interestingly, an important decision does not need to be work-related or related to an 
emphasis on economy or safety. Certain informants, in discussing leisure time 
activities such as hunting and skiing, expressed the view that well-being during these 
activities was important to them. As with work-related decisions, their information use 
in these situations tended to be high (Table 2), indicating that for a large amount of 
information to be used, it is sufficient for the decision-maker to judge the activity as 
being important. 
3.2 The weather conditions, the uncertainty, and the impact are all important 
A small amount of information was used for selected activities that were important to 
the decision-maker. For example economy was a guiding criterion in the commercial 
activity of Christmas tree cutting (Table 2). This observation indicates that substantial 
cognitive effort is not necessarily invested, though the decision is important for the 
decision-maker. Thus it appears that the amount of information used in complex real-
life decision-making depends on factors in addition to the importance of the decision. 
Certain informants used different amounts of information for the same activity 
depending on the weather conditions. A hunting activity is the clearest example of this 
change (Table 2). The farmer Daniel used less information when dry weather was 
forecast and more information if (uncertain) rain was forecast. Certain informants said 
they only had a prolonged use of forecasts if the weather conditions were uncertain or 
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close to their criteria. Siri checked the forecast daily if it was uncertain and more 
infrequently if the forecast appeared with a higher degree of certainty and the weather 
conditions were favourable for the activity. Thus the results suggest that the amount of 
information used is not only dependent on the coherence of information (Betsch and 
Glöckner, 2010) and the activity but also depends on the suitability of the weather 
conditions for the activity. Certain activities (e.g., Christmas tree cutting) will proceed 
throughout many types of weather conditions and only a few weather parameters are 
of interest. The weather forecast only becomes crucial when the weather conditions are 
marginal. 
The decision process appears to be related to the potential weather impact on the 
activity. When snow was forecast the tour guide Nils said that he could be obliged to 
cancel a hiking tour because the risk of avalanches. The teacher Jon said he had to use 
his winter bike instead of his summer bike if snow was forecast; nevertheless, although 
weather might slow down his speed and affect how he dressed and the equipment he 
used, he could still carry out the activity (unless the weather conditions were extreme). 
Presumably, this latter situation also relates to personal preferences or past experiences 
affecting their activity-related emotions (Slovic et al., 2004). 
The results indicate that substantial cognitive effort is invested not only because the 
decision and activity is important for the decision-maker (Jungermann, 2004) but also 
because of the suitability of the weather conditions for the envisaged activity.  
4. Handling complexity in information 
There are three key findings related to handling of complexity in information (RQ2): a) 
a suitable starting point is chosen, b) weather dynamics are left out in quick decisions 
using little information, and c) forecast uncertainty is not evaluated in quick decisions. 
 
4.1 A suitable starting point is chosen 
Comparing situations involving use of little with larger amount of information, no 
difference is found for the informant’s choice of starting point in searching for cues 
(Table 3). The degree of certainty was not evaluated, and maps and verbal text 
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forecasts were not used as a starting point. Information from Yr is more often used as a 
point of departure than other types of information.   
 
Table 3: Identified use of information (starting point, dynamics and uncertainty) for the 
maximum and minimum decision paths for each activity identified in the analysis. The 
additional information used in the maximum path is indicated with bold font. 
Decreasing/increasing amount of information are indicated with arrows. (The table is sorted 
according to the number of cues from Table 2.) (A=front page [Figure S1], B=overview 
[Figure S2], C=hour-by-hour [Figure 1], and D=long-term [Figure S3]) 
 
All informants were familiar with Yr, and it is likely that they knew from experience 
where to start looking for the information they needed. Choosing a suitable initial cue 
to assess a criterion is obviously time-efficient when addressing complex information 
and is particularly important for quick decisions. Identifying and using a small amount 
of information is one method for reducing the complexity of information and is used in 
quick decisions (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Betsch and Glöckner, 2010). If the 
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choice of starting point is made based on the experience, it is likely to be a method of 
handling the complexity in information on Yr, regardless of total amount of 
information used. 
Another possible explanation for the choice of starting point is that the informants, 
learning from experience (Peters, 2006) go directly to a personally preferred 
representation such as an overview forecast, a table, or a map. Ruth and Lise preferred 
to use a table rather than a diagram. The choice of starting point is also likely to 
depend on the activity; the same informant can prefer different starting points for 
different activities. The farmer Daniel said that he begins by looking at the long-term 
forecast table when planning for haying, but uses the hour-by-hour diagram when 
planning for car driving. Different representations have different advantages (modal 
affordances) (Kress, 2010), and the reason for choosing a diagram as a starting point 
rather than a table could be that the diagram offers the advantage of communicating 
development over time. Daniel said that he uses the temperature graph in the diagram 
rather than numbers in a table to determine whether the temperature will be below the 
freezing point when he makes a decision about car driving. 
4.2 Weather dynamics are left out in quick decisions 
Although they were not used as starting point, maps/animations, verbal text forecasts, 
or both were used later in the decision process (Table 3). The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that in situations in which informants use maps/animations and 
verbal text forecasts, they are more likely to make elaborate decisions. The dynamics 
in the movement of precipitation is a likely reason for using the map/animation and for 
reading the verbal text forecast (Sivle et al., 2014). When not evaluating dynamics, 
weather is viewed as a static phenomenon, which in turn might ease the mental 
workload in the decision-making process. Disregarding the weather dynamics might 
be a way to reduce complexity or options in information when making quick decisions. 
The student Ruth said that she found tables more convenient than maps when planning 
for her hike because they appeared to be more specific and accurate by providing a 
forecast solely for her location. 
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The map and verbal text can hold information on causal relationships (e.g., between 
low air-pressure and rain), which make the information more intricate. Another 
hypothesis might therefore be that the map and/or verbal text forecast are found to be 
more demanding in interpretation by the informants than the tables and diagrams and 
are omitted for this reason. Kjersti found the map difficult to understand and did not 
use it. However, when making an important decision this information appears to be 
viewed as valuable and worth the struggle and is included in the process. The farmer 
Daniel evaluates verbal text forecasts when planning for haying, but not when 
planning for everyday car driving (Table 3). This observation indicates that the 
multiplicity of representations on weather websites is an advantage. Certain 
representations (e.g., tables and diagrams) give easy access to static information when 
making quick decisions; representations that provide more dynamic information and 
demand more interpretative work are included when the decision is important for the 
decision-maker. 
4.3 Forecast uncertainty is not evaluated in quick decisions 
None of the informants evaluated the degree of certainty in the forecast as a starting 
point when searching for a cue. Certain informants used the uncertainty information on 
Yr and/or made their own uncertainty evaluation, e.g., that the forecast is more 
uncertain for one week ahead than it is for tomorrow, later in the decision-making 
process (Table 3). Elaborate decisions were often made in these situations. Evaluating 
uncertainty requires the consideration of several hypothetical outcomes, which again 
requires heavy mental processing (Joslyn et al., 2009b). Leaving out this evaluation 
can therefore ease mental processing and reduce complex information to a simple 
outcome (Janis and Mann, 1977; Joslyn et al., 2009b).  
According to Joslyn et al. (2009b) many persons unconsciously leave out uncertainty 
information. Table 3 indicates that uncertainty information is consciously left out 
when weather conditions are favourable or far from the personally set criteria. 
Uncertainty is included when weather conditions are close to the criteria. When 
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making a decision about boat driving, Arvid evaluates the uncertainty if the forecast 
wind speed is force 6 or stronger but not when the wind speed is lower. 
Another possible hypothesis is that people know that the weather forecasts are 
uncertain (Morss et al., 2008) and unconsciously evaluate whether they can trust the 
forecast. This situation is similar to using intuition (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). When 
the forecast is far from their criteria, they rely on past experiences and recognition of 
similar situations and unconsciously evaluate it as sufficiently certain to rule out the 
chance for change in weather that will alter the decision. In such case, the user do not 
leave out information because it is mentally challenging but because there is no need 
for a further (conscious) evaluation, intuition take care of many routine decisions 
(Betsch and Glöckner, 2010). 
5. General discussion 
5.1 Summary: Information use in weather related decision-processes 
The informants wanted to perform certain activities being more or less weather-
dependent. They selected their preferred starting point, possibly based on their 
experience combined with personal preferences. If the forecast weather conditions 
were suitable for the activity or the activity was not judged important, they made a 
quick decision using little information. However, if the suitability of the weather 
conditions was less obvious or the activity was judged important (and its success 
weather dependent), a more deliberate decision-process with prolonged forecast usage 
was implemented. Based on the results, a possible hypothesis is that activity is more 
important than occupation, education, age, and residence with respect to the amount of 
forecast information used in weather-related decision-processes.   
Reducing the amount of information (number of criteria and cues) to reduce 
complexity in information when making a quick decision was observed both in this 
study and in prior works (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Betsch and Glöckner, 
2010). A new finding in this study is that the choice of starting point might be 
interpreted as a method for handling complexity in information. Leaving out 
evaluations of dynamics and forecast uncertainty were two other such methods. 
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Leaving out such information can ease the mental processes involved in decision-
making because fewer hypothetical outcomes must be evaluated. Another possible 
explanation is that the information used to describe the dynamics and uncertainty is 
more demanding and time-consuming to interpret than other information and is left out 
for that reason. The inclusion of dynamics and uncertainty also appears to be related to 
the suitability of the weather conditions of the day. If the weather conditions are 
obviously favourable or far from the criteria, the results suggest that there is less need 
to include this information. 
Affect and emotions, e.g. based on prior experiences, and also intuition, is likely to 
play a part of the decision-processes. This means that real-world decision-processes 
are more extensive than and not as structured as described in this study.  
5.2 Implications for communication of forecast information 
5.2.1 Forecast providers should take into account the needs of the forecast users 
According to the classical view on rationality, the use of economic cost-loss models is 
how decision-making should be performed (Shafir et al., 2000). In economic models 
the pros and cons of a large number of alternatives are compared in a throughout 
analysis. This means that in cases in which the informants in this study used a large 
amount of information, they acted close to this classical view of rationality. This study 
presents a description of information use in familiar everyday decision-making 
situations. In certain cases, informants used very little information and hence their 
actions differed from the classical view on rationality. When less information is 
required complexity is reduced (Betsch and Glöckner, 2010), which means that less 
cognitive work must be performed. Reducing complexity in information can save the 
decision-maker from confusion, delays, and wasted resources (Janis and Mann, 1977). 
Even if using little information and making quick decisions, the users state reasons for 
their choices and thus appear rational in the sense of bounded rationality, choosing a 
reasoned and apparently suitable strategy in each situation. This finding is in 
accordance with theories suggesting that individuals employ simple rules allowing 
them to reduce cognitive effort (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010) in situations with restricted 
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time and resources. In this study, the informants Siri and Geir said that the amount of 
time and information they used depended on the importance of the activity, and they 
only spent a long time on Yr if the activity was important. Others did not bother using 
the map (Lise) or reading the verbal text forecast (Marta) unless the activity was 
sufficiently important and if they had time for it. It was not rational for them to spend 
much time and effort on the decision; it was more rational to make a quick decision.  
A short visit is not necessarily related to quick decision processes. Instead, the short 
visit might be a component of prolonged use. The farmer Daniel typically spent 15 
minutes on Yr once a day when planning for haying. Later the same day he spent a 
relatively short time checking forecast updates several times. Some of the long visits to 
Yr might also be because information is found contradictory or difficult to understand 
(Sivle et al., 2014), and hence more time is needed before reaching a decision. Five 
informants occasionally visited Yr only because they were interested in knowing what 
the weather would be and not because they were planning to make a decision. A 
similar result was found by Lazo et al. (2009). These visits might make the users more 
experienced and spending less time researching the weather in future decision-making.  
Although lacking knowledge might lead to difficulties in interpreting weather forecast 
information (Sivle et al., 2014), diverging forecast usage is not necessarily related to a 
lack of knowledge or rationality. Many informants used different information amounts 
in different decision situations, suggesting that making quick decisions and not 
assessing forecast uncertainty is not an indication of lacking user rationality. There is 
mixed evidence whether quick or elaborate decisions are better or worse, and it might 
differ from situation to situation (Jain et al., 2013). Dilling and Lemos (2011) argue 
that usability is a function of how information is produced and provided and how it is 
needed in different situations. Successful communication typically involves interaction 
and iteration between (forecast) producers and users, and the end users should receive 
the information they need in a form that they can use (Fischhoff, 2013). The results 
from this study can aid science communication to value the perspective in which, for 
the information to be useful for a range of decision-making situations, the science 
communicator take into account the needs of the general public.   
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5.2.2 Information communicated in forecasts should enable different decision-
processes 
Many studies in weather-related decision-making are performed with limited and 
isolated forecast information (Section 1). In this study, informants instead used and 
combined several pieces of forecast information. Our results show that weather-related 
decision-making can consists of more than a cost-loss strategy, as indicated by Morss 
et al. (2010). At times, quick decisions using little information were made instead of 
elaborate decisions. In these situations forecast uncertainty was typically not 
considered. Arvid consciously left out an evaluation of forecast uncertainty when he 
was able to make a relatively quick decision about boat driving because forecast wind 
speed was lower than a certain threshold. Above this threshold he included uncertainty 
estimates and made a more elaborate analysis and decision (closer to a cost-loss 
strategy). 
The fact that certain informants used notably little information and only one or two 
preferred representations while others used various representations in their decision-
making, underscores the importance of using multiple representations in the forecasts 
(Sivle et al., 2014). If there are several representations to choose from (common 
between the top five weather sites), it is likely easier to adapt the type and amount of 
information to the actual decision-making situation. This requires that the different 
types of information communicate well enough to be used in decision-making 
situations of various complexities. For instance, provided with both deterministic and 
probabilistic forecast information the users can choose which information to use.  
6. Conclusions 
In this in-depth study the analysis reveal that the amount of information used by 17 
informants in weather-related decisions depends on the importance of the activity and 
on the suitability of the weather conditions of the day. These factors were found to be 
more important to them than occupation, education, age, and residence. In quick 
decision-processes the complexity in the information must be reduced to make a 
decision. In addition to choosing a preferred starting point, the informants 
204 
 
accomplished this by leaving out evaluations of weather dynamics and forecast 
uncertainty. However, the results suggest it is important to retain this information in 
weather reports as it was used in elaborate decision-processes. The informants used 
different information according to their own judgments of the needs of the situations, 
implying that forecast providers should take into account the range of needs of the 
forecast users. Based on these results, the information communicated in the forecasts 
should enable the use of different amounts of information such that it allows informed 
decision-making. A multiplicity of representations could therefore be favourable for 
the employment of different decision-making processes.  
However, some informants used very little information and made quick decision-
processes. This may indicate that the existing graphics appear overwhelming for 
certain users. Therefore, how to simplify and deliver bespoke weather information 
would be an interesting next study, not least in light of the increased use of weather 
applications (apps) on smartphones (e.g., Rutty and Andrey, 2014). 
To enable an in-depth analysis, this study includes a relatively small number of 
interviews, and only a small number of user groups are included. As the informants 
related to a real weather report, we believe the findings hold high validity. However, 
information from other informants, and decision-making in other contexts, might give 
additional findings and provide nuances to our findings. In addition, this study does 
not provide quantitative information on how often different decision-making patterns 
are used. Complementary studies are therefore needed in order to get a more 
comprehensive picture of lay-people’s decision-making processes when using online 
weather information for deciding on everyday activities. 
The informants in this study sometimes left out evaluations of forecast uncertainty; 
thus, it appears that additional research is also required to understand how forecast 
providers should communicate uncertainty information to users. An interesting 
research question is what happens if forecast providers in some situations solely 
provide probabilistic weather information. This might be tempting since there are 
experimental evidences that providing laypeople with uncertainty information can be 
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beneficial for their decision-making (e.g., Roulston et al., 2006), and it is thinkable 
that probabilistic information can reduce forecast providers` risk of legal action against 
them compared to deterministic information. Will end users adapt and make more 
informed quick decisions, and hence benefit from the information? Will they instead 
be forced to use elaborate strategies in situations where they previously used quick 
strategies, and thus perhaps make more informed decisions but spend more time? Will 
some persons be incapable of making a decision at all and suffer from probabilistic 
information being provided? Existing studies give no answers to these questions. It is 
necessary to find forms of presentation for uncertainty information that allow for both 
quick and more elaborate decision-processes. 
New research should explore how laypeople that make similar types of quick and 
elaborate decisions would use a forecasting parameter that is conveyed 
deterministically and probabilistically. It is necessary to carry out this research in such 
a way that task and restrictions are adapted to real-life quick decision-making 
processes. At minimum, normal user situations should be mimicked to allow both 
quick and more elaborate processes. For example, the decision-making should be 
performed with and without time restrictions and in the contexts of different activities 
and weather conditions. Future research should also consider the influence on 
intuition, affect, and emotions on the decision-processes. 
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Supporting information (Paper 2) 
The interviews were centred on printouts of one particular forecast from Yr consisting 
of four printed pages with different information/time-scales. Whereas the hour-by-hour 
page is shown in Figure 1, Figures S1, S2, and S3 show segments of forecasts and 
uncertainty information from the three other pages of the web-service www.Yr.no (Yr) 
used in the interviews (The forecasts are in Norwegian language since this are the 
actual forecasts used in the interviews). 
 
Figure S1: Segment of the front page of the web-service www.Yr.no (Yr). Forecast is in 




Figure S2: Segment of the overview forecast page of the web-service www.Yr.no (Yr). 





Figure S3: Segment of the long-term forecast page of the web-service www.Yr.no (Yr). 
Forecast is in Norwegian language since this is the actual forecast used in the interviews. 
 
 

